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National Innovation Systems (NISs) are a source of considerable policy interest, 
especially when used to enhance nations’ innovative capacity and competitiveness. The 
study develops a framework for assessing the status and performance of NISs based on 
concepts of policy adoption, implementation, and evaluation. The study then examines 
the case of Thailand, which is building its national innovative capacity using the NIS 
approach. The issues relevant to Thailand’s NIS are reviewed and the assessment 
framework is applied. A comprehensive model of the Thai NIS is also conceptualized, 
and recommendations for Thai innovation policy are made. These recommendations 
include minimizing conflicts in resource allocation, incentivizing private sector 
innovation, encouraging universities’ participation in the NIS, and rationalizing the 
public sector components. Based on these policy recommendations, the study offers a 
“country-specific” framework for assessing the status and performance of Thailand’s 
NIS. It is shown that the NIS is a sophisticated yet useful approach to encouraging 
innovation in the economy. Both commonality and uniqueness exist in developing and 
individual country NIS, therefore each country has to acknowledge these factors and 
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With globalization, the pace of international economic integration has accelerated 
during the last two decades through innovations in communications, information 
processing, and other advanced technologies. Thomas Friedman (2005) refers to 
globalization as a process that is “shrinking and flattening the world” (p. 11). One of the 
important characteristics of globalization has been the reduction of domestic impediments 
that expose actors
1
 at national and sub-national levels to the pressures of economic 
competition at the international level. These conditions make it increasingly inevitable for 
actors to seek the most innovative technologies and methods of working in order to 
compete globally.  
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), innovation is now the key driver for economic growth in developed countries, 
with at least 50% of growth directly attributable to it (OECD, 2005). Innovation is the act 
of bringing something new into use, including a new product, process, or method of 
production. These trends now mean that the creation and exploitation of innovation and 
an understanding of the processes that stimulate it are fundamental to nations’ economic 
growth, development, and social welfare (Kayal, 2008; OECD, 2005).  
Figure 1.1 below presents countries’ rankings in global competitiveness matched 
with rankings of their capacity for innovation. Several countries, including Denmark, 
                                                 
1
 Actors refer to enterprises and firms, their clients and suppliers, universities and centers of productivity, 
research institutes, government and standard-setting bureaus, and banks (OECD, 1997b). 
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Finland, Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United 
States are among the top performers in both categories. These countries are typified by 
conditions that are conducive for advanced technology development, such as high levels 
of investment in research and development (R&D) activities, often as much as 2% of 
GDP.  
Figure 1.1 Competitiveness and Capacity 
for Innovation Ranking of Selected Countries 
 
Source:  Based on World Bank, 2009 (for capacity for innovation ranking) and WEF, 2010 (for 
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Many of these leading countries take a holistic approach to encouraging modern 
technological innovation in their economies through the implementation of strategic 
public policies. The “National Innovation System (NIS)” is a conceptual framework used 
by many of these countries for developing policies that coordinate and stimulate 
innovative activities in the economy (EU, 1995; OECD, 1997a; OECD, 1997b). The NIS 
approach holds that the process of technological innovation is enhanced with the 
interaction of public and private institutions and the coordination of relevant policies, 
incentives, and initiatives (Edquist, 1997; Freeman, 1982; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; 
Smith, 1997). 
The innovation system approach takes the view that private firms are the primary 
innovators in the economy. Innovating firms undertake R&D activities in pursuit of 
“new-to-the-world” products and processes for markets and/or for internal use. However, 
firms also face the risk that innovative efforts might not turn out as they intended or that 
or their benefits may spill over to others. Firms therefore face disincentives to 
undertaking innovative activities.  
To help in the innovative process, government can play an important role. 
Government can stimulate technological innovation in firms by providing supportive 
institutions and rules, targeted incentives, R&D collaboration and investment, and a 
coordinating infrastructure. Measures such as these can be incorporated in a systemic 
approach, which government can use to create an environment that is conducive for 




Statement of the Problem 
The systemic approach to the promotion of innovation in the economy has gained 
popularity in both developed and developing countries. Governments around the world 
are aware that countries pursuing a systemic innovation development strategy have 
technological advances and a competitive edge. Therefore, several countries are adopting 
the NIS approach in an attempt to repeat these same successes. This is the idea of “policy 
diffusion” and “best practice.” Moreover, the OECD, which promotes international 
standards and best practices for economic development policy, has promoted the NIS 
concept among both its member and non-member countries.
2
  
For policymakers in developing countries, however, the adoption of the NIS as a 
policy framework may pose challenges. Developing countries often lack the scientific 
and technological foundation and the institutional components necessary to close 
innovation development gaps through the NIS approach (Shulin, 1999). Studies of NIS 
implementation in developing countries have therefore focused on facilitating NIS “best 
practices” as well as identifying “country-specific” aspects. This may require the design 
and implementation of NIS to be based more on domestic needs, capabilities, structures, 
and intuitions instead of “one-size-fits-all” international standards (Intarakumnerd, 2007; 
Kayal, 2008; OECD, 2005; Shulin, 1999).  
From these experiences, national-level policymakers, especially those in 
developing countries, need a solid understanding of the NIS concept. Critical questions 
emerge for policymakers in evaluating the potential of the NIS. What are the necessary 





components of a fully-functioning NIS? How should NIS be structured and implemented 
in a given country? What criteria should policymakers use in determining the status of the 
NIS and how can the status and performance of the NIS be assessed? Few governments, 
even in developed countries, appear to have established systematic evaluation 
mechanisms for innovation policies. A framework for making a comprehensive 
assessment of the NIS approach could be particularly helpful to developing-nation 
policymakers.  
To demonstrate how an assessment framework can be created and applied in a 
developing country context, a detailed case study of the NIS of Thailand is presented. 
Thailand is in the “efficiency-driven” or “investment-driven” stage of economic growth, 
and is in the process of transitioning to upper-middle-income status (WEF, 2010). To 
compete successfully with other countries and move into the “innovation-driven” stage, 
Thailand must build capacity to absorb complex technologies, accelerate productivity 
through innovation, and develop and commercialize new products (Brimble, 2003, p. 
340; USAID, 2011; WEF, 2010). Since 2008, Thailand has been formally consolidating 
its policy to enhance the nation’s competitiveness by encouraging innovation in firms 
under the NIS concept. Applying the assessment framework to the Thailand case helps to 
show: (1) why the country adopted the NIS approach; (2) the specifics of the system 
including its history, structure, and function; and (3) ways of evaluating the overall 
performance of the system in terms of fostering innovation. Moreover, perspectives of 
key government officials involved in Thailand’s NIS, gathered through interviews, 
compliment the assessment. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The above questions demonstrate the need for a comprehensive analysis of the 
NIS approach. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to develop a broad framework for 
assessing NIS which will investigate several key issues. First, an understanding of the 
NIS concept itself is required. What are the basic concepts of the NIS approach for 
encouraging innovation and what are the fundamental components of a system? Second, a 
comprehensive assessment should address the rationale for the adoption of the NIS 
approach. What motivates policy selection and what are the goals the policy is intended 
to address? Third, the assessment must investigate real-world organizational and 
institutional practices involved in designing and implementing the system. Finally, a 
comprehensive NIS assessment should provide guidance on ways to determine its 
effectiveness. Once NIS is adopted and implemented, how can its performance be 
measured? How do we know the system is working? 
The following chapters develop and apply a framework for NIS assessment. In 
Chapter 2 the study reviews the scholarly literature on the role of technology in the 
economy, technological innovation, and the theoretical underpinning of NISs. Chapter 3 
reviews relevant literature on the adoption and diffusion of public policy, and policy and 
program implementation and evaluation. It also presents three cases of NIS in innovation-
leading countries, Finland, Korea, and Singapore, and reviews the techniques and 
measurements recommended by the OECD, the World Bank, and the World Economic 
Forum for evaluating countries’ innovative performance. Chapter 4 presents and 
discusses the methods used in this study and includes the fully-formed NIS assessment 
7 
 
framework. Chapter 5 provides a case study of Thailand focusing on relevant economic 
development trends and the formulation of science and technology policy including the 
country’s NIS program. Chapter 6 provides an assessment of Thailand’s NIS 
performance based upon a number of assessment criteria adapted to the Thailand case. As 
a result, the impediments to innovation in Thailand become clear, and policy 
recommendations to address these impediments are discussed. Finally, Chapter 7 
summarizes the study, presents a “country-specific” assessment framework for 






INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE NIS 
 
In the global economy, technology, innovation, and national economic progress 
have become closely connected. It has been widely mentioned that technological 
innovation is an important source of competitiveness, economic development, and 
prosperity (Kayal, 2008; OECD, 2005; Roos, Fernstrom, & Gupta, 2005). It is said that 
“if you don’t have innovation, you have nothing.”
3
  
This chapter begins developing an assessment of NIS by addressing several key 
points. First, the idea of innovation and its place in the economy is presented. Next, the 
role of government in encouraging innovation for economic development is discussed. 
The concepts of the systemic approach to innovation and the evolution of the NIS idea 
are then presented. Finally, the need for developing countries to catch up in the global 
economy and the possibility that NIS can assist this process is noted.  
Technology and Innovation 
Technology is a process or technique embodied in products, designs, 
manufacturing, or service provision which transforms inputs of labor, material, capital, 
information, and energy into outputs which are distributed to the market by firms 
(Burgelman, Christensen, & Wheelwright, 2004; Christensen & Bower, 2004). Firms 
adopting and exploiting the same technology can be grouped into industries, for example 
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 Mandel, M. (2001, February 16). Obama’s innovation push: Has US really fallen off the cutting edge? 




the automobile industry or the pharmaceuticals industry. Emerging technologies can 
create new industries when a technology embedded in a new product progresses from 
entering the market to growing, maturing, and ultimately declining from the market 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). This process is referred to as the technology life cycle or 
the product life cycle.  
Innovation is the act of bringing something new into use. This definition of 
innovation is differentiated from the idea of “invention,” which is the act of bringing 
something new into being. In commercial or industrial applications, an innovation is a 
new product, process, or method of production. In organizational terms, innovation can 
mean the process of generating and implementing new ideas (Mohr, 1969; Rogers, 1995; 
Schumpeter, 1934; Smith-Doerr, Manev, & Rizova, 2004; Tidd, 2002).   
Technology is often viewed as an integral part of innovation. Many examples of 
technological innovations can be identified, such as the first microprocessors or digital 
cameras, which were new products based on new technologies. The MP3 player is also 
considered an innovation because it was a new product based on existing technologies. 
Using GPS for tracking transportation and delivery is an example of an innovative 
process. Introducing new management systems such as supply-chain management or 
quality-management systems is an organizational innovation (OECD, 2005). 
This study views innovation primarily as the generation and implementation of 
new ideas that involve new technologies. However, innovation dealing with non 




The Role of Technological Innovation in the Economy 
Successful technological innovation has been described as the creation of value 
through transforming new knowledge and technologies into products and services for 
national and global markets (IBM, 2004). Increasingly higher rates of innovation 
contribute to economic growth in a pattern described as a “cycle of innovation” 
(Schumpeter, 1939) or “innovation waves.”  
Figure 2.1 Innovation Waves 
 
 




Figure 2.1 above shows that through time individual innovation waves introduce 
new technologies and therefore set up the following wave by stimulating new innovation 
opportunities. This ripple effect of continued innovation enables further economic growth 
by creating more technological advance, markets, business development, spinoff products 
and firms, jobs, and continued innovation. 
Potential increases in productivity in an economy are seen by some to be heavily 
influenced by technological innovation and technological learning (Koh, 2006; OECD, 
2005). National economic growth is viewed as a progression through “stages” of 
technological change and expanded productivity.
4
 Three stages of economic growth have 
become well-known: (1) the factor-driven stage of growth, (2) the investment-driven (or 
efficiency-driven) stage of growth, and (3) the innovation-driven stage of growth (Koh, 
2006; WEF, 2010). 
Countries in the factor-driven growth stage produce commodities based on natural 
endowments and low cost labor or very simple products designed by others. Typically, 
firms in these countries compete through resource extraction, assembly, or simple 
manufacturing. Moreover, productivity and wages are typically low. Technological 
learning comes from imitation, imported technology, and foreign investment (Koh, 2006; 
WEF, 2010).  
In the investment-driven growth stage, countries emphasize accumulating 
technological, physical, and human capital. Physical infrastructure and economic 
regulations are improved, and investment incentives are offered.  Foreign investment and 
                                                 
4
 See Rostow (1959) as one well-known example of this literature. 
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technology flows more easily into countries in the investment-driven stage. Domestic 
technological improvements are also facilitated. Science and technology policy 
emphasizes applied research, and productivity increases through efficiency gains (Koh, 
2006; WEF, 2010).  
Figure 2.2 Stages of Growth and the Global Technology Frontier 
           
        
            
            
         
Source: Based on WEF, 2010  
Finally, countries in the innovation-driven stage of growth place emphasis on 
R&D, entrepreneurship, and innovation. These countries create new knowledge and new 










firms to produce innovative products using state-of-the-art processes. Science and 
technology policy emphasizes basic research and significant investment in R&D is made 
by the public and private sectors. Science-based learning and the ability to shift rapidly to 
new technologies are significant to competitiveness in the innovation-driven stage (Koh, 
2006; WEF, 2010). 
Figure 2.2 above shows countries’ progress through these economic growth stages 
toward the “global technology frontier.” Moving from stage to stage involves 
transitioning from a technology importing economy; which relies on endowments, 
infrastructure, capital accumulation, and technology imitation; to a technology generating 
economy. This means that the country is innovating at the global technology frontier in 
some sectors (Koh, 2006; Porter, Sachs, & MacArthur, 2001; WEF, 2010). 
The Role of Government in Promoting Innovation 
Previously, innovation was thought of as a linear process where science, human 
capital, fiscal capital, and R&D were the inputs; and innovation was the output. In today 
with intense and complex global competitiveness, however, a simple linear process for 
creating innovation is not sufficiently productive. In developed countries, improvements 
to innovation performance means enhanced competitiveness at the global level. In 
developing countries, improved innovation creates the potential to compete after first 
catching up.  
Countries are now taking control of innovation by imposing a systemic approach 
to the process. In the systems approach to the process of innovation, government plays a 
key role because of the public goods aspects of innovation itself. According to Brimble 
14 
 
(2003), the investments in human resources and R&D needed for innovation are 
indivisible and the returns may not be seen until the long term (p. 342). Under these 
conditions, markets will have difficulty efficiently allocating the resources required for 
innovation. The process of innovation also contains risks. It involves R&D under 
uncertainty, where outputs may not yield the expected benefit. It also includes spinoffs 
and externalities where the benefits that are created may spill out from the innovating 
firm. Because of these circumstances, firms may underinvest in innovation and R&D and 
levels of innovation will be lower than society would prefer.  
The above discussion provides a rationale for government involvement to 
promote innovation. As Kenneth Arrow (1962) pointed out, the market for innovation can 
fail due to the existence of externalities and spillovers related to the nature of 
information, which is what Arrow sees as the key commodity involved in innovation. 
These external effects are uncertainty, inappropriability, and the indivisibility of 
innovation. Uncertainty means there will be risks involved with innovation, 
inappropriability means innovators may not be able to capture the full benefits of their 
innovations, and indivisibility means an innovation is non-rival because the quantity 
available does not diminish with use.  
Because of these characteristics, the market on its own will not supply a socially 
optimal level of research and innovation. Government often intervenes in the market to 
correct market failures and also to provide public goods and protecting property rights.  
Government’s reason for intervening in the market with respect to innovation therefore is 
to correct the market failures inherent in research, information, and innovation.  
15 
 
Table 2.1 Public Policy Effects on Innovation 
Policy Effects on Innovation 
R&D funding R&D funding impacts scientific direction and production of scientists and 
engineers.  
R&D funding supports innovation infrastructure of universities, research 
centers, federal labs, and industry research.  
R&D funding supports pre-competitive collaboration, small 
manufacturers, and tech-based start-ups.  
Public R&D goals and administrative procedures can conflict and misalign 
with private sector goals, expectations, and management requirements. 
Technology 
transfer   
Technology transfer impacts the incentive for industry-university 
collaboration and rate of knowledge flow to innovators. 
Human 
resource policy 
Federal education and training programs, education subsidies and research 
funds to support universities are a determinant of the supply of qualified 
workers needed for scientific research, development and 
commercialization of innovation. 
Tax policy A policy provides R&D incentive.  
Rate of depreciation affects transfer of knowledge embedded in new 
capital.  
A policy provides level of incentives for consumers to adopt innovation. 
Standards Standards can facilitate platform technologies, including internet, 
computing systems, and software.  
Standards can also function as a barrier to technical change and can 
restrict markets. 
Procurement Government can stimulate market and standards development through 
large scale aggregation.  
Design specifications can restrict introduction of new technologies. 
Antitrust Antitrust can encourage industry innovation collaboration and new market 
entrants.  
Antitrust can delay innovation introduction. 
Intellectual 
property (IP) 
IP acts as incentive for innovators.  
IP can restrict entry of competitors.  
IP protection can be weak globally, reducing return to innovation. 
Market access Choice and access to foreign markets, export conditions and foreign direct 
investment influence market potential, risk and growth.  





Political pressures add to protectionist risks, constraints on global 
investment, domestic purchasing provisions, employment transition costs, 
and higher skill standards. 
 




Government can act to overcome these circumstances and help to manage the 
risks of innovation for firms. Government can encourage innovation with policies that 
define and enforce rights so that benefits of innovation can be captured by firms; provide 
incentives to encourage R&D in firms; assist in the incubation of new innovative firms; 
help to modernize technology in existing production facilities; build technology centers; 
and increase the supply of technologists, scientists, and engineers through university 
programs and other related policies (Atkinson, 1993; Eisinger, 1988; Lugar, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1987). Table 2.1 above notes these public policy measures and 
their potential effects on innovation. 
NIS: Historical Background 
Implementing the policies above requires understanding the relationship between 
technological innovation, industry, firms, R&D, and government. Various ideas have 
evolved over time concerning the best way for countries to facilitate these relationships to 
undertake innovation in their economies. The NIS approach has evolved from these 
trends of thinking. The most fundamental of these ideas is the linear model of innovation, 
mentioned above.   
Similar to the linear model, neoclassical growth theory sees innovation as the 
result of market forces in perfect competition, in which information and knowledge are 
equivalent commodities and automatically diffused at no cost. Firms have full 
information and similar technology. The optimal level of innovation is achieved when 




Although some countries achieved levels of innovativeness and economic growth 
by implementing policies based on the linear model and neoclassical growth theory, in 
other countries innovation and economic development lagged. For these countries, 
endogenous growth theory addressed some issues absent in the earlier theories. In this 
theory, investments; capital accumulation; and incentives for R&D, the education system, 
and entrepreneurship determine long term economic growth (Romer, 1990). Emphasizing 
these factors leads to the view that innovative performance can be shaped by the 
institutional make-up of the economic system.  
The systemic approach to innovation is more integrated with economic policies. 
This means that the flows of technology and information among people, enterprises, and 
institutions are the key to the innovative process. The systemic approach puts emphasis 
on the role of system-specific institutional factors that encourage innovation and 
technological change (Edquist, 2001; Lundvall, 1992; OECD, 1999). It shows how the 
components for fostering innovation are connected to each other, the system, and the 
environment. In this way, strengths and weaknesses in the system can be revealed. As 
Aronson (1997) notes, 
Systems thinking . . . can play a key role in producing the understanding of 
the overall system needed to target innovation efforts more effectively (it) 
does so by providing a methodology and a set of tools for constructing 
maps of systems and determining the points at which change can have the 
greatest impact on . . . performance (p. 1).  
 
With this new paradigm, innovation is the result of the complex set of 
relationships among actors in the system, including enterprises and firms, their clients 
and suppliers, universities and centers of productivity, research institutes, government 
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bureaus, and banks (OECD, 1997a). These actors comprise a system that contributes to 
innovation in a country. Actors and the linkages that connect them are the important 
components of the innovation systems approach when viewed at the national level. 
Moreover, policies conducive to innovation are also essential. The so-called National 
Innovation System (NIS) operates at this broadest level (Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, 
Silverberg, & Soete, 1988; Edquist, 1997; Feinson, 2003; Freeman, 1987; Lundvall 1992; 
Nelson, 1993; Niosi, 2002).  
Freeman (1987) states that an NIS is “the network of institutions in the public and 
private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies” (p. 1). Its key features are the organization of R&D and production in 
firms, inter-firm relationships, the role of government, and the interactions among these 
(Freeman, 2004). Lundvall (1988) focuses on the design of innovation-supporting 
institutions and the process of technological learning. Nelson (1987) focuses on the role 
of private firms, government, and universities in the production of new technology within 
the NIS. Edquist (1997) considers the innovation system most broadly by examining all 
important actors and interactions in economic, social, political, organizational, and 
institutional realms with influence on the development, diffusion, and use of innovations. 
Components of a “Good” NIS 
With the theoretical basis for NIS described above, what does an NIS look like 
and what is it supposed to do? A well-functioning NIS should produce several important 
outputs, including: (1) the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, products, processes, 
and technological opportunities; (2) innovation resources, including fiscal capital, 
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financing options, a competent labor force, and supportive educational structures; (3) 
guidance for technology, market, and partner research; (4) networking and linkages for 
knowledge exchange; (5) facilities, equipment, and administrative support; (6) research 
and development; and (7) rules and regulations that enhance market access and protect 
innovators’ rights (Edquist, 2001; Feinson, 2003).  
To produce the outputs described above, some fundamental components of the 
NIS are required. Recent studies have attempted to demonstrate the necessary elements in 
the NIS concept and their effectiveness (e.g. Kayal, 2008; Kuhlman & Arnold, 2001; 
OECD, 1997b; OECD, 1999; Speirs, Pearson, & Foxson, 2007). From these studies, two 
models of NIS format are reviewed: the Innovation Policy Terrain Model and the Generic 
Model.  
Innovation Policy Terrain Model 
The “Oslo Manual” is one of the guideline documents developed by the OECD 
for analyzing innovation (OECD, 1997b; OECD, 2005). The manual examines factors 
that contribute to the innovative capacity of firms and groups them into four domains: (1) 
framework conditions, (2) the science and engineering base, (3) transfer factors, and (4) 
the innovation dynamo. Together these domains are referred to as the Innovation Policy 
Terrain Model (OECD, 1997b). They are presented in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.2 below.  
Framework conditions compose the larger environment that surrounds the 
innovating firm, including: (1) the educational system; (2) transportation and 
communication infrastructure; (3) financial institutions; (4) the legislative and economic 
setting, including patent laws, taxation, corporate governance rules, and trade policy; (5) 
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market accessibility, including market size, access, and customer relations; and (6) 
industry structure and the competitive environment, including the existence of supplier 
firms.  
The science and engineering base provides knowledge and skills to support 
innovation and includes: (1) technical training systems, (2) the university system, (3) 
support for basic research, and (4) various R&D activities. 
Figure 2.3 Innovation Policy Terrain Model 
 





Table 2.2 Innovation Policy Terrain Model 
Components Description 
Framework conditions Basic educational system 
Communication infrastructure 
Financial institutions 
Legislative and macro-economic settings 
Market accessibility 
Industry structure and competitive environment 
Innovation dynamo Market strategy 
R&D 
Non-R&D 
Science and engineering base Technical training system 
University system 
Basic research 
Public good R&D activities 
Strategic R&D activities 
Direct innovation support 
Transfer factors Linkages between innovating units 
Technological expert 
International links 
Mobility of expert technologists 
Access to public R&D 
Spin-off company formation 
Trust and openness 
Codified knowledge 
 
Source: Based on OECD, 1997b  
Transfer factors include: (1) formal and informal linkages between firms, such as 
user-supplier relationships, industry clusters and networks of firms, regulatory agencies, 
and research institutions; (2) technological “gatekeepers,” i.e. individuals who are up to 
date on technological innovations and facilitate the flow of knowledge; (3) networks of 
international experts; (4) mobility of expert technologists/scientists; (5) access to public 
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R&D capabilities; (6) the formation of spin-off companies; (7) ethics, value systems, and 
trust; and (8) codified knowledge through patents and publications in scientific journals.  
The innovation dynamo is the set of factors that shape the firm’s innovative 
capacity, including: (1) strategic decisions about which markets to serve or create 
innovation for; (2) basic research, strategic research, and product concept development; 
and (3) other factors, such as opportunity identification, production facility development, 
capital investment and technical information, patent rights, human skills, and 
management systems (OECD, 1997b; Speirs et al., 2007). 
Generic Model 
The OECD also presents a more specified model of system components called the 
Generic Model, focusing more on the innovating firm and its interactions in the national 
system of supporting institutions (Kuhlman & Arnold, 2001; OECD, 1999). The 
components of the model emphasize the market and non-market knowledge interactions 
between firms, institutions, and other human resources involved in a national system 
(Speirs et al., 2007). These are presented in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 below.  
The Generic Model highlights the importance of six components necessary for 
innovation. Demand includes the need for innovations on the part of consumers and other 
producers in the economy. The industrial system is all sizes of firms in the economy, 
including large companies, SMEs, and new technology-based firms. Intermediaries are 
research institutes and other brokers of information or knowledge, such as government 
agencies. The education and research system includes higher education, job skills 
training initiatives, and also research conducted by public sector organizations. The 
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political system involves the government and its policies, especially those that involve 
science, technology, and innovation policy. Infrastructure includes standards and norms, 
venture capital, intellectual property rights, and other supporting structures for potentially 
innovating firms. These components all interact within broad framework conditions, 
which include fiscal and tax policy, worker mobility rules, and other incentives that affect 
the occurrence of firms’ innovation. 
Figure 2.4 Generic Model of NIS Components 
 






Table 2.3 Generic Model of NIS Components 
Components Description 
Framework conditions Financial environment 
Taxation and Incentives 
Propensity to innovations and entrepreneurship 
Mobility 
Demand Final consumers 
Intermediate producers 
Industrial system Large companies 
Mature SMEs 
New technology-based firms 
Intermediaries Research institutes 
Brokers 
Education and research system Professional education and training 
Higher education and research 
Public sector research 
Political system Government 
Governance 
Science, technology, and innovation policies 
Infrastructure Banking and venture capital 
Intellectual property and information 
Innovation and business support 
Standards and norms 
 
Source:  Based on Kuhlman & Arnold, 2001  
The Innovation Policy Terrain Model and the Generic Model suggest the main 
necessary components of a well-functioning NIS that can produce many, if not all, of the 
desired outputs reviewed earlier. These components can be placed into three broad 
categories: innovators, linkages, and environment as illustrated in Figure 2.5 below as a 
conceptual model of NIS. Innovators in the NIS include: (1) innovating firms; and (2) 
public, private, and academic institutes involved in technological R&D and innovation. 
The linkages in the NIS include, for example: (1) industrial clusters; (2) organizations that 
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Figure 2.5 Conceptual Model of NIS 
 
 
assist potential innovators in accessing opportunities and knowledge, such as research 
councils or technology transfer offices; (3) business, scientific, and academic 
conferences, and other forums for knowledge exchange; and (4) government agencies 
that set goals and directions and provide funding in support of firm innovation. The 
environment component refers to the playing field on which innovators interact through 
linkages. It includes, for example: (1) incentives for innovation such as taxes and 
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subsidies, (2) rules and regulations governing market access and the use and mobility of 
innovation capital, (3) regimes for securing intellectual property, and (4) important public 
services, such as a supportive educational and human resource development system.  
NIS as a Means of Focusing on Innovation for Developing Countries 
The NIS is seen as a framework for organizing and coordinating policies that 
stimulate innovation in a nation’s economy. Using NIS, countries no longer use a linear 
input-output process to achieve innovation. The advantage of the NIS approach is the 
systemic view that it takes of innovators, linkages, and the environment in the economy.  
The remainder of this chapter concerns developing countries and NIS. These 
countries were noted earlier as most in need of an assessment of NIS status and 
performance. Is NIS a means for developing countries to effectively participate in the 
global economy? And what are the benefits to developing countries of this participation?  
By participating in the global economy, developing countries can take advantage 
of international and domestic economic opportunities. In the global economy, developing 
countries have the opportunity to supply goods and services to the global marketplace, 
which can create growth in export sectors. They also have the opportunity to acquire 
goods and services from the global marketplace, which can provide valued imports to 
producers and consumers. Finally, participation in the global economy means developing 
countries can attract investments of global capital, which can lead to increased 
employment and business development opportunities (Wolf, 2005, p. 3). 
Developing countries can also create domestic opportunities for themselves by 
participating in the global economy. As Wolf (2004) notes “. . . the determinants of 
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economic success are predominantly if not overwhelmingly domestic” (p. 5). These 
determinants are the capacity of the state to supply the needed conditions for a market 
economy (Wolf, 2004, p. 5). Friedman (1999) describes this as the “hardware,” 
“software,” and “operating system” of good economic governance (p. 150-153). Effective 
participation in the global economy requires adjustments to economic and governing 
policies. For developing countries, these may include making the economy more open 
through structural adjustments, securing property rights, implementing appropriate 
regulatory oversight, and conforming to international standards.  
Positive externalities are associated with these adjustments because they prepare a 
country for participation in the global economy, and also enhance domestic economic 
performance and governance. Friedman (2005) states, 
More open and competitive markets are the only sustainable vehicle for 
growing a nation out of poverty, because they are the only guarantee that 
new ideas, technologies, and best practices will easily flow into your 
country and that private enterprises, and even government, will have the 
competitive incentive and flexibility to adopt those new ideas and turn 
them into jobs and products (p. 399). 
 
Friedman’s comments indicate the benefits to developing countries of acquiring 
knowledge and technology from the global economy. Without sufficient domestic 
capabilities, a country is unlikely to benefit from this knowledge and runs the risk of 
continuously lagging behind. “Upgrading” the economy through technological innovation 
can better position a developing country to catch up and compete in the global economy 





Many of the developing countries will have to move from natural resource 
extraction economies to knowledge-based ventures that add value to these 
resources. All these changes require a shift in public policy . . . Domestic 
innovation will not be possible without access to international markets; 
access to international markets will not be possible without technological 
innovation (p. 638).  
  
Without innovation, developing countries can become trapped in lower growth 
stages, and opportunities for economic development are unlikely to emerge. Developing 
countries are increasingly aware of these circumstances so creating and managing 
technology and innovation is a prime concern. Chen and Dahlman (2005) note,  
There are many ways for developing countries to avoid reinventing the 
wheel and tap into, adopt, and adapt technical knowledge that was created 
in other developed countries. Therefore a key element of a developing 
country’s innovation strategy is to find the best ways to tap into the 
growing global knowledge base and decide where and how to deploy its 
domestic R&D capability (p. 7).  
 
For developing countries, the NIS could be a part of the adjustment and upgrading 
process described above. Moreover, the NIS can help these countries to innovate and 
move to higher stages of economic growth. 
Finally, a study of national innovation policy in a rapidly industrializing Southeast 
Asian country would not be complete without a discussion of the Flying Geese model of 
Asian development. The Flying Geese model is a set of interconnected concepts about the 
pattern of national industrial and technological development that also includes spillover 
effects for international economic development. According to its originator, the Japanese 
economist Kaname Akamatsu, 
the wild-geese-flying pattern of industrial development denotes the 
development after the less-advanced country’s economy enters into an 
international economic relationship with the advanced countries 




Akamatsu originally developed the theory in the 1930s to explain the process of 
development and “catch-up” in Japanese industry. The work was published in English in 
the 1960s. More recently, the Flying Geese model has been used to explain industrial 
development experienced in other East Asian economies during the post-war period 
(Kojima, 2000).  
The theory includes three models of industrial and technological development: An 
intra-industry development model, an inter-industry development model, and a regional 
development model (Kojima, 2000). In the first model, intra-industry development occurs 
by (1) importing foreign goods from more advanced countries, (2) domestic learning and 
adaptation to produce similar goods to compete in local markets with the imported goods, 
and (3) efficient mass production of goods that can be exported to foreign markets. 
Government assists this process by taxing imported foreign goods during the period when 
domestic industries are learning to produce the goods themselves (Akamatsu, 1961, 
1962). Akamatsu noticed that the growth curves for the three stages of industrial 
development took on an inverted V-shape and looked like a flock of geese flying in 
formation, so he named the theory accordingly.  
In the second model, inter-industry development occurs when producers first 
master production in more labor-intensive, less technologically-demanding industries. 
After this period, producers “graduate” to higher-order industries that require more 
advanced skills and technology. Value is added and comparative advantage is gained with 
each shift to more advanced industries (Kasahara, 2004). In Japan, the inter-industry 
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development sequence can be seen in the progression from textiles, to chemicals, to iron 
and steel, to automobiles, and to electronics (Kwan, 1996).   
Akamatsu’s third model in the Flying Geese theory focuses on regional industrial 
development and gained attention during the 1980s and 1990s as a conceptual framework 
for explaining the catching-up process in East Asia (Kasahara, 2004). The third flying 
geese model follows the transfer of industries from the leading economy in the region, 
Japan, to the lesser-developed, follower economies of the region. As Japan continued to 
pursue more advanced, higher value-added industrial production, it abandoned less 
advanced industries. However, to the follower economies, the industries Japan had left 
behind were more advanced. Adoption of these industries by the followers helped to 
stimulate their own industrial and technological development.  
Viewed in this way, the economic development of the entire region resembled the 
flying geese pattern, with Japan as the “lead goose,” and the “follower geese” formed into 
three tiers behind. The first tier behind the leader is composed of the countries referred to 
as the “newly-industrialized economies (NIEs),” including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore. The next tier is composed of a core group of countries in the 
Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. Finally, the last tier is composed of the least developed 








. . . with regard to this sequence . . . the underdeveloped nations are 
aligned successively behind the advanced industrial nations in the order of 
their different stages of growth in a wild-geese-flying pattern (Akamatsu, 
1961, p.208). The less advanced . . . geese are chasing those ahead of 
them, some gradually and others rapidly, following the course of industrial 
development . . . the advanced . . . geese . . . are flying in the lead onward, 
incessantly achieving technological innovations . . . (Akamatsu, 1962, 
p.17-18). 
 
Figure 2.6 below depicts the hierarchy of the East Asian economies described in 
the third Flying Geese model. As this figure is based on earlier applications of the model, 
it is important to note that, today, China would not be considered a Fourth tier goose. At 
the time of this writing, China’s industrial development has become increasingly more 
sophisticated. As such, it could be argued that China currently fits into at least the Third 
tier in the region. 
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The textile industry appears to follow the sequence of third Flying Geese model, 
beginning in Japan and then moving to each of the three follower tiers in succession. 
More recently, mass production of textiles has mainly occurred in Third and Fourth tier 
countries such as the Philippines, China, and Vietnam (Kwan, 1996). Japan remains the 
regional leader in more advanced industries such as automobiles and electronics. 
However, some Second Tier countries like Korea have begun to challenge the lead goose 
in these areas. Indeed, the third Flying Geese model suggests that as their industries and 
economies advanced, follower geese could move to higher tiers in the regional formation. 
Since the lower tier countries in the region were further behind in terms of industrial 
development, the adoption and adaptation of new foreign goods and technology meant 
that rapid rates of economic growth could be realized (Kojima, 2000).  In this pattern of 
constantly striving to catch leading geese, all of the geese in the formation fly forward 
together toward higher levels of industrial, technological, and economic development.  
The Flying Geese theory can have implications for public policies related to 
innovation in catching-up economies. These countries may direct research and 
development efforts toward product adaptation so that technological learning can occur. 
Relatively weaker intellectual property rights may also be implemented to help domestic 
firms to more easily adopt, reverse engineer, and modify imported foreign goods and 
technology. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational corporations (MNCs) have 
been identified as the key mechanisms to transfer industrial know-how and technology 
between countries (Kojima, 1978). Therefore, catching-up countries may welcome 




NIS ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EVALUATION 
In building an NIS assessment framework, this chapter examines the adoption and 
implementation of NIS and the evaluation of its performance. It reviews: (1) the scholarly 
literature on adoption, implementation, and evaluation of public policies and programs; 
(2) adoption, implementation, and evaluation of NIS in three innovation-leading 
countries, Finland, Korea, and Singapore; and (3) innovation system evaluation methods 
utilized by three international organizations, the OECD, the World Bank, and the World 
Economic Forum.  
Why Organizations Adopt Policies  
Policy scholars, political scientists, and sociologists have been prominent in the 
study of policy adoption patterns. A well-known model of policy adoption classifies 
adopters by their willingness to change as innovators, early adopters, early majority, late 
majority, and laggards (Rogers, 1995). Innovators are the first group to adopt new ideas 
with high motivation, needs, and expectations. They are followed by early adopters, the 
majority adopters, and finally laggards who are the last group to adopt new ideas, if at all.  
Some other theories of policy adoption focus on adopter’s motivation and 
resources (Mohr, 1969); position in social networks (Berry, 2008; Walker, 1969); 
political, social, economic, demographic, and path-dependent characteristics (Berry, 
2008; Berry & Berry, 1990; Walker, 1969); and technological advancement, power and 
resources, and familiarity with the considered policy (Wejnert, 2002). Other theories 
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focus on the policy itself, including the costs and benefits of alternative policies and their 
public and private consequences (Wejnert, 2002). Other characteristics are considered, 
including relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability of 
alternative policies (Rogers, 1995). The deciding factor is the advantage that the new 
policy will deliver. 
Conditions in the external environment can also influence the policy adoption. 
These conditions include focusing events, triggering mechanisms, windows of 
opportunity, and punctuations of the status quo (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Cohen, 
March, & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1995); policy entrepreneurs (Grinstein-Weiss, Edwards, 
Charles, & Wagner, 2009; Kingdon, 1995); learning from or imitating other successful 
adopters (Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; Shipan & Volden, 2008); regional 
diffusion (Berry & Berry, 1990; Grinstein-Weiss et al, 2009; Wejnert, 2002); economic 
competition (Shipan & Volden, 2008); and the growth of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and global networking via ICT (Wejnert, 2002).  
In these theories, policy adoption is influenced by: (1) adopter’s readiness for the 
new policy, (2) advantages of the proposed policy, and (3) new opportunities or threats 
that make policy change attractive. It is possible that these influences may combine to 
move a policymaker to adopt a new policy. These concepts can help to understand why 
countries adopt NIS as a framework for innovation policymaking.  
NIS Adoption in Finland, Korea, and Singapore 
Shulin (1999) states that it is important to ask how innovation activities in 
national economies begin (p. 44). Understanding the process of identifying and 
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considering potential solutions to policy problems is a first step in NIS assessment. Why 
do countries decide to put NIS into effect? Events leading to the adoption of NIS in 
Finland, Korea, and Singapore are reviewed here.  
Finland 
The NIS in Finland has been referred to as a “showcase” and is seen as a learning 
example for other countries (Roos et al., 2005). According to Georghiou, Smith, 
Toivannen, and Ylä-Anttila (2003), the development of NIS in Finland is linked to 
changes in the national economy, adaptation to the policy environment, and learning from 
other countries. They find Finland’s NIS to be an “outcome of adopting policy 
organizations and models from various countries and adjusting them to the national 
frameworks . . . Policies have also reacted to the changes in industrial structures both in 
the home country and internationally” (p. 56).  
Innovation policy in Finland evolved through three phases: (1) creating the basic 
structures in the 1960s and 1970s, (2) greater technology orientation in the 1980s, and (3) 
developing a knowledge-based society and the NIS in the 1990s (Georghoiu et al., 2003). 
In the first phase, the Science Policy Council (later renamed the Science and Technology 
Policy Council) was established for coordinating S&T policy guidelines. New 
mechanisms for planning, coordinating, and financing university research were also 
established and development of higher education increased. Conditions also improved for 
industrial R&D (Georghiou et al., 2003, p. 58). 
In the second phase, Finland’s innovation policy was designed by OECD 
guidelines. During the 1980s, Finland experienced strong growth and an expanding 
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international market. However, exports could not keep pace with domestic demand and 
could not support rising living standards. Eventually there was a recession (Georghiou et 
al., 2003, p. 39). During this period, technology policy in Finland targeted ICT, and key 
programs were initiated. The Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation 
(TEKES) was established and took charge of R&D loans and grants. Nokia, Finland’s top 
firm and a world leader in telecommunication, played a key role in national technology 
programs. Moreover, nationwide networks of science parks and centers of expertise 
became important for transfer, diffusion, and commercialization of research results 
(Georghiou et al., p. 58).  
In the third phase, “NIS” and “knowledge and know-how” became important 
ideas for innovation policy. Four areas are emphasized: (1) knowledge creation and 
utilization, (2) R&D and education, (3) development and absorption of new technology, 
and (4) national and international cooperation (Georghiou et al., 2003, p. 59). Finland 
became a major exporter of electronics and high-tech products and its productivity, 
exports, and R&D were very strong by international comparison. Finland went from 
being one of the least R&D intensive countries in the OECD to one of the most. Finland 
leapfrogged in world exports, production, and R&D of ICT. These successes were due to 
changes in technology policy priorities, the role of the business sector, and decentralized 
decision-making (Georghiou et al., 2003, p. 47).  
By the end of the 1990s, Finland had more high-skilled and high-tech industries 
and lower dependence on raw material and energy-intensive industries. Finland became 
the first country in the world to formally adopt the NIS approach, and the economy 
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entered the innovation-driven growth stage (Georghiou et al., 2003, p. 57, 60; Roos et al., 
2005). 
Korea 
Korea’s economic transformation has been profound,
5
 and its NIS has been a key 
factor in the country’s growth and development (Bartzokas, 2007; Kim, 1993; Suh, 2000; 
Wong, 1999; Yim, n.d.). Historically, Korea lacked natural resources and began its 
modern development with no technological base. With its NIS, the Korean government 
has created policies that allowed a transition to technology-based economy. The Korean 
NIS is characterized by active learning; restricted foreign direct investment (FDI); use 
and diffusion of R&D; an export orientation; and high investment in human capital 
(Feinson, 2003; Shulin, 1999). 
Three stages of economic growth in Korea have been identified: (1) a factor-
driven stage during the 1960s and the early part of the 1970s, (2) an investment-driven 
stage from the 1970s through the mid 1990s, and (3) an innovation-driven stage from the 
1990s through the present. Three phases of S&T policy correspond to these growth 
stages: (1) the imitation phase in the 1960s and 1970s, (2) the transformation phase in the 
1980s, and (3) the innovation phase in the 1990s (Kim, n.d, p. 3). 
In the 1960s, Korea developed by a government led strategy to grow large-scale 
industry for export. Key industries and banks were nationalized. The government took 
control over credit and used a strong license and permit system. During this time, the 
                                                 
5
 In the 1950s, per capita income in Korea was under US$100. Between 1966 and 1996, per capita income 
grew by 6.8% annually. Between 1962 and 2002, GDP grew by approximately 7% annually. During parts 
of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, GDP growth averaged approximately 19% (Bartzokas, 2007, p. 5; Choi, 
2003 as cited in Yim, n.d., p. 2; World Bank, 2000, p. 1, p. 16; Yim, n.d., p. 16). 
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Science and Technology Promotion Act, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the 
Korean Institute of Science and Technology, and other government research institutes 
(GRIs) were all established (Kim, n.d., p. 4).  
Industry grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s. Heavy industries and chemicals 
were emphasized and large family-owned conglomerates called chaebols
6
 were the 
dominant type of firm. In this transformational period of S&T in Korea, industry began 
its own research efforts in response to the National R&D Program which provided tax 
incentive for private firm’s R&D. Universities began to provide higher quality human 
resources (Yim, n.d., p. 13) and the Daedeok Science Town (later renamed Daedeok 
Innopolis) in Daejeon was also created (Kim, n.d., p. 6).  
In the 1990s, the development goal was to promote high-tech innovation and 
transition to a knowledge-based economy with policies to support technology 
development and information infrastructure. However, due to structural weaknesses in 
the economy and the corporate sector and the 1997 regional financial crisis, GDP growth 
in Korea declined -6.7% (World Bank, 2000, p. 7). According to Chung (2003), the crisis 
“. . . became a driving force to increase the innovation potential of the Korean NIS” (p. 
484), and overcoming the crisis and adjusting to policy shifts “prompted Korean firms to 
make a great leap in technological capability” (Lee, 2003, p. 233).  
The economy was reformed, restructured, and liberalized (Kim, n.d.; World Bank, 
2000, p. 6). Highly skilled human resources in information technology and biotechnology 
were developed. Highly Advanced National Projects (HAN) were undertaken, including 
                                                 
6
 Some of the well-known chaebols are Hyundai, Daewoo, Sumsung, and LG.  
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biomedical, biotechnology, electronics, next-generation vehicular, semiconductors, 
materials technology, and others.
7
 Government also played a leading role by enhancing 
university research capacity, promoting cooperative research, and coordinating policy. 
Important S&T measures for innovation took place, including: (1) the five-year plan for 
innovation in 1997; (2) the creation of the National Science and Technology Council in 
1999; (3) the creation of  the Office of Minister of Science, Technology, and Innovation 
to coordinate the NIS in 2004; (4) the promotion of university-based research; (5) the 
formation of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology; and (6) the 
strengthening of the GRIs by placing them within a “research council” system (Kim, 
n.d., p. 6, 14; Lee, 2003, p. 233). Following the crisis, Korea became competitive 
through innovation (Kim, n.d., p. 3). 
Singapore 
Singapore’s NIS has contributed to its status as a regional and global innovation 
leader (Wong, 1999). Singapore is a small city-state with a service oriented knowledge-
based economy and one of the world’s busiest ports. Singapore’s GDP averaged 8% 
annual growth through the 1990s (Koh, 2006). It developed with an open economy and 
strong government involvement in land, labor, and industrial development (Koh, 2006, p. 
143). Singapore’s NIS has been based on government facilitation of technological 
learning from MNCs. This has resulted in a large supporting industry for MNCs and 
“substantial technological capability . . . among many local subcontracting . . . firms” 
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(Wong, 1999, p. 20). Over time, technological innovation capability has shifted from 
MNCs to local high-tech firms (Wong, 1999).  
Wong (2003) refers to four stages of Singapore’s growth: (1) the industrial take-
off stage from 1965 through the mid 1970s, (2) the local technological deepening stage 
from the mid 1970s through the late 1980s, (3) the applied R&D expansion stage from 
the late 1980s through the late 1990s, and (4) the high-tech entrepreneurship and basic 
R&D stage from the late 1990s onward.  
Because of a lack of natural resources, the industrial take-off stage was 
characterized by low cost labor-intensive manufacturing, dependence on technology 
transfer from MNCs, and export led growth (Wong, 2003; Wong & Singh, 2005). During 
the 1960s and 1970s, tax incentives and grants were offered to MNCs to locate in 
Singapore and produce for global markets (Koh, 2006, p. 143). The strategy successfully 
accelerated growth, however, local firms had no incentive to invest in indigenous 
innovation (Yeung, 2006). During this time, Singapore’s government began to emphasize 
technical education (Koh, 2006). 
In the technological deepening stage, MNCs operations were upgraded and local 
supporting industries developed. Multinational corporations provided significant 
investments in technology.
8
 Government policy emphasized developing technological 
infrastructure and human resources to support innovative capacity, including the 
Singapore Science Park and programs for skill upgrading, high-tech start-ups, and 
entrepreneurialism (Koh, 2006, p. 146). After a recession in 1985, government assisted 
                                                 
8
 Foreign investment contributed 26% of gross domestic fixed capital formation during this period, which 
was one of the highest rates among Asian Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) (Yeung, 2006, p. 263). 
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the development of the venture capital industry, initiated an open-door immigration 
policy, and liberalized business regulations (Koh, 2006, p. 156).  
In the R&D expansion stage, rapid growth of applied R&D activities by MNCs 
and public R&D institutions to support MNCs innovation occurred. Knowledge-intensive 
services and manufacturing became key drivers for growth (Wong & Singh, 2005, p. 3). 
A five-year national technology plan was created. It allocated US$2 billion to build R&D 
infrastructure, provided incentives to attract private sector R&D, and developed technical 
manpower to support R&D (Koh, 2006, p. 146; Yeung, 2006). The plan identified key 
research areas for development, including biotechnology, food and agro- technology, IT 
and telecommunication, microelectronics, and semiconductors. The National Science and 
Technology Board (NSTB) was formed and tasked with development of new research 
institutes in these strategic areas (Monroe, 2006). Also during time, the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (MTI) coordinated economic and financial policies, tax regimes, loan 
regulations, and stock market rules to support of Singapore’s innovation strategy. The 
MTI coordinates with other innovation policies from the Economic Development Agency 
(EDA), which engages in economic promotion, and the Agency for Science and 
Technology Research (ASTAR) which coordinates research programs, 
commercialization, and licensing (Koh, 2006, p. 155).  
In the fourth stage, policy emphasized indigenous technological innovation 
capability, local high-tech start-ups, and science-based industry. In 1996, the Innovation 
Program was created to develop indigenous creative capability widely. Moreover the 
government created research institutes in IT, microelectronics, and life sciences to 
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encourage MNCs to locate their R&D activities in Singapore. The 1997 regional financial 
crisis caused an economic downturn in Singapore and showed that a “higher 
technological competitive edge” was needed (Wong & Singh, 2005, p. 21). Government 
increased its R&D investments to 2.6% of GDP in 1998, and the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology (MCIT), Information and Communication 
Development Authority (IDA), and Media Development Authority (MDA) were all 
formed. In 1999, the government removed regulations on high-tech entrepreneurialism 
and allocated US$1 billion for high-tech venture capital activities (Wong & Singh, 2005, 
p. 21). The One-North R&D complex was created as a S&T research “community” with 
research facilities, schools, amenities, and public transportation. It adopted the idea of a 
Silicon Valley funded at US$8.6 billion over 15 years. It focused on R&D innovation and 
business networking in biosciences and IT (Monroe, 2006). The National Science and 
Technology Plan for 1996-2001 sought to develop domestic capabilities in biomedicine 
to complement existing capability in electronics, chemicals, and engineering. The long-
term strategy was to become a world class hub for biomedical science and a regional 
leader in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, healthcare services, and biotechnology R&D 
(Koh & Wong, 2005). 
How Organizations Implement Policies 
Once new policies are adopted to address problems or capitalize on opportunities, 
they must then be implemented. Policy implementation is the process of going from 
concept to end-product. It is a critical step for policy success. In developing countries, 
research has shown that program implementation and administration were the critical 
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problems influencing policy effectiveness (Patton, 1997, p. 199). Implementing a new 
policy may mean that the adopter has little or no experience with the policy, so assessing 
its design and implementation becomes important (Wholey, 1979). Examining 
implementation helps to understand the functioning of policy or program components, 
and whether the policy or program is operating as it is supposed to (Patton, 1997).  
Ideally, policies are implemented rationally by putting operations in place that 
meet intended policy goals. Agencies that implement government policies are created and 
staffed by civil servants with technical expertise in relevant policy and program. This 
staff develops, implements, monitors, and improves programs that serve the public good. 
Government agencies should be apolitical, efficient, and effective policy implementers, 
with clear lines of hierarchy (Roth & Wittich, 1978).  
Some research indicates that policy implementation may not work as smoothly as 
the ideal case predicts. Wholey, Scanlon, Duffy, Fukumoto, and Vogt (1970) say, “We 
cannot predict . . . which results will follow from particular policies, nor should we be 
confident that policy implementation will conform to plan” (p. 21). Implementation 
problems include limited resources or understanding, lack of flexibility, situational 
decision-making, principal-agent problem including moral hazard and adverse selection.  
Implementation problems can also occur because policymakers may only have a vague 
idea of what they want, so policies may be poorly conceptualized and infeasible before 
the actual implementation (Lindblom, 1959; Lipsky, 1980; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; 




According to Doner (2009) effectively implementing innovation policies in 
developing countries requires consultation, credible commitments, and monitoring (p. 
72). Consultation means actors exchange information on their preferences, capabilities, 
and intentions. Credible commitment means actors comply with their preferences and 
agreements. Monitoring means evaluating performance and outcomes and revising 
policies and responsibilities as needed (Doner, 2009, p. 73). 
Technology, products, processes, and practices that are new to developing country 
firms can be complex, costly, and their benefits are uncertain (Doner, 2009, p. 74). 
Therefore, the role of government is to help potentially innovative firms manage expected 
risks and uncertainties “. . . where the agency elicits information from firms regarding 
key externalities and their management in an ongoing process of information exchange, 
goal setting and adjustment, and mutual monitoring” (Doner, 2009, p. 75). This requires 
consultation and credibility among all parties and monitoring of performance so that 
agreements can form. Therefore, developing countries will require ever-greater levels of 
these three institutional capacities to successfully implement innovation policy.  
NIS Implementation in Finland, Korea, and Singapore 
 The components and the implementation of the Finnish, Korean, and Singaporean 
NIS are presented in this section. The actors, interaction, and organizational structure of 
each of these systems are discussed below and also depicted in Figure 3.1-3.3. The 
objective is to find what happens in these countries’ NIS to encourage innovation, and 




A “full systems approach” is taken in Finland by examining all elements of NIS, 
including customers, government and regulatory bodies, technology transfer 
organizations and incubators, R&D bodies, financial institutions, and others (Roos et al., 
2005). According to Roos et al. (2005), key organizations involved in the Finnish NIS 
are: (1) the Academy of Finland, (2) the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and 
Innovation (TEKES), (3) public R&D organizations, (4) technology transfer agencies, 
and (5) capital providers. These are shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
Figure 3.1 Organization of Finland’s NIS 
 
Source: Roos et al., 2005 
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The Academy of Finland finances scientific research in all disciplines and 
provides expertise in science policy development. Funding is provided for projects and 
programs; research centers of excellence; research positions and training; foreign visiting 
professors; and international networking and collaboration between universities, research 
institutes, and business. Annual funding for projects from the Academy accounts for 16% 
of government R&D spending.
9
  
The Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES) is in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry and is responsible for implementing technology policy. It 
provides financing to universities and research institutes projects, and also to firms’ 
product development where risk is present. It funds and coordinates joint programs 
implemented by firms, research institutes, and universities, and coordinates international 
cooperation in research and technology (Roos et al., 2005). 
Universities, polytechnics, national research institutes and the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland (VTT) are major public R&D organizations. These organizations spend 
approximately 30% of the nation’s budget for R&D. There are strong links between 
business and university R&D and other public sector R&D groups. The Finnish 
Innovation Fund (SITRA) provides start-up capital for technology firms and funds 
research projects for existing firms, training projects, and foreign venture capital, and 
matches SMEs with “business angels” (Roos et al., 2005).  
The Science and Technology Policy Council (STPC) facilitates innovation 
policymaking. The council is chaired by the Prime Minister and develops guidelines for 





the government’s R&D funding. It coordinates R&D issues among the other ministries 
and provides consultation between industry, funding agencies, government organizations, 
and universities (MEE, 2009).   
The National Innovation Strategy of 2008 identifies measures to meet the goals 
defined for the NIS (MEE, 2009). These measures include: (1) establishing large, 
modern, and flexible higher education entities; (2) supporting interaction between 
universities, trade, industry, and research institutes; (3) developing management training 
to meet world standards; (4) introducing entrepreneurship, creativity, and innovation into 
teaching; (5) providing incentives and opportunities for life-long learning; (6) motivating 
investors to commit to business growth by taxation; (7) motivating venture capital 
investment through public-private cooperation; and (8) using public procurement to 
enhance demand for innovations (Vuegelers, et al., 2008). 
Universities provide two types of innovation-support structures for firms, 
including industry-academia research clusters and business incubators. These structures 
help to develop linkages with international firms and indigenous firms. Between 1995 
and 2000, venture capital investments increased by 10 times. Approximately one-third of 
private equity investment went into ICT. Today, the venture capital market has been 
described as “vibrant” with “unparalleled” financing opportunities for high-tech firms 






Government policy and programs, government-sponsored research institutes, and 
private industry have played important roles in Korea’s NIS (ISI, GIGA, & STIP, 2008; 
Yuh, 2006). Figure 3.2 below shows the organization of Korea’s NIS.  
Figure 3.2 Organization of Korea’s NIS 
 
Source: ISI et al., 2008 
The National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC) was established in 
1999 to prioritize the S&T budgets and coordinate national S&T and R&D programs. The 
NSTC is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister of Science and Technology and composed 
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of thirteen S&T related ministers and nine representatives from the S&T community 
(Bartzokas, 2007, p. 31).  
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is the secretariat for NSTC. It 
is responsible for managing and coordinating policy concerning S&T, industry, human 
resources, and national R&D (Bartzokas, 2007). The MOST coordinates R&D initiatives, 
human resource development and education, internationalization policies and activities of 
science-based ministries, and government supported research institutes. It is also 
responsible for Korea’s Centers of Excellence (COE), which implement programs that 
encourage basic research in major universities. These centers are the Science Research 
Centers, the Engineering Research Centers, the Medical Science and Engineering 
Research Centers, and the National Core Research Centers. 
The Office of Science and Technology Innovation (OSTI) within MOST forms a 
science and technology R&D system for future development. It promotes efficient 
investment and budget allocation, the development of future growth industries, and 
human resources in S&T. The President’s Council on Science and Technology is made 
up of nongovernmental science experts and corporate leaders in various S&T areas. The 
council plays an important role in policymaking as the government has taken a more 
market-oriented approach. The Korean government wants “science policy to satisfy more 
of the private sector’s needs, so it has become more open to its views” (Bartzokas, 2007, 
p. 31).  
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The role of universities in Korea’s NIS has expanded.
10
 Universities contributed 
approximately 83% of scientific publications between 1995 and 2000 (ISI et al., 2008). 
Recently, patenting, technology transfer, and commercialization of innovations have all 
improved among Korea’s universities. Through the COE model, government has 
supported research groups with specific capabilities at universities across the country. 
Currently, there are 150 COEs in engineering, medicine, science, and core national 
objectives.  
The Science and Technology Framework Law of 2001 grants authority for S&T 
policy and R&D coordination within the MOST. The law provides rules and regulations 
governing S&T, and enables the development of policies for R&D. It is the framework 
for 31 STI-related laws in areas such as human resource development (HRD), nuclear 
energy, R&D promotion, and technological development support. The S&T Framework 
Law is seen as fostering an “innovation-driven culture” in Korea (Bartzokas, 2007, p. 31; 
ISI et al., 2008, p. 259). The law has facilitated recent changes to the IP regime, and also 
has been helpful in supporting Korea’s regional targeting policy for innovation. 
The Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) is the central body for patent-
related policies and activities. The KIPO has streamlined innovation activities by 
separating patent and utility model applications. It has also accelerated commercialization 
and transfer of patented technology. In 2005, KIPO registered the fourth-highest number 
of patents in the world (ISI et al., 2008). 
                                                 
10
 From 1970-2004, the number of higher education institutes grew from 142 to 411 and the number of 
enrolled students grew from approximately 200,000 to 3.5 million. 
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A regional targeting policy is also used to support innovation. Free economic 
zones (FEZs) provide tax breaks, deregulation, financial incentives, and enhanced 
services in targeted regions of the country. Companies in these regions must attract a 
minimum amount of foreign investment to qualify for benefits. The FEZs offer an 
inducement for foreign companies to invest in Korean firms. Currently, FEZs exist in 
Busan-Jinhae, Gwangyang, and Incheon.  
Since the 1970s, the Korean government has sponsored a levy-grant program to 
assist firms in technological HRD. The program is an inducement for firms to invest in 
HRD and tech-skill development (Arnold, Bell, Bressant, & Brimble, 2000, p. 110). 
Firms contribute a mandatory levy to a fund that can be used for HR training and skills 
development. Because the contribution is mandatory, firms have no reason not to invest 




Singapore’s Science and Technology Plan indicates a transformation to research-
driven and knowledge-intensive economy (MTI, 2006). The plan defines the roles for 
organization and administration of Singapore’s NIS. Figure 3.3 below shows the 
organizational structure of Singapore’s NIS.  
The Research, Innovation, and Enterprise Council (RIEC) is chaired by the Prime 
Minister and includes other ministers, industry leaders, and scientists and academics. It 
advises the government on research, innovation and enterprise strategies. The RIEC 
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 Levy and grant amounts, firm size for program exemption, and sponsored training activities, have varied 
over time. The levy is typically some predetermined proportion of the wage bill. Firms with less than a 
minimum number of employees are exempted. If grants to firms for HRD activities exceed their 
contribution level, government makes up the difference (Arnold et al., 2000, p. 110-112). 
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promotes these functions with new initiatives in S&T and knowledge-based economic 
growth. These functions are implemented by the National Research Foundation (NRF). 
NRF funds programs that meet the objectives of these strategies, coordinates national 
research efforts, and develops policies for implementing the national R&D agenda (MTI, 
2006). 
Figure 3.3 Organization of Singapore’s NIS 
 
Source: MTI, 2006 
The Agency for Science, Technology, and Research (ASTAR) and the Economic 
Development Board (EDB) are located in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). The 
ASTAR fosters scientific research and talent by setting priorities for public research and 
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developing the research labor force. It enables commercialization of research outputs, 
attracts research-intensive projects from MNCs, and enhances capabilities of industry 
clusters and local enterprises. The EDB identifies technologies and growth areas, 
promotes private sector R&D in local enterprises, and attracts MNCs to locate R&D 
activities in Singapore (MTI, 2006). 
The Ministry of Education (MOE) oversees and funds basic research for 
knowledge creation in universities. Universities are primarily engaged in independent and 
collaborative research projects to create new knowledge for future innovations. 
Polytechnic institutes perform developmental research and joint projects with industry 
and local enterprises. This will strengthen domestic private sector innovation. The 
Academic Research Fund (AcRF) also funds basic research in universities and strategic 
research for independent researchers. The AcRF attempts to attract world-class 
researchers to Singapore who can “seed ideas and new breakthroughs” and enhance 
graduate education (MTI, 2006). 
The Science and Technology Plan attempts to develop an “open platform that 
allows the free flow of ideas among the players in the research landscape” (MTI, 2006, p. 
29). The plan emphasizes collaboration among the performers of R&D. Linkages 
between research institutes, universities, public research agencies, and disease centers and 
hospitals facilitate the flow of research from basic to applied research and then to 
commercialization. These linkages are formed through joint programs, seminars, 
conferences, project supervision, and appointments, and facilitated by ASTAR and NRF. 
The NIS also supports linkages to the private sector through two programs. One is a 
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government incentive for MNCs to help local engineers acquire new technical skills. The 
other is the Local Industry Upgrading Program (LIUP) which encourages MNCs to help 
local suppliers to upgrade their procedures and technologies (Wong & Singh, 2005). 
Singapore has three science parks that provide infrastructure for R&D. The first 
two parks include government agencies, several private firms involved in IT and 
telecommunications, and high-tech R&D institutes. The third one is One-North as 
mentioned above (Finegold, Wong, & Cheah, 2004; Wong & Singh, 2005). Besides the 
science parks, there are seven technopreneur incubation centers that facilitate networking 
for over 400 technology-related firms. The program is managed by a group of public and 
private sector operators (Wong & Singh, 2005, p. 41). 
Singapore funds firm-level human resource development with a levy-grant 
program called the Skill Development Fund.
12
 The training provision comes from in-
house, local training organizations, and foreign providers of specialized training. The 
training and skill types have focused on ICT fields and the needs of SMEs (Arnold et al., 
2006, p. 109-112). 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) provided finance in the early stage of 
Singapore’s high-tech development. In 1999, the government provided the US$1 billion 
Technopreneurship Fund to induce venture capitals to Singapore. The fund attracted 
several leading venture capitalists from the United States. The requirements on the 
national stock exchange were simplified for new ventures to access market funding. The 
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 The program has used a levy rate between 1-4% of the wage bill, depending on firms’ needs for 
technological skill upgrading. 
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Start-up Enterprise Development Scheme (SEEDS) was also created to fund early stage 
business development over 100 new start-ups (Wong & Singh, 2005). 
How Organizations Evaluate Policies 
Policymakers must evaluate the performance of policies after implementation. 
They need to know how the policy is performing to meet the goal. Policy evaluation is 
the way to provide this important information. Evaluation measures the effects of a policy 
against the goals where the analysis of performance data indicates when policies work 
well, when improvements are needed, or when a policy should be discontinued. It also 
contributes to subsequent decision-making about programs (Shadish, Cook, & Leviton, 
1991).    
Evaluations have been developed for assessing the utility, the feasibility, and 
other missions of policies and programs in a wide range of fields. Many different types of 
evaluations exist. The generic “program outcome” evaluation model, for example, 
analyzes: (1) inputs, which are the resources put into a program; (2) activities, which are 
the things the program actually does; (3) outputs, which are the products that are 
produced; (4) outcomes, which are the results of the activities and outputs; and (5) 
impacts, which are the program’s long term consequences (World Bank, 2007, p. 161). 
Another well-known evaluation framework is the CIPP model, which investigates four 
elements, including context, inputs, process, and products (Stufflebeam, 1971).
13
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Nowadays, performance measurement is seen as a necessary tool for the 
evaluation of public policies (Thomas, 2006). The policy evaluation has become 
increasingly popular in the public sector in recent years with ideas of re-inventing 
government, total quality management (TQM), performance-based management and 
others (Thomas, 2006, p. 1). However, evaluating the performance of public policies 
through formal evaluations can be difficult. According to Thomas (2006), the problem is 
“. . . measurement . . . in terms of linking outcomes in society to programs” (p. 21).  
Performance indicators can be both quantitative and qualitative and vary in terms 
of validity and reliability (Patton, 1997). Choice of indicators can be affected by 
availability of resources for data collection, and the time frame associated with the 
interest (Patton, 1997, p. 159-160). Patton (1997) says, “some kind of indicator is 
necessary . . . to measure the degree of outcome attainment . . . the key is to make sure 
that the indicator is a reasonable, useful, and a meaningful measure of the intended client 
outcome” (p. 160-161). 
International Organizations Evaluation of NIS Performance  
Some international organizations regularly evaluate nations’ innovation 
performance, including the OECD, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum. 
They use proxy variables referred to as “innovation indicators,” to evaluate and rank 
national innovation performance. The evaluation practices of these organizations are 





The OECD is comprised of 34 member countries.
14
 It has established many 
guidelines on the measurement of science, technology, and innovation activities at 
national and regional level. Some of these include: (1) Frascati Manual for surveys of 
research and experimental development, (2) TBP Manual for the measurement and 
interpretation of technology balance of payments (TBP) data, (3) Oslo Manual for 
collecting and interpreting technological innovation data,
15
 (4) Patent Manual for using 
patent data as science and technology indicators, and (5) Canberra Manual for the 
measurement of human resources devoted to science and technology (OECD, 2002). This 
section discusses the Oslo manual, which identify innovation indicators and best practices 
for NIS.  
The Oslo Manual is a series of works produced in 1992, 1997, and 2005, by the 
OECD which serves as a methodological reference for the analysis of innovation impacts 
in national economies. The Oslo Manual “provides guidelines for collecting and 
interpreting innovation data in an internationally comparable manner” (OECD, 2005, p. 
10). It recommends using firm-level surveys and provides guidelines for developing 
survey instruments (OECD, 2005).  
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 Current members are advanced and emerging countries including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
15
 The Oslo Manual also inspired the development of the manual for the standardization of technological 
innovation indicators in Latin American and Caribbean countries, called the “Bogota Manual”  produced by 
many institutions including Organization of American States (OAS), Ibero-American Network of Science 
and Technology Indicators (RICYT), Ibero-American Program of Science and Technology for 
Development (CYTED), Andrés Bello Convention (SECAB), and Colombian Observatory of Science and 
Technology (OCYT). The manual focuses on specific characteristics of innovation systems and firms in 
less developed countries. 
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Firm surveys provide qualitative data on innovation activities. Surveys collect 
data on the source of knowledge relevant to firms’ innovation activities, firms’ R&D 
expenditure and performance, inter-industry collaboration, numbers of innovative 
products, return on investment on innovation effort, the presence of linkage between 
public and private research sectors, personnel movements, and other innovation-relevant 
data (OECD, 2005; Stahl-Rolf & Hamann, n.d.). The manual recommends collecting 
quantitative data on firm expenditures for innovative activities for a given period (rather 
than expenditure data for a specific innovation) (OECD, 2005, p. 98). The manual also 
recommends collecting information on how firms protect their innovations, such as 
patents, copyrights, registration of designs, trademarks, or confidentiality agreements 
(OECD, 2005).  
The World Bank 
Currently, the World Bank evaluates 146 countries’ innovation systems in terms 
of their readiness for the knowledge economy. The Knowledge Assessment Methodology 
(KAM)
16
 was developed by the World Bank as a “knowledge economy benchmarking 
tool.” The KAM uses 148 structural and qualitative variables to evaluate performance in 
the knowledge economy. Each variable is ranked on an ordinal scale and serves as an 
indicator. These variables are grouped into four pillars: (1) the economic and institutional 
regime, (2) education and skills, (3) information and communication infrastructure, and 
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 The KAM uses data from World Bank databases and also UNCTAD, UNESCO, and WEF. The World 
Bank continuously updates the KAM data and expands coverage when possible. The details of KAM can 





(4) the innovation system. The innovation system pillar of the KAM has 29 variables, as 
shown in Table 3.1 below. The KAM evaluates the innovation system for countries by 
using data on these variables.  
Table 3.1 KAM Innovation System Pillar 
Pillar 4 The Innovation System 
FDI outflows as % of GDP S&E journal articles  
FDI inflows as % of GDP  S&E journal articles/mil. people 
Royalty and license fees payments (US$ mil.) Availability of venture capital   
Royalty and license fees payments 
(US$/pop.)    
Patents granted by the USPTO  
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$ mil.) Patents granted by the USPTO/mil. people 
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$/pop.)  High-technology exports as % of manuf. 
exports  
Royalty payments and receipts (US$ mil.)  Private sector spending on R&D  
Royalty payments and receipts (US$/pop.)  Firm-level technology absorption  
Science and Engineering enrollment ratio (%)  Value chain presence  
Science enrollment ratio (%) Capital goods gross imports (US$ mil.)  
Researchers in R&D Capital goods gross exports (US$ mil.)  
Researchers in R&D/mil. people  S&E articles with foreign coauthorship (%) 
Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP  Avg. Number of citations per S&E article 
Manuf. trade as % of GDP  Intellectual property protection  
University-company research collaboration   
  
Source: Based on World Bank, 2012   
However, of these 29 indicators, only 3 are used by the KAM to develop 
innovation rankings for countries: (1) total royalty and license fees payments and receipts 
in million USD, (2) patent applications granted by United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO), and (3) scientific and technical journal articles.
17
 





The World Economic Forum 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) evaluates countries’ innovation capacity in 
relation to their competitiveness in the global economy. It annually publishes these results 
in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). The report examines factors leading to 
sustained economic growth and prosperity, and provides “benchmarking tools for 
business leaders and policymakers to identify obstacles to improved competitiveness thus 
stimulating discussion on the best strategies and policies to overcome them” (WEF, 2010, 
p. 3).  
The GCR uses an extensive set of indicators which are grouped into 12 pillars, and 
“innovation” is one of them (WEF, 2012, p. 4).
18
 The competitiveness of countries was 
evaluated using these indicators and pillars, and countries are ranked accordingly. The 
2012-2013 GCR measures competitiveness using surveys distributed by the WEF to 
business leaders in 144 countries. Survey questions ask them to evaluate various aspects 
of the operating environment in their country on an ordinal scale (WEF, 2012).  
According to the WEF, to enhance living standards in a country for the long term 
requires improvements to the innovation pillar (WEF, 2012). It is comprised of the 
following indicators: (1) capacity for innovation, (2) quality of scientific research 
institutions, (3) company spending on R&D, (4) university-industry collaboration on 
R&D, (5) government procurement of advanced technology products, (6) availability of 
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 The other pillars are institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary 
education, higher education training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market 
development, technological readiness, market size, and business sophistication. 
61 
 
scientists and engineers, (7) utility patents, and (8) intellectual property protection. 
Survey questions correspond to these indicators, and are shown in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2 GCR Questions Corresponding to Innovation Indicators 
Question How to Answer 
In your country, how do companies obtain 
technology? 
1 = exclusively from licensing or     
      imitating foreign companies 
7 = by conducting formal  research and  
      pioneering their own new products  
      and processes 
How would you assess the quality of scientific 
research institutions in your country,? 
1 = very poor 
7 = best in their field internationally 
To what extent do companies in your country 
spend on R&D? 
1 = not at all 
7 = heavily 
To what extent do business and universities 
collaborate on R&D in your country? 
1 = not at all 
7 = extensively 
Do government procurement decisions foster 
technological innovation in your country? 
1 = not at all 
7 = extremely effectively 
To what extent are scientists and engineers 
available in your country? 
1 = not at all 
7 = widely available 
How would you rate intellectual property 
protection, including anti-counterfeiting 
measures, in your country? 
1 = very weak 
7 = very strong 
 
Source: Based on WEF, 2012 (Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013) 
Note: Besides these above questions, the GCR also used the number of patents for inventions per 
millions of population in 2009 as an additional innovation indicator. 
 
The GCR notes that less advanced countries can improve productivity by adopting 
existing innovation or making incremental improvements. However, countries in an 
innovation-driven stage of growth; such as Finland, Korea, and Singapore; must innovate 
new products and processes to be competitive (WEF, 2012, p. 7). The GCR recommends 
that countries create an environment that is conducive to innovation and supported by the 
public and private sectors. This environment includes high levels of investment in R&D, 
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especially by the private sector; high quality scientific research institutions; extensive 
research collaboration between university and industry; and secured property rights. 
NIS Evaluation in Finland, Korea and Singapore  
Below are three tables presenting the results of innovation performance evaluation 
for Finland, Korea, and Singapore from the Knowledge Assessment Methodology 
(KAM) and the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). These countries’ scores and 
rankings on innovation performance are among the best in the world and reflect 
positively on the NIS in each country.  
Table 3.3 Innovation Rankings and Scores for Innovation-Leading Countries 
Country 
KAM GCR 
Innovation Rank Innovation Score Innovation Rank Innovation Score 
Finland 3 9.66 2 5.75 
Korea 21 8.80 16 4.94 
Singapore 4 9.49 8 5.39 
 
Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 and WEF, 2012  
Table 3.4 GCR Innovation Indicator Rankings for Innovation-Leading Countries 
Indicator Finland Korea Singapore 
Capacity for innovation 4 19 20 
Quality of scientific research institutions 13 24 12 
Company spending on R&D 3 11 8 
University-industry collaboration in R&D 4 25 5 
Government procurement of advanced technology products 14 33 2 
Availability of scientists and engineers 1 23 13 
PCT patents, applications/mil pop.* 3 9 13 
Intellectual property protection 1 40 2 
 
Source: Based on WEF, 2012 (values on 7-scale for 146 countries except PCT*) 
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Table 3.5 KAM Innovation Indicator Scores for Innovation-Leading Countries 
Indicator Finland Korea Singapore 
FDI outflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008 6.95 6.41 9.53 
FDI inflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008 2.64 0.79 9.64 
Royalty and license fees payments (US$ mil.), 2009 7.92 9.36 9.68 
Royalty and license fees payments (US$/pop.), 2009 9.68 9.04 9.92 
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$ mil.), 2009 9.21 9.37 9.05 
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$/pop.), 2009 9.60 8.57 9.44 
Royalty payments and receipts(US$ mil.), 2009 8.72 9.28 9.52 
Royalty payments and receipts(US$/pop.), 2009 9.60 8.48 9.92 
Science and engineering enrollment ratio (%), 2009 9.55 9.44 10.00 
Science enrollment ratio (%), 2009 6.44 4.89 9.00 
Researchers in R&D, 2009 6.71 9.18 5.89 
Researchers in R&D/mil. people, 2009 10.00 8.08 8.77 
Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP, 2008 9.90 9.60 8.91 
Manuf. trade as % of GDP, 2009 5.95 8.83 9.91 
University-company research collaboration (1-7), 2010 9.85 8.40 9.62 
S&E journal articles, 2007 8.41 9.38 8.00 
S&E journal articles/mil. people, 2007 9.79 8.28 9.38 
Availability of venture capital (1-7), 2010 9.85 3.21 9.85 
Patents granted by USPTO, avg. 2005-2009 8.97 9.73 8.56 
Patents granted by USPTO/mil. people, avg. 2005-2009 9.59 9.66 9.18 
High-tech exports as % of manuf. exports, 2009 8.02 9.47 9.92 
Private sector spending on R&D (1-7), 2010 9.69 9.24 9.47 
Firm-level technology absorption (1-7), 2010 9.24 9.54 9.24 
Value chain presence (1-7), 2010 9.39 9.01 9.39 
Capital goods gross imports(US$ mil.), 2005-2009 5.67 7.16 9.93 
Capital goods gross exports (US$ mil.), 2005-2009 8.73 9.40 10.00 
S&E articles with foreign coauthorship (%), 2008 2.29 0.49 2.01 
Avg. number of citations per S&E article, 2008 8.96 6.88 8.54 
Intellectual property protection (1-7), 2010 10.00 6.87 9.85 
 
Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 (scores on 10-scale for 146 countries) 
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Besides international surveys and indicators discussed above, there are other ways 
in evaluating NIS performance such as in-house evaluation, as in the case of Finland; or 
independent observations and secondary data, as in the case of Korea and Singapore. 
These are discussed below.  
Finland 
Finland is a continuing global leader in innovation, however, a new innovation 
strategy was adopted in 2008 to redirect the NIS and focus on problems of the system 
(Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 21). In 2009, a panel of domestic and international experts was 
assembled by Finland’s Ministry of Education and Ministry of Employment and 
Economy to evaluate the performance of the NIS and its future prospects.  
The panel commissioned several in-depth studies including a firm-level survey, 
and concluded that Finland’s NIS “has an admirable track record and its current 
performance is still good” (Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 88). According to the panel, 
however, “good is not enough” (Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 9). The system is too complex 
and not user friendly. Private firms require too much time and effort in dealing with NIS 
actors, related policies, and initiatives (Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 17-18). Therefore, the 
NIS should be simplified. The number of policy instruments should be reduced by 90% 
and the number of public innovation policy organizations should also be reduced 
(Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 88).  
The panel also found there is a shortage of educated labor in Finland’s high-tech 
companies (ISI et al., 2008; Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 18). It therefore recommended 
several changes to the higher education system, including redefined tasks for 
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polytechnics and universities; financial incentives for high-quality research, education, 
and internationalization; and repositioning academically-oriented research into the 
universities and commercially-oriented research into a small number of public R&D 
organizations (Vuegelers et al., 2009, p. 88).  
Korea 
Evaluation of firm-level innovation shows that Korea is restructuring from a 
manufacturing-led economy to a knowledge-intensive one and transitioning from 
imitation to innovation (Lee, 2003, p. 221). A firm survey in 2002 showed that 43% are 
technologically innovative (Intarakumnerd, Chairatana, & Tangchitpaiboon, 2002). In 
2003, the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) ranked Korea first 
in the world for IT infrastructure and third for S&T achievement (Yim, n.d., p. 2). The 
long-term innovation vision plans for 2025 and 2030 continue current NIS policies and 
targeted sectors, including a shift to private sector driven innovation and international 
competitiveness and openness.  
However, several challenges for Korea’s NIS have been identified; including 
enhancing efficiency and interactions through strengthened links among R&D institutes 
both domestic and foreign ones; more joint research and manpower exchange; more 
technical cooperation between foreign and domestic firms; and implementing enhanced 
FDI regimes, cross-licensing, and strategic alliances (Bartzokas, 2007, p. 7-8). 
In 2008, the Institute for Systems and Innovation (ISI), the German Institute of 
Global and Area Studies (GIGA), and the Georgia Tech Program in Science, Technology 
and Innovation Policy (STIP) also identified strengths and weaknesses in Korea’s NIS. 
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The performance of S&T administration, the GRIs, and the educational system was seen 
as critical. Korea’s tax incentive system was described as complex with many elements. 
Patent registration adjustments, the creation of spinoff firms, and improved university 
efforts have resulted in better technology diffusion, patenting, and commercialization. 
However, innovation linkages through science parks have not been achieved and 
chaebols have not reached the desired innovation capacity (ISI et al., 2008).  
Singapore 
Singapore has scored highly on key innovation indicators in international 
evaluations (Wong, 2003). However, Wong and Singh (2005) claim that insufficient 
attention has been given to promoting innovation collaboration among local enterprises. 
They find that despite some examples of promoting R&D consortia, inter-firm 
collaboration in Singapore lags behind countries such as Finland and Taiwan. This 
situation is identified as a major weakness in Singapore’s NIS (Wong & Singh, 2005, p. 
34).  
Moreover, venture capital deals are lagging despite government initiatives to 
establish Singapore as the preferred venture capital location in Southeast Asia (Wong, 
2003). Approximately US$13 billion (S$16 billion) in venture funds were managed in 
2004, but there was weak high-tech start-up formation in the country (Wong & Singh, 





METHODS FOR NIS ASSESSMENT 
This chapter presents a framework that could be used by policymakers for 
assessing the status and performance of national innovation systems in fostering 
technological innovations in a given country, especially a developing one. The 
framework is based on a few fundamental questions that would likely be of interest to 
policymakers and policy analysts. In this way, the framework enables a broad-based 
examination of NIS as an approach for organizing policies and institutions in multiple 
domains as they are brought into the production of technological innovation.  
A Conceptual Framework for NIS Assessment 
The findings of the previous two chapters are synthesized into this framework. 
The framework calls for an understanding of, first, what the NIS is, i.e. its theoretical 
conceptualization and its basic system components; second, why the NIS approach is 
adopted, i.e. the rationale for incorporating the approach in encouraging innovation; third, 
its implementation in terms of the organizational structures and functions in place; and 
fourth, potential methods by which the performance of the NIS can be evaluated. Put 
simply, the assessment framework asks: What is NIS? Why is NIS adopted? How is NIS 
implemented? And how can NIS performance be evaluated?  Table 4.1 presents these 
four questions as well as the responses that have been uncovered so far through the 




Table 4.1 NIS Assessment Framework 
Question Explanation Theory Best Practice Criteria 
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The framework presents three dimensions that build on each other and lead to 
criteria for answering these questions. The dimensions include explanation, theory, and 
best practice. The explanation dimension provides a brief concept of each question and 
indicates what to look for. Understanding the questions points policymakers in the right 
direction for finding criteria for an answer. Each question has a unique concept that 
requires background or theories related to NIS. The theory dimension provides 
policymakers an empirical basis for understanding the concepts, evolution, and 
components of the NIS; the adoption and diffusion of public policy; and policy and 
program implementation and evaluation. Theories can be used to develop guiding 
principles which can help to translate NIS concepts into practice. The best practice 
dimension reflects real-world NISs using short cases of three innovation-leading 
countries: Finland, Korea, and Singapore. It examines their NIS adoption, 
implementation and evaluation against the theory. The selection of these three countries 
is based on their success in applying the NIS approach and stage of economic 
development as innovation-driven economies. Finland was the first country to adopt NIS 
and that led to positive changes to its economy up to present, Korea turned crisis into 
opportunity in the transition to a technology-based economy using NIS and has become 
competitive in the global economy, and Singapore is a regional and global innovation 
leader. Additionally, the evaluations of NIS by the OECD, the World Bank, and the 
World Economic Forum are also reviewed to provide policymakers techniques and 
measurements for evaluating their countries’ innovative performance.  
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Criteria bring together these dimensions. Understanding the questions, the 
theories behind them, and real-world experiences provides guidance for policymakers in 
acquiring relevant data to create their own indicators for NIS assessment. Some criteria 
could be based on presence or absence of necessary system components, while other 
criteria could be based on organizational and institutional structures and capacities. This 
study does not attempt to create uniform sets of indicators for a given country’s NIS 
assessment. Instead, it gives policymakers a framework for finding their own indicators 
that are “made to measure” their specific system.  
Application of the Framework: A Case Study and Interviews 
The remainder of this study demonstrates how the NIS framework can be applied 
to assess the status and performance of an individual country’s NIS. In the next chapter, 
the case study of Thailand’s NIS is presented, including a background of the country, an 
overview of recent socioeconomic trends and STI policy developments, and the details of 
its NIS. Thailand is in the efficiency-driven stage of economic growth and is in the 
process of structuring its NIS. History, size and endowments, and economic development 
stage have shaped Thailand with a different set of institutions, various government roles, 
and the relations among them as well as different national focuses. These make Thailand 
a suitable candidate among developing countries for an in-depth review of the NIS. 
In addition to reviewing the Thailand case, the interview method is used to obtain 
insightful information about Thailand’s NIS. Individuals with knowledge and experience 
in Thailand’s NIS were asked for their evaluations of the system. These individuals are 
officials from different departments of Thailand’s national government; including Mr. 
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Alongkorn Ponlaboot, Deputy Minister of Commerce (MOC); Prof. Dr. Soottiporn 
Chittmittrapap, Secretary General of National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT); 
and Dr. Yada Mukdapitak, Deputy Secretary General of National Science Technology 
and Innovation Policy Office (STI). Open-ended interviews were conducted and based on 
the following questions: 
1. In your view, is the NIS approach being implemented effectively?  
2. How can NIS be improved?  
3. What is your agency’s role in this system?  







A CASE STUDY OF THAILAND’S NIS 
This chapter presents an in-depth case study of Thailand’s NIS. It includes a brief 
background of the country itself, a discussion of its stages of economic growth and 
technological developments. It examines preconditions to Thailand’s NIS, provides a 
broad description of the NIS, and notes some important outputs of the system.  
Thailand’s shift from an agricultural-based to a higher-technology path stemmed 
in part from a conscious national development strategy. Thailand, like many other 
developing nations, has recognized that facilitating the transition to an innovation-based 
economy is an important public policy priority. A brief overview of the nation’s path to 
economic development and technological progress helps to contextualize this case 
study’s review of the NIS.  
Background 
 Thailand (Figure 5.1 below) is centered on the Chaophraya River basin, where an 
agrarian and feudalistic society originally developed. Bangkok is the capital of Thailand 
and is the largest city with a population of 9.6 million in 2009 (USAID, 2011). It is a 
modern, international city experiencing rapid growth and is the center of government, 
business, finance, industry and culture in the country.   
After World War II, Thailand became a modernizing democratic nation with a 
market-based economy and strengthening international cooperation (Baker & 
Phongpaichit, 2005; Chairatana, 2006; Krishna, n.d.; USAID, 2011). Today, Thailand is a 
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newly industrialized country with a population of 67.8 million. Most of the population is 
employed in agriculture. However in recent decades, industrial manufacturing has also 
contributed significantly to GDP and has become an engine of growth and investment 
(CIA, 2010).  
Figure 5.1 Map of Thailand 
 
 
Source: CIA, 2011  
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Government in Thailand 
Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932. The current king, His 
Majesty Bhumibol Adulyadej, assumed the throne in 1946 and is the world’s longest 
reigning monarch. The king, prime minister, and the cabinet compose the executive 
branch of government. The prime minister is typically the leader of the party which gains 
a majority in parliament from direct elections. The prime minister forms a government by 
nominating 35 ministers and deputy ministers to compose the cabinet. 
The prime minister and the cabinet formulate government policy and agencies 
translate policies into action. Thailand’s parliament is bicameral with five hundred 
members in the House of Representatives and one hundred fifty members in the Senate. 
The House of Representatives has the main legislative, appropriations, and constitutional 
amendment powers, while the Senate has primary advisory with appointment powers. 
The House can also remove ministers and prime ministers with a vote. The judiciary in 
Thailand is composed of three systems: a Court of Justice, an Administrative Court, and 
the Constitutional Court. Thailand has had seventeen constitutions since 1932 and has 
also experienced several military coups during this time (Baker & Phongphaichit, 2005; 
Girling, 1981; Library of Congress, 1987; US Department of State, 2011). There are 77 
provinces in Thailand, including Bangkok. Provincial governors are appointed by the 
Minister of the Interior, except for the governor of Bangkok who is directly elected.   
Stages of Economic Growth 
Industrialization in Thailand began in the late 1950s. Government promoted 
private investment, the role of state enterprises was reduced, and investment in 
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infrastructure increased. The first national social and economic development plan was 
drafted in 1961 and resulted in economic growth driven by private sector capitalism 
(Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 150-151). The Board of Investment (BOI) was created 
to promote investment by providing tax and non-tax incentives and other privileges, the 
Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT) was created to provide financing for 
industrial investments, the Small Industry Finance Corporation (SIFC) provided finance 
to SMEs, and the Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research (TISTR) 
began conducting R&D (Brimble, 2003, p. 337; Chairatana, 2006, p. 120).  
During the 1960s, Thailand employed an import-substitution strategy with tariffs 
on imports to stimulate domestic industries. By the early 1970s, a major shift in policy to 
promote export was undertaken; however, some barriers and control on many products, 
imports, and industrial activities remained (Brimble, 2003, p. 339). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, policy favored export industries and also small-scale 
and regional industries. After 1980, the contribution of agriculture to Thailand’s GDP 
began to decline, and industry’s share began to rise (Chairatana, 2006, p. 121). In this 
period, Thailand positioned itself as an attractive place for labor-intensive manufacturing 
by combining imported capital and technology with local human and natural resources. 
Products were marketed and exported through foreign partner networks (Chairatana, 
2006). Rapid growth had begun and lasted through the 1980s and into the 1990s. The 
economy grew at approximately 10% by the middle of the 1980s. Thailand was viewed as 
an attractive investment location in the Asia-Pacific region. The BOI removed obstacles 
and provided more incentives for private investment in key sectors. It promoted regional 
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areas and infrastructure development, with private sector investment becoming 
increasingly important.  
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Thailand took steps toward more openness 
and competitiveness in the economy. The economy grew by more than 8% a year 
between 1991 and 1995, per capita incomes rose, and poverty decreased dramatically 
(Brimble, 2003, p. 336). For the period 1985-1994, Thailand’s per capita GNP grew by 
8.2% (Brimble, 2003, p. 336; Chairatana, 2006, p. 120-122). 
In 1995, Thailand joined the World Trade Organization. Foreign direct investment 
and exports of manufactured products were the main drivers of growth, and the share of 
GDP from manufacturing reached approximately 30% (Brimble, 2003, p. 336). The rapid 
growth put pressure on infrastructure and resources causing production costs to rise. 
There was also intensifying competition from low-wage countries, such as India, China, 
and Indonesia. In response, Thai manufacturers shifted to higher value-added and more 
sophisticated products and moved up the value added ladder (Brimble, 2003, p. 336).  
In 1997, however, the Thai economy went into a deep recession due to the failure 
of the financial sector. This economic crisis lasted the remainder of the decade. As a 
result, the currency collapsed, over 2 million people lost their jobs, consumers stopped 
buying, and creditors stopped paying their loans. The economy had become fragile due to 
cheap credit, weak financial controls, and excessive foreign investment. Between 1997 
and 1998, the economy declined by 11%. GDP growth in 1998 was -8.3%, and inflation 
rose to 8% (Baker & Pongphaichit, 2005; Bosworth, 2005, p. 2; Brimble, 2003, p. 336-
339; Chairatana, 2006).  
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The crisis in Thailand triggered similar crises in several other East Asian 
countries because of the level of integration of the regional economies. This phenomenon 
was referred to as “contagion.” The IMF intervened in Thailand and some of the other 
affected countries to help stabilize the situation. Friedman (1999) has referred to the 
Asian Economic Crisis as the “first global financial crisis of the new era of globalization” 
(p. 1). 
Investment was also affected by the crisis. In the first half of the 1990s, 
investment averaged 40% of GDP; however after the crisis, investment has been reduced 
to only 20% (Bosworth, 2005, p. 2). The crisis caused financial and corporate 
restructuring, and the government implemented reform to the financial sector (Brimble, 
2003, p. 339). By the early 2000s, economic output had bounced back to the pre-crisis 
level; however, economic growth was on a lower trajectory. At this point, Thailand 
required “significant increases in competitiveness in the major export sectors” (Brimble, 
2003, p. 337).  
Thailand’s growth has been described as relatively capital intensive because the 
growth of the capital stock has been greater than the growth of the output (Bosworth, 
2005, p. 2). Studies conducted by domestic institutions indicate strong rates of capital 
formation. Moreover, the largest improvement in total factor production (TFP) has 
occurred in agriculture while TFP growth in the service sector has frequently been 




Current Economic Status 
Thailand is transitioning into a middle-income country. It is seen as a business-
friendly manufacturing hub, and an investment, industry, and tourism destination in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Thailand’s GDP in 2010 was approximately US$153.19 billion, and 
its GDP per capita was US$2,276.28 (ADB, 2012).
19
 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below show the 
structure and trends of economic output and exports for Thailand in recent years. For the 
period of 1990-2010, overall, Thailand’s GDP and its GDP per capita have increased 
during this period. Moreover, the output of the agricultural, industrial and service sectors 
of the economy have remained consistent during this period (ADB, 2012). 
Exports are critical to the economy, accounting for about two-thirds of GDP 
(USAID, 2011). In 2010, exports grow by 26.8% and in 2011 by 15.5% (ADB, 2012). 
Export activities are concentrated along the Eastern Seaboard, where port facilities and 
major industrial estates are located. Major export industries include electronics, 
automotive, chemicals and heavy industry.
20
 The electronics industry is the country’s 
largest source of manufacturing export, particularly hard disk drives. Most electronics 
firms are original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for foreign multinational 
corporations (MNCs). Automobiles and automotive parts exports account for 12% of 
GDP. Thailand has become an important base of production for automotive firms from 
Japan, the United States, and Europe. It is predicted that Thailand will be one of the top 
10 motor vehicle producing countries in the world by 2015 (Intarakumnerd, 2010).  
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 GDP and GDP per capita in constant 1988 dollars 
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Table 5.1 Thailand’s Output in Constant Prices 1990-2010 
Indicator 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
National Accounts 
   GDP per capita (USD) 1,359.21 1,930.74 1,418.37 1,446.14 2,276.28 
   GDP (billion USD, at constant prices) 75.84 114.69 88.22 94.14 153.19 
       GDP by industrial origin at constant prices (billion USD) 
       Agriculture 10.28 10.78 9.09 8.49 12.72 
       Mining 1.21 1.74 1.88 2.15 3.37 
       Manufacturing 21.09 37.36 32.15 36.60 62.44 
       Electricity, gas, and water 1.82 3.08 2.86 3.15 5.46 
       Construction 4.55 7.16 2.24 2.29 3.40 
       Trade 13.18 20.14 13.92 13.22 20.36 
       Transport and communications 5.72 9.33 8.52 9.37 14.34 
       Finance 4.21 12.48 5.99 7.02 11.92 
       Public administration 2.39 3.02 2.79 2.84 4.24 
       Others 11.38 9.59 8.78 9.02 14.94 
   Structure of output (% of GDP) 
       Agriculture 10.0 9.1 8.5 9.2 10.9 
       Industry 37.2 37.6 36.9 38.8 40.1 
       Services 52.8 53.3 54.6 52.0 49.0 
 
Source: Based on ADB, 2012 
Note: The base year for constant prices is 1988; Services includes banking, finance, and tourism. 
 
Agricultural products are also a major export. Approximately 42% of the working 
population is engaged in agriculture (USAID, 2011). Thailand is the largest exporter of 
rice in the Southeast Asian region and one of the largest in the world. It is also the 
world’s largest exporter of shrimp and natural rubber. Besides electronics, automotive, 
and agricultural products, other important exported products include gems and jewelry, 
chemicals, and polymers. Currently, the United States is Thailand’s largest export market, 
followed by China (ADB, 2010; ADB, 2012).  
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Tourism is also a major component of the economy with approximately 15% 
annual growth in numbers of tourists in 2010 (Durongkaveroj, 2010; MFA, 2010). 
Typically, tourism accounts for about 6% of Thailand’s annual GDP. Tourism is more 
important to Thailand’s economy than to any other Southeast Asian country. 
Table 5.2 Thailand Exports 2000-2011 
 
Indicator 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Exports      
     Exports value (billion USD) 62.2 110.9 177.8 152.4 193.3 222.6 
     Exports growth (%) 19.9 14.9 15.54 -14.3 26.8 15.5 
Key Exported Products, growth rate (%)      
     Automatic data processing machines  
     parts and accessories 
7.6 28.6 1.4 -9.9 9.4 -13.9 
     Motor cars, parts, and accessories 27.2 40.5 14.8 -26.3 48.3 -8.8 
     Electronic integrated circuits  52.3 21.4 -18.0 -7.8 16.3 -6.7 
     Rubber    31.5 8.2 15.1 -34.6 70.5 59.3 
     Precious stones and jewelry  -1.4 21.7 48.0 21.8 9.9 1.2 
     Polymers of ethylene, propylene, etc.  
     in primary forms 
53.5 34.6 0.9 -16.1 31.8 32.4 
     Iron, steel and their products n/a 16.0 12.2 -4.4 n/a n/a 
     Machinery and parts thereof n/a 26.0 -7.0 -18.7 36.3 19.4 
     Refine fuels n/a 33.7 84.6 -27.6 14.9 23.5 
     Rice -15.8 n/a 70.5 -15.3 n/a -2.3 
     Rubber products n/a n/a 19.0 1.9 33.1 24.4 
     Chemical products n/a 27.7 4.9 7.4 19.9 37.0 
 
Source: Based on MOC, 2012 (Exports) and NSO, 2012 (Key Exported Products) 
Note: n/a means the product is not in the top 10 exported items. 
 
In 2009, Thailand’s “Creative Economy” became the focus of a new economic 
development strategy. The Director of the National Innovation Agency, Dr. Supachai 
Lorlowhakarn said,  
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The emergence of the ‘creative economy’ concept in recent years is 
closely linked to innovation. In essence, a creative economy is deeply 
anchored in continuous innovation wherein not only technological 
advancements, but also business factors and social factors provide a 
foundation for such development.
21
 
The Creative Economy policy as defined by the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) covers four industry clusters.
22
 These are: (1) cultural 
heritage industries, which include crafts, historical and cultural tourism, Thai foods, and 
traditional medicine; (2) performing and visual arts; (3) media, including film, 
publishing, broadcasting, and music, and (4) functional creation industries, which include 
design, fashion, architecture, advertising, and software. These clusters comprise 
“creative” domestic industries which are less dependent on foreign capital and technology 
(PRD, 2011). The new strategy is referred to as “Creative Thailand.” The goals of the 
Creative Thailand policy are to promote Thailand as a hub of creative industries in South 
East Asia, and to boost the economic contribution of national creative industries from the 
12% to 20% of GDP by 2012 (PRD, 2011).  
The Thai government has identified several measures to achieve the goals of the 
Creative Thailand policy, including: (1) establishing a dedicated agency to oversee policy 
implementation; (2) enhancing the efficiency of the nation’s intellectual property 
management system; (3) developing a next-generation ICT infrastructure to support 
creative industries; (4) updating the national curriculum with courses and textbooks on 




 The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) describes the creative economy as a 
way to drive a balanced and sustainable production restructuring strategy under the 10th National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (2007-2011). The major principle is the creation of value by 
applying knowledge and innovation, together with strength from the diversity of natural resources, culture, 
and Thai ways of life (http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/review/content.php?chapterID=76). 
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the Creative Economy and intellectual property; (5) promoting the value of traditional 
knowledge and creativity at the regional and community levels; (6) establishing new 
sources of funding and new investment measures to support creative industries and 
businesses, especially SMEs; and (7) allocating approximately US$670 million from 
2010-2012 to lay the groundwork for the Creative Economy agenda.
23
  
Science, Technology, and Innovation 
From the late 1950s to about 1980s, science and technology policy development 
started to take shape in Thailand. In 1959, the National Research Council of Thailand 
(NRCT) was created to formulate and implement national research policy and 
strategies.
24
 In 1963 the Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research 
(TISTR) was created for implementing special S&T policies of the Thai government.
25
 
The First (1963-1966) and then the Second (1967-1971) National Economic and 
Social Development Plans were launched during this period.
26
 In 1979, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST) was created to formulate national policy for S&T, the 
environment, and energy, and to implement these policies efficiently to bring about the 
most socio-economic benefits and national stability.
27
 Four universities offering degrees 
in engineering, computing, and other technological fields opened during 1970s: the Asian 
Institute of Technology (AIT), King Mongkut’s University of Technology North 













Bangkok (KMUTNB), King Mongkut’s University of Technology Ladkrabang (KMITL), 
and Mahidol University (MU) (Inarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007).  
During the 1980s, technology plans were developed and two key public 
technology research institutes opened. The Fifth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1982-1986) called for promoting S&T to raise output and 
productivity and conserve factors of production for agriculture, manufacturing, and 
energy.
 28
 The development of the 20-year S&T master plan (1990-2011) also began at 
this time. The National Science and Technology Development Board (NSTDB) was 
established during this period to conduct, support, coordinate, and promote efforts in 
scientific and technological development in the public and the private sectors. The 
National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) and the National 
Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) were also created. BIOTEC 
supports the creation and transfer of technology for industry, agriculture, natural 
resources, and the environment.
29
 NECTEC undertakes and promotes the development of 
electronics and computer technologies through R&D activities, and serves as a linkage 
between research communities and industries through established industrial clusters.
30
  
Between 1987 and 1997, 103 scientists and engineers and 39 technicians per 
million persons were engaged in R&D in Thailand, and science and engineering students 
accounted for 18% of college and university enrollments. Suranari University of 
Technology opened, and planning for the Thailand Science Park (TSP) began in 1989. 









TSP would become a major hub for technological innovation in the country 
(Intarakumnerd et al., 2002).  
In the 1990s, the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1992-1997) called for a sectoral approach to technology development and initiated 
several instruments to encourage innovation.
31
 The National Science and Technology 
Development Agency (NSTDA) was established in 1991 with an annual budget of US$50 
million. Its task was to promote a knowledge-based society through R&D, technology 
transfer, human resources development, and infrastructure development and research.
32
 
The Thailand Research Fund (TRF) was set up to strengthen Thailand’s research 
infrastructure through grants provision.
33
 The National Synchrotron Research Center 
(NSRC) was also established to conduct nationwide research in basic science, chemistry, 
and biochemistry for industrial adaptation.
34
   
In 1996, the First National Information Technology Policy, called IT 2000, was 
developed. It identified three key areas necessary for IT development in Thailand: (1) an 
equitable national information infrastructure, (2) human resources, and (3) enhancement 
of government service. The Thailand Graduate Institute of Science and Technology 
(TGIST) was established to develop human resources in S&T, and link industry and 
academia.
35
 King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi (KMUTT), 













Mahanakorn University of Technology (MUT), and the National Science Museum 
(NSM), also opened during the decade. 
The Asian economic crisis that struck Thailand in the late 1990s has been called a 
“blessing in disguise,” because the country then became aware of the importance of 
learning processes and linkage creation for supporting industries (Intarakumnerd & 
Brimble, 2007, p. 263). After the crisis, the idea of “competitiveness” gained more 
attention in Thailand and throughout the region. It triggered science, technology, and 
innovation policy reform (Brimble, 2003, p. 340; Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 
263).  
Immediately following the crisis, Thailand re-examined its approach to economic 
growth and development, led by the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinwatra, 
who emphasized the country’s economic competitiveness. Support for innovation-
oriented policy in the government also took shape at this critical time. Dr. Yada 
Mukdapitak, the deputy secretary general of Thailand’s Science, Technology and 
Innovation Policy Office, states that NIS was recognized in Thailand around 1998 by 
NSTDA (discussed below). During the 1990s, Dr. Yongyut Yuthavong, the first President 
of NSTDA, was searching for a way to manage the country’s S&T development in a 
more systemic approach and also to understand international trends in technology transfer 
and technological innovation. A two-year research project was initiated to uncover details 
about systemic approaches to S&T development. Dr. Mukdapitak was one of three 
NSTDA’s researchers assigned to the project. NIS came to the researchers’ attention 
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because of the global trend of innovation thinking at that time (personal communication, 
April 7, 2011).  
Research on NIS in Thailand had begun. Its aim was to understand the concept of 
NIS itself and determine how it could bring changes to the country’s S&T development 
approach. Dr. Mukdapitak and her colleagues investigated what other countries were 
doing with NIS, including Finland, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Interviews with key people that studied NIS and innovation policy in those 
countries were conducted (personal communication, April 7, 2011).  
The NSTDA study resulted in a report on innovation systems, and 
recommendations to the government for a change in national direction for R&D and S&T 
development. The Research and Policy department at NSTDA also invited Bengt-Åke 
Lundvall, a leading NIS expert from Aalborg University in Denmark, to help explain the 
NIS idea to the Thai government. The NIS concept was initially applied. NSTDA 
supported the NIS approach to prioritize what needed to be done, and to direct key 
system actors to accomplish innovation-related tasks (Y. Mukdapitak, personal 
communication, April 7, 2011). 
Description of Thailand’s NIS 
The rationale for NIS adoption in Thailand is based on three main factors: the 
environmental context, competition, and learning. The environmental context refers to 
outward influences that cause changes in making decisions (e.g. system shocks, crisis). 
Competition means that adoption occurs when the adopter enters into economic 
competition. Adoption is more likely when positive economic spillovers are present. 
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Negative economic spillovers discourage adoption. Learning can incorporate the 
adopter’s own experiences as well as the experiences of others. Learning also involves 
the processing of information which can be obtained from internal and external sources.  
The Asian economic crisis of 1997 raised the awareness of competitiveness of the 
country and triggered science, technology, and innovation policy reform. Concerted 
learning and research efforts at this time in Thailand focused on a more systemic 
approach to manage the country’s innovation development. NIS came to the country’s 
attention because of the global trend of innovation system thinking at that time. Adoption 
of the NIS approach was a good fit with the historic and continuing build-up of science 
and technology infrastructure and capacity in the country. A long-term view of growth 
and development was emphasized by both NIS and S&T build-up. 
Different reasons for adopting a policy or program leads to different responses 
and means of implementation, and most importantly, this can lead to different levels of 
success. If the adopters are forced to adopt something into use without background 
knowledge and experiences, they may not be ready and find it difficult. Similarly, when 
the adopters voluntarily adopt something without learning it thoroughly, it may not be 
well conceived and fail. Will different adoption types affect the performance? For 
Thailand, the factors that triggered NIS adoption are the environmental context from 
financial crisis, competition in global economy, and learning from experiences of NIS 
leading countries. This gives us understanding of the way Thailand adopted the NIS and 




Implementation of the NIS is proceeding in Thailand, affected by the wider policy 
environment discussed above. National Innovation Agency (NIA) and the National 
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI) have both shown capacity in 
planning for and fostering innovation. Foreign-based firms and investors are transferring 
capital and some necessary technology to suit their operations to the local affiliate firms. 
This transfer takes place through the conventional branch plant arrangement. Most 
domestic firms in Thailand appear to lack the resources, technical sophistication, and 
stimulus to be real participants in the implementation of the NIS. Institutional structures 
to facilitate innovation are taking shape; however, weak or missing linkages among 
innovation actors persist in the system. Most notably, the critical linkage between 
industry and universities appears to be underdeveloped. Rationalizing the system and 
enhancing the credibility of actors and their incentives can have a positive impact on 
policy implementation. These issues will be described in more detail and addressed 
through policy recommendations in the sections below. 
In Thailand, the NIS is intended to assist the innovative efforts of targeted firms in 
private industry. These firms undertake R&D and innovative activities to produce 
products and processes that embody technological innovation. Public organizations, 
including key government agencies and research institutions are integral to facilitate the 
innovative efforts of firms. Key political and social institutions create “framework 
conditions” (OECD, 1997b) that also help to promote a climate for innovation in the 




The Private Sector 
Industry accounted for approximately 45% of Thailand’s GDP in 2010 (CIA, 
2010). Major industries include textiles and garments, agricultural processing, food and 
beverages, cement, jewelry, electric appliances, machinery and equipment, computers 
and computer parts, integrated circuits, communications equipment, furniture, rubber and 
plastics, automobiles and automotive parts. The industrial production growth rate was 
14.5% in 2010, which was the ninth-highest in the world. Manufacturing exports 
accounted for approximately 50% of GDP in 2010, especially machinery and electronic 
components (CIA, 2010; NSO, 2007). Table 5.3 below is based on Thailand’s last census 
of industry in 2007.
 36
 It shows output from major industrial divisions in terms of value 
added production. Communication equipment, food and beverages, motor vehicles, and 
fabricated metals are the leading industries in terms of value added. 
Large multinational corporations (MNCs) and large state-owned enterprises 
dominate the economy and are the most important contributors to GDP (Intarakumnerd, 
2010). The automotive and electronics manufacturing sectors include important Japanese 
firms, such as Honda, Toyota, Hitachi, and Matsushita (Andrews, Chompusri, & 
Baldwin, 2003).
37
 Between 1995 and 2004, transportation machinery and electronics 
including hard-disk drive (HDD) were the top two manufacturing subsectors in terms of 
FDI (Brimble & Urata, 2006).  
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Table 5.3 Industrial Value Added Production 2007 
Industrial Division 
Value added 
(million USD) % 
Food and beverages 7571.0 14.0 
Textiles, apparel, leather products 4784.0 8.8 
Wood and wood products, paper and paper products, 
printing 
2519.4 4.6 
Chemicals and chemical products 3431.1 6.3 
Rubber and plastic products 3783.6 7.0 
Non-metallic, basic metals and fabricated metallic products 6596.2 12.2 
Machinery and equipment 2971.8 5.5 
Radio, television, and communication equipment and 
apparatus 
7990.5 14.7 
Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 6661.8 12.3 
Furniture manufacturing 1925.8 3.5 
Others 6047.1 11.1 
Total 54,282.6 100.0 
 
Source: Based on NSO, 2007  
Note: Value added equals gross output less production expenses 
 
The R&D activities of most MNCs appear disconnected from local affiliates and 
institutions (Brimble & Urata, 2006). In the HDD subsector, however, Seagate 
Technology appears to be the only MNCs in Thailand to acknowledge the values of 
innovation linkages. It is the country’s largest employer and has developed mutual 
technology, human resources, and R&D connections with several of Thailand’s 
universities (Brimble & Doner, 2007, p. 1029-1030; Doner, 2009, p. 136). Seagate has 
taken the initiative on: (1) developing a consortium of five universities to deliver a 
customized curriculum for producing engineers to manage the company’s high-tech 
facilities, (2) participating in a government cooperative training program hosting 20-40 
students per year, and (3) establishing joint R&D centers at Khon Kaen and Suranaree 
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Universities. These have been successful efforts with benefits for both partners (Brimble 
& Doner, 2007). However, Thai authorities have been unable to transfer lessons from the 
Seagate example into initiatives for related industries (Brimble & Doner, 2007; Doner, 
2009). 
In 2006, Thailand’s small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) contributed 
nearly 40% of GDP. Thailand’s BOI estimates that 99% of the companies operating in 
the country in 2010 were SMEs. SMEs are defined as having no more than 200 
employees and no more than US$200,000 of capital. Thailand has many SMEs which 
account for 78% of employment. However, Thailand has fewer medium-sized enterprises 
and more small enterprises than other Asian countries. The many small enterprises in the 
country employ relatively small numbers of workers. This suggests that barriers to 
growth exist in the economy (Intarakumnerd, 2010). Some SMEs, many large local firms, 
and most MNCs, possess little higher order technological capabilities, as shown in Table 
5.4 below (Arnold et al., 2000). Perhaps because of the lack of technological skills in 
SMEs, the Office of Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion’s (OSMEP) set up the 
SMEs promotion plan (2007-2011) as a strategy for upgrading their productivity and 
















Occasionally present, limited in 
scale, depleted by 1997 crisis in 
some cases, strengthened by 
pressures in many cases 
Very rarely present 
Design and engineering Capabilities limited but 
growing, when present play a 
limited technological 
development role but this is 
likely changing 
Rarely present though 
emerging in some firms 
Technician and craft 
skills and capabilities 
Usually present, often the focus 
of training efforts, selected key 
skills sometimes weak 
Strong skills sometimes 
present, though key skills 
often weak or absent 
Basic operating skills 
and capabilities 
Present, often strong, and 
regularly upgraded 
Often weak with limited and 
irregular upgrading 
 
Source: Based on Arnold et al., 2000 
Many Thai firms have shown slow and passive technological learning, a lack of 
R&D capabilities, and long-term technological development (Arnold et al., 2000; TDRI, 
1992). However, there are some business sectors in Thailand that are investing relatively 
more in R&D, as shown in Figure 5.2 below. These include some key manufacturing 







Figure 5.2 Business Sector R&D Expenditures in 2005 for High-Ranking Sectors 
 
Source: Based on Vanichseni & Suvalai, 2009 
There are two main organizations that are active in promoting innovative capacity 
and diffusing innovation knowledge among domestic firms (Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 
2007, p. 255). These are the Technology Promotion Agency (TPA) and the Kenan 
Institute Asia (KI Asia). They serve as “bridging agents” by providing education, 
training, technical services, and technology transfer to industry partners. The TPA and KI 
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Asia have also become involved in government policies to enhance the capacity and 
entrepreneurship of Thai SMEs (Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 256).  
Cluster development is seen to enhance the competitive advantages of industries. 
Porter (2003) notes the progression of national economies in cluster development, 
including manufacturing, service, and regional assembly. An important step is to upgrade 
the sophistication of clusters to more advanced activities, such as Silicon Valley. The 
Thai government has taken policy steps over the years to encourage cluster formation for 
industrial development, and Thailand industrial clusters have been recognized 
internationally (WEF, 2010). The greater Bangkok area has become a favorable base for 
world-leading firms to produce for regional and global markets. Currently in the Bangkok 
area, there is an electronic industry cluster and an automobile industry that are 
particularly active and worthy of attention. 
Thailand is the largest hard-disk drive (HDD) assembler in the world 
(Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 249). Major manufacturing facilities in the Greater 
Bangkok region are operated by world-leading firms, including Seagate, Maxtor, Western 
Digital, Hitachi-IBM, and Fujitsu (Yeung, 2008). Thai firms typically import high-tech 
components, and then export the assembled product worldwide, therefore local content is 
low. Technology is transferred from foreign affiliates, and marketing and production 
decisions are made by MNCs headquarters (Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 249). 
Thai HDD firms have shown strong capabilities in investment, process development, and 
industrial engineering, but weak capabilities in product engineering and innovation and 
linkage development. Firms have expressed interest in strengthening linkages to other 
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industry stakeholders through joint efforts by industry and government (Intarakumnerd & 
Brimble, 2007, p. 249).   
Since 1999, NSTDA has supported cluster development programs for the HDD 
industry. Representatives from the storage technology industry, the Thai government, 
academia, and public research institutes have created a collective management committee 
to help guide the development of the industry in Thailand. In 2004, the committee 
planned several joint activities utilizing public-private partnerships. Projects were 
designed to further develop human resources, industry automation, investment 
opportunities, and technology “road mapping and to create a Disk Storage Institute.” As 
of 2005, most of these projects are underway using public and private financing, with 
NECTEC and MOST playing a supportive (Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007).  
In the automobile manufacturing industry, the Greater Bangkok and eastern 
seaboard region of Thailand is now Southeast Asia’s leading production center. More 
than 20 world-leading assembly firms and hundreds of suppliers are active (Yeung, 
2008). The automobile industry is now Thailand’s second largest export industry after 
electronics and electrical products (Yeung, 2008, p. 27).  
In the automobile cluster, both foreign and Thai-owned assemblers and suppliers 
gain the benefits of lower transport and logistics costs, increased certainty in inter-firm 
transactions, reduced time-to-market, and just-in-time production flexibility. These 
advantages come from the geographic proximity of firms in the cluster. The Thai 
government has played an important role in facilitating cluster development by creating 
sector-specific industrial estates, and securing regional economic cooperation. The 
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National Innovation Agency (NIA, discussed below) has become increasingly involved in 
the automobile cluster. These efforts have helped to connect Thailand’s automobile 
cluster with global automobile production networks.  
Yeung (2008) investigated the emergence of industrial clusters in Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, including the HDD and automobile clusters. He describes three 
models for the existence of industrial clusters: (1) an “agglomeration economies model” 
which results from local specialized labor, local provision of non-traded inputs, and the 
flow of product and market knowledge; (2) an “industrial complex model” which results 
from lower transport and logistics costs and greater certainty in transactions; and (3) a 
“social network model” which results from localized trust and interpersonal relationships, 
institutionalized practices, conventions, and norms. Yeung finds that aspects of the HDD 
and automobile clusters in Thailand can be explained by the agglomeration economies 
and industrial complex models, but not the social network model. 
Public Sector Organizations  
In Thailand’s NIS, several public organizations help to create a supportive climate 
for innovation by connecting potential innovators with resources and with each other. As 
noted above, there are few linking organizations in the private sector; therefore public 
institutions serve as the main linkages in Thailand’s NIS. These include: the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, the National Science and Technology Development Agency, 
the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office, the National Innovation 
Agency, the National Research Council of Thailand, the Thailand Research Fund, four 
public research institutes, and the Thailand Science Park. 
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The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) was established in 1979. Its 
responsibilities are formulating, coordinating, and implementing national policy for S&T, 
the environment, and energy. It oversees the work of fourteen agencies and enterprises, 
including the National Science and Technology Development Agency, the National 
Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office, and the National Innovation 
Agency).
38
 The Permanent Secretary of MOST Pornchai Rujiprapha states,  
We must capitalize on our competitive advantages by investing in R&D. It 
is our goal that we invest in research and innovation in the advanced-
industrial clusters . . .We realize that to escape the middle-income trap, 
Thailand must invest in research to stay ahead in the international 
economy. We plan to become an innovation hub in Southeast Asia, 
capitalizing on a well-trained science-and-technology workforce, science-
and-technology training services, cost effectiveness in R&D, a foreign-
direct-investment-friendly policy, government support and incentives for 
investment and our well-known hospitable culture.
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The National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand 
(NSTDA) is an autonomous agency within the MOST. It was created by the Science and 
Technology Development Act of 1991 and tasked with conducting, supporting, 
coordinating, and promoting efforts in scientific and technological development in the 
public and the private sectors.
40
 NSTDA enables scientists and experts to meet and work 
on scientific and technological issues of national and international priority. NSTDA is the 
home of the four national research centers discussed below: BIOTEC, MTEC, NECTEC, 
and NANOTEC. In 2008, NSTDA’s R&D budget was approximately US$64 million 
(1,910 million baht) (Vanichseni & Suvalai, 2009). 










The Technology Management Center (TMC) is the commercial department of 
NSTDA and facilitates the growth of high-tech industry in Thailand.
41
 It encourages 
researchers to transform their results into SMEs and other firms commercial applications 
in assisting them toward knowledge-based, higher value-added operations. The TMC 
offers financial assistance to firms through research grants, R&D loans and tax incentives 
(in conjunction with the Revenue Department), and loans for company start-ups and new 
technology. It also co-invests in pioneering or high priority national projects. Other 
programs operated by TMC include the Industrial Technology Assistance Program 
(ITAP), which helps firms overcome technical obstacles, and the Support for Technology 
Acquisition and Mastery Program (STAMP), which helps firms acquire and utilize new 
technology.   
The National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI) is under the 
MOST and was created by the National Science, Technology, and Innovation Act of 2008 
(discussed below).
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 Its objective is to develop science, technology, and innovations for 
national economic and social development. STI’s major responsibilities are: (1) 
formulating national STI policies and plans; (2) developing standard measurements, 
indicators, and databases, and conducting research on science, technology and innovation 
policy; (3) providing support and advice to other government agencies in formulating 
their own STI implementation plans; (4) coordinating and monitoring the development of 








a national S&T workforce; and (5) monitoring and evaluating national STI 
implementation actions.  
The STI sees three elements important for innovation: (1) Thailand’s NIS; (2) 
technical requirements, including hardware, software, engineering technology, and basic 
science; and (3) the goals of innovation, including new and emerging industries and 
businesses, economic growth, and social development (Durongkaveroj, 2010). It enacted 
a 10-year Science and Technology Action Plan (2004-2013) to strengthen industrial 
clusters and innovation capabilities. The plan includes targets for measuring innovation 
progress which concern levels of R&D expenditure and manpower. Indicators, databases, 
indexes, reports, and research on comparative STI policies are also provided. STI 
coordinates and monitors the development of human STI resources in the country, and 
ensures consistency between other innovation-oriented agencies and the STI policy and 
plan.   
The National Innovation Agency (NIA)
43
 was established by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology in 2003 as an autonomous organization. NIA was tasked with 
enhancing the national innovation system through a broad-based approach. The 
establishment of the NIA combined the Innovation Development Fund, previously under 
the NSTDA, and the Revolving Fund for Research and Technology Development, 
previously under the MOST. The intention is to set up a single agency to undertake and 
support national innovation development.  





NIA serves as a central coordinator in the innovation system by linking different 
organizations from the fields of education, technology, finance, manufacturing and 
management. It provides technical advice, financing and investment, industry and 
innovation markets assessment, post-R&D support for commercialization. NIA uses 
knowledge management and promotes a cluster format for achieving three objectives: (1) 
inducing innovations in economic units, (2) creating a supportive atmosphere for 
innovation culture, and (3) strengthening organizations in innovation direction. Five 
innovation cluster projects are ongoing in NIA: (1) food and herbs, (2) indigenous rubber 
and derived products, (3) software and mechatronics, (4) automotives and parts, and (5) 
engineering and industrial designs.  
The NIA is implementing the STI Policy goals at firm level. Acting as a “match-
maker and integrator” (Lorlowhakarn & Ellis, 2005), it supports research in areas that 
meet business needs, and encourages development of start-up companies, especially 
SMEs. NIA has initiated and partnered in several schemes to manage the risks of 
investing in innovative businesses and facilitate the emergence of new companies 
involved in knowledge-based R&D. For example, with one scheme, NIA bears the 
interest payments incurred on behalf of the recipient for the first three years 
(Lorlowhakarn & Ellis, 2005).  
The NIA has performed these activities on a variety of recent projects. These 
include: (1) the  University Business Incubator program with the Commission on Higher 
Education and several universities, (2) the Innovation Management for Executives (IME) 
training course supported by 17 universities and companies; (3) five-minute diagnostic 
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test kits for H5N1 Avian Influenza and Salmonella; (4) R&D, commercialization, and 
cluster building for native herbal extracts with five universities, eight suppliers, and the 
spa industry; (5) the Design and Branding Innovation Project of the Ceramics 
Development Cluster in Lampang province, which seeks to establish CeraLampang as a 
world-renowned Thai national brand; (6) the National Organic Agriculture Model to 
stimulate the organic sector’s product and process-based innovations; (7) consortium 
building between four software companies and shrimp producers and exporters for a 
computer-based traceability system to verify  product safety and quality for the Thai 
shrimp industry; and (8) introduction of new technologies, funding, and strategic 
innovation projects for the natural rubber industry in order to increase the international 
competitiveness of the sector and stimulate private sector investment (Lorlowhakarn & 
Ellis, 2005).  
Recently, NIA is granting approximately US$10 million (300 million baht) to 
Thai companies to set up a pilot plant for bioplastic production. This is part of NIA’s plan 
to offer 30% funding support for investments in bioplastic production. The manager of 
the NIA’s Innovation Strategy Department, Sura-at Supachatturat said, “Without the NIA 
sharing the risks, it would be very difficult to persuade companies to set up the plant in 
Thailand due to the relatively high cost.” Moreover, NIA director, Supachai 
Lorlowhakarn said, “If the project succeeded, it could also help to promote efforts to 
restructure Thailand’s agricultural system.”
44
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 NIA hopes to kickstart new industry with B300m (2011, April, 18). Bangkok Post.  
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The National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT)
45
 was established in 1959 as 
the government’s highest council on issues of scientific research relating to national 
development. To carry out this mission, NRCT: (1) formulates the national research 
policy and strategy; (2) develops research standards, research systems, and conducts 
research monitoring and evaluation; (3) promotes local and international research 
cooperation; (4) promotes and supports research, inventions, innovation, and technology 
transfer to social, industrial, and commercial sectors; (5) reports on national research 
status and research indicators; and (6) serves as a knowledge center for research.  
In 2009, the NRCT initiated Thailand’s research system reform to establish 
linkages among domestic and foreign research agencies, stakeholders, researchers, and 
other related parties. In the process of the research system reform, NRCT has been 
working closely with other research agencies, including National Science and 
Technology Agency (STI), Thailand Research Fund (TRF), National Science and 
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA), Health System Research Institute (HSRI), 
Agricultural Research Development Agency (ARDA), National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), and Office of  Educational Council (OEC). The reform 
program intended to bring clarity and more efficient administration to Thailand’s research 
system. In 2009, NRCT had an R&D budget allocation approximately US$23 million 
(677 million baht) (NRCT, 2009).  





 The Thailand Research Fund (TRF) was established by the 1992 Research 
Endowment Act to enable greater efficiency in research support.
46
 Its objectives are to: 
(1) build up professional researchers and strengthen the research community, (2) support 
basic and applied research significant to national development, (3) promote the 
dissemination and use of research findings, and (4) raise funds for national R&D efforts. 
In 2008, TRF had an R&D budget allocation of approximately US$43 million (1.3 billion 
baht) (Vanichseni & Suvalai, 2009). 
There are four major public research institutes in Thailand that innovate new 
technological products and processes: The National Center for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology, The National Metal and Materials Technology Center, The National 
Electronics and Computer Technology Center, and The National Nanotechnology Center. 
These centers are administered by NSTDA.   
The National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) was 
first set up under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy (discussed below) in 
1983. The BIOTEC became one of the NSTDA centers in 1991.  Operating outside the 
framework of civil service and state enterprises allows BIOTEC to better support and 
transfer technology to users. BIOTEC operates research units at Thailand Science Park 
(discussed below) and also at specialized university laboratories. It develops 
biotechnology innovations for industry, agriculture, natural resources, and the 
environment. It conducts research in genetic and biotechnology applications in 





agricultural science, biomedical science, and environmental science; and also conducts 
policy-related research, and outreach, training, and international relations activities.
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The National Metal and Materials Technology Center (MTEC) was established in 
1986 as a project under the Office of the Permanent-Secretary of the then Ministry of 
Science and Technology. Its main objective is to support R&D in metals and materials 
instrumental for the industrial sector and the overall development of the country. The 
MTEC became one of the NSTDA centers in 1991. Its research became more integrated 
with all of Thailand’s major industrial clusters: food and agro; medical and public health; 
automotive and transportation; software, microchips, and electronics; energy and 
environment, and textiles and chemicals.
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The National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) was 
established in 1986 and became a specialized national center under NSTDA in 1991. 
NECTEC’s responsibilities are to undertake and promote the development of electronics 
and computer technology innovations. These responsibilities carry out R&D activities; 
design and engineering; technology transfer to industries and communities; human 
resource development; and policy research, industrial intelligence, and knowledge 
infrastructure. NECTEC also provides a linkage between research communities and 
industries through established industrial clusters.
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The National Nanotechnology Center (NANOTEC) was established in 2003 as an 
autonomous research agency under NSTDA and the Ministry of Science and Technology. 









Its mission is to design and conduct R&D and support technology transfer for 
nanotechnology applications to Thailand’s industrial sector.  Its goals are to strengthen 
the nation’s global competitiveness, promote public awareness of nanotechnology 
development trends, and protect the environment.
50
  
The Thailand Science Park (TSP) came into operation in 2002 with 140,000 
square meters of space, outside of Bangkok. A new phase of development, called 
Innovation Clusters 2, adds a further 127,000 square meters of space for private 
companies.
51
 The TSP is an important component in Thailand’s in research and 
innovation system. Currently it hosts NSTDA headquarters, TMC, BIOTEC, MTEC, 
NECTEC, and NANOTEC, and over fifty-nine corporate tenants. The park is also located 
close to three of Thailand’s leading universities: the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), 
Thammasat University (TU), and Sirindhorn International Institute of Technology (SIIT).  
The park offers state-of-the-art facilities and business space and value-added 
services, including subsidized facility rates, technology and technical support, human and 
legal resources, financial support, intellectual property and licensing services, contract 
research and collaborative research support, and participation in a joint investment fund 
administered by the NSTDA Investment Center (NIC). Tenants of the park also enjoy the 
most attractive BOI incentives. The Thailand Science Park-Incubator (TSP-I) programs 
help start-up companies and entrepreneurs transfer product ideas into businesses. 
Successful start-ups may become fulltime tenants of the park.  







 From the above discussion, Figure 5.3 illustrates the public organizations in 
Thailand’s NIS. 
Figure 5.3 Public Organizations of Thailand’s NIS 
 
 
Source:  Author 
Framework Conditions 
Some key political and social institutions surround Thailand’s private and public 
organizations involved in the NIS. These institutions help to create “framework 
conditions” (OECD, 1997b) that are conducive to innovation by providing rules and 
resources, and creating incentives and expectations. In Thailand, framework conditions 
include laws, plans, and policy statements directed at science, technology, and 
innovation; rules and regulations governing capital investments and intellectual property; 
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the ICT infrastructure; and the higher education system, which provides human resources 
with the capacity for innovation.  
Laws, Plans, and Policies 
The National Science, Technology and Innovation Act was created in 2008 to 
guide the formulation of policy and plans for STI in Thailand, as well as strengthening 
S&T manpower and infrastructure (Intarakumnerd, 2010). The Act addresses: (1) 
production, development, and mobility of STI human resources; (2) collaboration among 
research institutes and educational institutions; (3) protection of intellectual property 
rights; (4) use of public fiscal, financial, and procurement mechanisms to expand the 
market for innovation;  (5) collaboration among state agencies, the private sector and the 
civil sector  for  technology transfer; (6) development of STI infrastructure for knowledge 
dissemination and exploitation; (7) revision of relevant laws, by-laws, rules, or 
regulations; and (8) recognition of distinguished STI organizations or persons.
52
 The Act 
created a supra-ministerial body called the National Science, Technology and Innovation 
Policy Committee which is chaired by the Prime Minister. The committee is tasked with 
monitoring and reporting the results of the national STI Plan (discussed below) including 
the performance of government agencies (Intarakumnerd, 2010). The Act also established 
the National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Office to implement the law.
53
   
The current 10-year Science and Technology Strategic Plan (2004-2013) is 
focused on enhancing the NIS and industrial clusters. The plan emphasizes the strength of 




 Ibid.  
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human resources; an encouraging environment for S&T development; and the capacities 
of four core technologies for the future, including information and communications 
technology, biotechnology, material technology, and nanotechnology. The Strategic Plan 
also sets three targets for increasing Thailand’s innovation competitiveness by the year 
2017. These targets are: (1) approaching 1% of GDP on R&D expenditure, (2) creating 
10 R&D personnel (full-time equivalent: FTE) for every 10,000 persons, and (3) 
achieving a ratio of 50:50 private sector to government expenditure on R&D 
(Durongkaveroj, 2010).  
Thailand’s National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy expands the 
Strategic Plan. It covers the 10-year period from 2012 through 2021. The policy sets 
goals, strategies, and measures for guiding innovation. These concern the innovative 
capability of localities and communities, industrial sectors, STI human resources, 





Industrial development in Thailand is primarily financed by banks. However, 
banks are relatively risk-averse therefore entrepreneurial start-ups have been less likely to 
obtain funding. Some industrial development banks exist, but reportedly they are 
inefficient, not well known, and have misevaluated past innovation projects. Instead, 
industrial development banks have contributed through innovation awards, public 





relations, and training programs (Intarakumenrd, 2010; Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, 
p. 256-257).  
The Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) is a subunit of the Thailand stock 
exchange (SET) for trading technology and SMEs shares. However, start-up companies 
and most SMEs have difficulty participating because of required capitalization levels. 
Several venture capital funds have been supported by the Thai government with a 
combined value of over US$500 million. Tax incentives to promote more venture capital 
investment have been considered, however, the venture capital industry and its effect on 
innovation in Thailand remains underdeveloped. As a result, SMEs seek loans from 
informal sources where they can get credit more quickly (Intarakumnerd, 2010; 
Intarakumnerd & Brimble, 2007, p. 256-257).  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a significant role in the Thai economy, 
which contributed to GDP growth and employment through capital formation, exports, 
and imports (Montreevat, 2006). Most FDI has been attracted by industrial 
manufacturing, however, in recent years the service sector’s share of FDI has been 
increasing. In 2004, 41% of total FDI came from Singapore, 20% from Japan, 13% from 
the EU, and 9% from the US (Montreevat, 2006).  
The Board of Investment (BOI) has authority to grant tax incentives to promote 
investment. Its “investment zones” policy supports government goals of decentralizing 
Thailand’s industrial base away from the Bangkok metropolitan area. Three investment 
zones exist: Zone 1, including Bangkok and the five surrounding provinces; Zone 2, 
including the 12 provinces surrounding Zone 1; and Zone 3, including the remaining 58 
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provinces, many of which are under-developed. To encourage projects in the less 
developed areas, projects located in Zone 3 receive the most generous tax privileges, 
while those in Zone 1 receive the least. 
The BOI has identified priority projects in basic transportation systems, public 
utilities, environmental protection, technological development, machinery and equipment, 
vehicle parts, electronic appliances, and computers. These projects are automatically 
entitled to a corporate income tax exemption for eight years, and an import duty 
exemption on machinery, regardless of project location. Strategic industries are also 
targeted with a customized incentive scheme to promote cluster-based investment. 
Customized incentives are also granted to skills, technology, and innovation industries, 
such as the HDD industry, semi-conductors, software, the automotive industry, mold and 
die, iron and steel, alternative energy, business process outsourcing, and regional 
operating headquarters (ROH). 
The standard company tax rate in Thailand is 30% of net profits, which is 
relatively high compared to other countries in the region. However, concerning FDI and 
innovation, there is a 10% corporate tax rate for Regional Operating Headquarters (ROH) 
and SMEs. Venture capital investment in SMEs is also incentivized through tax 







Table 5.5 Investment Incentives 
Types of Companies Tax Incentives 
Regional operating 
headquarters 
10% corporate income tax on net profits, interest and royalties for 
ROH 
SMEs companies Reduced company tax rates for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) are as follows: 
- 15% on net profits up to 1 million baht 
- 25% on net profits of 1 to 3 million baht 
- 30% on net profits above 3 million baht 
Listed companies Reduced tax rates for companies listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) and the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) are 
as follows: 
- 25% for companies listed on the SET from September 6, 2001 
to December 31, 2005 
- 20% for companies listed on the MAI from September 6, 2001 




Corporate tax exemptions are granted to venture capital companies 
that invest in SMEs. 
Dividends received from SMEs and gains arising from the transfer of 
shares in SMEs are granted exemption from corporate tax. 
 
Source: Rochananonda, 2006 
Intellectual Property Rights 
In Thailand, intellectual property rights have been often abused, particularly 
through copyright infringement (Kelly & Chuenjaipanich, 2002).
55
 Despite aggressive 
legislation to facilitate enforcement, there is still an excessive amount of infringing goods 
in the Thai marketplace. Actually, there is less patent infringement issues (Kelly & 
Chuenjaipanich, 2002). The Thai Patent Act of 1979 allows applicants to file for patent 
for inventions, designs, and petty patents. The criteria for patents are novelty, inventive 
step, and industrial applicability. There is no business method patent in Thailand and 
computer programs are not patentable subject matter. Thailand is not a member of the 
                                                 
55
 Thailand “top IP pirate,” Bangkok Post 3/05/2011 
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Patent Cooperation Treaty but it is bringing its examination procedures in line with 
international standards (DIP, 2009; Kelly & Chuenjaipanich, 2002).  
In Thai culture, intellectual property infringement has not been viewed as 
criminal. Therefore there is less public sentiment to protect IPRs. Moreover, IPR 
protection is often seen as imposed by western standards and disrespectful to Thai 
culture. The Thai Department of Intellectual Property (DIP) has attempted to raise 
awareness that counterfeiting has damaged Thailand’s ability to compete in the global 
marketplace (Kelly & Chuenjaipanich, 2002). 
 The Thai government has continued to increase efforts on prevention and 
suppression of intellectual property violation. Intellectual property issues were raised by 
the Abhisit Vejjajiva government as a part of the strategy to achieve a creative and 
knowledge driven economy. As a WTO member, Thailand has taken steps to comply 
with international intellectual property standards (DIP, 2009).  
ICT Infrastructure 
In 1987, the National Information Technology Committee (NITC) was formed to 
oversee policy aspects of IT development and usage in Thailand. In 1997, NITC created 
six laws to facilitate and regulate IT:
56
 (1) the Data Protection Law, (2) the Computer 
Crime Law, (3) the Electronic Data Interchange Law, (4) the Electronic Transaction Law, 
(5) the Electronic Funds Transfer Law, and (6) the Universal Access Law. This legal 
framework reduces the risks to individuals and private firms in using ICT. 





National policies also aid the development of ICT in Thailand. Following IT 2000 
policy (discussed above), IT 2010 was created to cover the period 2001-2010 and help 
Thailand transition into the Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE)/Knowledge-Based 
Society (KBS) (NECTEC, 2003). The IT 2010 policy seeks to: (1) raise the capability of 
the country from a technology adopter to a technology leader, (2) increase the proportion 
of “knowledge workers” in the country to 30%, and (3) increase the share of “knowledge-
based industries” within the overall economy to 50%. IT 2010 noted that organizational 
reforms and inter and intra sectoral partnerships would be required to implement these 
goals. 
In 2006, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology conducted 
an assessment of IT 2010’s progress toward its three goals. In terms of the goal of 
becoming a technology leader, Thailand had moved up from “dynamic adopter” to 
“potential leader” status.
57
 In terms of the goal of increasing Thailand’s knowledge 
workers, the assessment noted that based on National Statistics Office figures, 21.1% of 
the country’s labor force could be considered “knowledge workers.” In terms of the goal 
of increasing the share of knowledge industries in the country, the assessment found that 
this percentage had remained relatively consistent between 2004 and 2006 at 25% 
(MICT, 2009). These results show that midway through IT 2010’s time horizon, Thailand 
had made important gains in fulfilling its information technology goals (MICT, 2009). 
                                                 
57
 The MICT assessment used the United Nations Development Program’s Technology Achievement Index 
(TAI) for 2005 to evaluate Thailand’s progress towards the technology leader goal. The TAI groups 
countries into four categories based on their capacity to create new technology, diffuse the adoption of new 
technology, diffuse long-existing technologies, and build human skills for technology creation and 
adoption. The four categories are leaders, potential leaders, dynamic adopters, and marginalized (Desai et 
al., 2002, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2002/papers/ip_desai-2.pdf). 
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The first ICT Master Plans (2002-2006) were created to further develop ICT in 
Thailand for R&D, expansion into international markets, utilization by SMEs, and 
provision of government administration and services (Kaonantakool, 2006). The second 
ICT Master Plan (2009-2013) established “a fair and competent regulatory body for 
telecommunications and broadcasting, bridging the digital divide, and building 
confidence in e-commerce” (Koanantakool, Udomvitid, & Thuvasethakul, 2010, p. 342). 
The Strategic Master Plan on Electronic, Computing, Telecommunication, and 
Information (ECTI) Technologies (2000-2009)
58
 was also developed to strengthen R&D 
in ECTI and transfer ECTI technologies and products to the industrial sector.  
Several studies have reported the progress of ICT development in Thailand. These 
include IT legal and regulatory infrastructure; network infrastructure in schools and 
universities; increased telephone penetration, fiber-optic cable, and microwave 
communication services; networking government agencies and delivering e-Government 
services; development of the Thailand Software Park and the Electronic Commerce 
Resource Center; and increased numbers and funding of IT-related research projects 
submitted by government agencies, universities, and private sectors (Koanantakul, 2006; 
NECTEC, 2003; UNESCAP, 2009). 
Higher Education 
Currently Thailand’s higher educational system is composed of 78 public 
universities, including 11 autonomous universities, 34 private universities, and 34 private 





colleges, with approximately 2 million students.
59
 The number of public universities has 
increased dramatically because public institutes were upgraded to universities in 2004. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the higher educational system was expanded with the 
creation of provincial, open, vocational, and agricultural universities, and teacher training 
colleges. Between 1970 and 2000, 3.4 million Thais earned a tertiary education. This is 
20-fold increase. Most of these became professionals, technicians, executives, and 
managers in the growing economy (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 207).   
In 2002, Thai public universities became “semi-autonomous” meaning that while 
still subsidized by the government, they gained more financial freedom. The universities 
were expected to generate more income from other sources, especially the private sector. 
While public funding would mainly cover teaching expenses, research agencies supported 
collaboration with industry and commercialization. These changes helped to promote 
R&D, however, difficulties remained because academic promotion is more dependent on 
teaching than research (Doner, 2009; Schiller & Liefner, 2007). There is a lack of high 
quality research transferable to industry, and universities’ rules do not encourage 
conducting personal projects with industry (Schiller & Leifner, 2007). By 2007, only six 
universities had become autonomous, and university-industry linkages (UILs) remained 
weak.  
Thai universities’ primary concern is educating students. Private firms have little 
interest in linking with universities, except for a few cases such as Seagate (Doner, 2009, 
p. 135; Termpittayapaisith, 2006). In the early 2000s there was 





. . . a consensus that Thai universities performed poorly in training 
personnel and exposing companies to new ideas . . . overall research 
output was low, research topics were inconsistent with industrial needs, 
and faculty ties with business were individual and temporary. These 
weaknesses were in part the result of low demand: in most sectors, local 
firms’ technological and absorptive capacities were insufficient to 
stimulate much demand for university inputs. More technologically 
advanced foreign firms were either uninterested or sceptical as to the 
institutions’ capacities to provide needed service. But the incentives and 
structure of the universities themselves were also a key part of the problem 
. . . their funding has been largely unrelated to research productivity, 
teaching-effectiveness, or market-related services . . . (Doner, 2009, 134-
135, 138). 
 
In closing, it is important to consider how Thailand’s overarching science and 
technology policy framework compares with the recent creative economy effort 
mentioned above. There are key elements of the nation’s science and technology policy 
that match up well with components of the creative economy agenda. Where the science 
and technology policy offers support for industrial clusters and collaborative efforts, the 
creative economy identifies which industries: the “creative” ones involved with culture, 
art, media, design, software development, and related. It also identifies which 
collaborators: university centers of excellence, SMEs, local- and community-level actors, 
and the Ministry of Commerce. Thailand’s science and technology policy advocates 
enhanced intellectual property protection and improved ICT infrastructure for the nation. 
The creative economy acknowledges that improvements in both of these areas can 
encourage innovation and creativity among emerging, targeted industries and among 
traditional knowledge-holders at local levels. With 99% of the business sector in Thailand 
composed of small, medium, micro, and informal enterprises in 2010, accounting for 
approximately 39% of GDP, the S&T policy and the creative economy agenda are right 
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to encourage the innovation potential at this level (Durongkaveroj, 2010). In this sense, 
some objectives of the creative economy are compatible with the broader directions 





ASSESSMENT OF THAILAND’S NIS PERFORMANCE  
Formally evaluating the performance of Thailand’s NIS can help to make 
decisions about improving it. Evaluation provides critical feedback in the policy 
assessment process, and there are a variety of ways to evaluate the NIS, both quantitative 
and qualitative. In this chapter, evidence for the performance of the Thai NIS is 
presented. It discusses innovation effectiveness in terms of both international and 
domestic quantitative indicators and the opinions of government officials with knowledge 
of the system. It also discusses the performance of Thailand’s NIS in terms of the 
outcomes of innovation. Innovation outcomes are the long-term, broad-scale effects of 
innovation on the economy. With an idea of the effectiveness of the NIS, barriers to 
innovation performance are identified, and policy recommendations to improve the 
performance of the NIS are made. 
International Indicators 
In the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) for 2012, 
Thailand received an innovation system score of 5.95 on 10-scale, ranking 55
th
 out of 146 
countries. This was up four places from the 2009 KAM ranking. The KAM collects data 
on 80 variables which serve as proxy measurements for a country’s innovation system, its 
educational system including training, its information infrastructure, and its institutional 
and economic incentives regime. The 29 innovation system indicators collected in the 
KAM and their scores for Thailand are shown in Table 6.1 below.  
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Table 6.1 KAM for Thailand Innovation System Indicators 
Indictor Score 
FDI outflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008 4.92 
FDI inflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008 5.14 
Royalty and license fees payments (US$ mil.), 2009 8.80 
Royalty and license fees payments (US$/pop.), 2009 7.12 
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$ mil.), 2009 7.38 
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$/pop.), 2009 5.95 
Royalty payments and receipts (US$ mil.), 2009 8.48 
Royalty payments and receipts (US$/pop.) 2009 6.80 
Science and engineering enrollment ratio (%), 2009 n/a 
Science enrollment ratio (%), 2009 n/a 
Researchers in R&D, 2009 6.30 
Researchers in R&D/mil. People, 2009 3.42 
Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP, 2008 2.38 
Manuf. trade as % of GDP, 2009 9.28 
University-company research collaboration (1-7), 2010 7.10 
S&E journal articles, 2007 7.24 
S&E journal articles/mil. People, 2007 5.17 
Availability of venture capital (1-7), 2010 7.02 
Patents granted by USPTO, avg. 2005-2009 7.53 
Patents granted by USPTO/mil. People, avg. 2005-2009 5.89 
High-tech exports as % of manuf. exports, 2009 8.93 
Private sector spending on R&D (1-7), 2010 6.56 
Firm-level technology absorption (1-7), 2010 5.50 
Value chain presence (1-7), 2010 7.48 
Capital goods gross imports (% of GDP), avg. 2005-2009 9.48 
Capital goods gross exports (% of GDP), 2005-2009 9.48 
S&E articles with foreign coauthorship (%), 2008 3.68 
Avg. number of citations per S&E article, 2008 7.29 
Intellectual property protection (1-7), 2010 4.05 
 
Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 
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 Although the KAM collects data for 29 indicators, it assesses the innovation 
system performance for a given country using only three of them: (1) total royalty 
payments and receipts, (2) patent applications granted by US Patent and Trademark 
Office, and (3) scientific and technical journal articles.
60
 Its score for total royalty 
payments and receipts was 8.48 (on a 10-scale), 7.53 (on a 10-scale) for patent 
applications granted by USPTO, and 7.24 (on a 10-scale) for scientific and technical 
journal articles.  
The WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2012-2013 ranks Thailand’s 
innovation system 68
th
 out of 144 countries, with a score of 3.19 on the 1-7 scale. The 
Table 6.2 below shows Thailand’s ranking on the seven innovation indicators. According 
to the report, Thailand has little competitive advantage on any of these innovation 
indicators. Its mid-range rankings for the indicators in Table 6.3 make sense for a middle 
income country that is attempting to advance from the efficiency-driven growth stage and 
close the gap with innovation leaders. There is clearly room for improvement on all of the 
GCR indicators, however. The intellectual property protection indicator shows the most 
potential for improvement. As a technology and innovation adopter and adapter, it may 
not be surprising that weak intellectual property protection exists. However, 
strengthening institutions that govern IP is one measure that can help Thailand to advance 
to higher innovation, growth, and development stages. 
 
                                                 
60
 The innovation system is the simple average of the normalized scores on these three variables. Retrieved 
from  http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp 
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Table 6.2 GCR for Thailand Innovation Indicators  
Indicator Rank 
Capacity for innovation 79 
Quality of scientific research institutes 60 
Company spending on R&D 74 
University-industry collaboration in R&D 46 
Government procurement of advanced technological products 98 
Availability of scientists and engineers 57 
Patents per million population 72 
Intellectual property protection 101 
 
Source:  Based on WEF, 2012  
Both the KAM and GCR collect data for an extensive set of innovation system 
and other relevant indicators, as discussed in Chapter 3. They provide quantitative 
measurements and rankings determined through scientific research. The full breakdown 
of Thailand’s KAM and GCR entries are included in Appendix A and B, respectively. By 
analyzing data on internationally accepted innovation indicators, the World Bank and the 
WEF give Thailand’s NIS a fair rating. Thailand’s NIS is not as good as that of 
innovation-leading countries such as Finland, Korea, or Singapore, but it is also not as 
bad as with innovation laggard countries, particularly ones in least developed countries 
(LDCs), such as Angola and Bangladesh and ones in the Southeast Asian region, such as 
Laos and Myanmar. 
Table 6.3 below compares Thailand’s KAM innovation system rank to several 
least developed countries (LDCs). The table shows that Thailand, a middle-income 
country in the efficiency-driven growth stage, has a better-performing innovation system 
than the poorer, lesser-developed countries in the KAM. From the table, the closest LDC 
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to Thailand is Senegal, whose innovation system rank is 111
th
. Contrary, the GCR ranks 
Senegal (62
nd
) higher than Thailand (68
th













    
Table 6.3 KAM and GCR Innovation Rank   





KAM GCR KAM GCR 
Angola 146 n/a Madagascar 119 106 
Bangladesh 135 130 Malawi 114 99 
Benin 112 84 Mali 130 88 
Burkina Faso 123 107 Mauritania 137 121 
Burundi n/a 140 Mozambique 133 122 
Cambodia 124 67 Myanmar 145 n/a 
Chad n/a 113 Nepal 121 133 
Djibouti 143 n/a Rwanda 134 51 
Eritrea 128 n/a Senegal 111 62 
Ethiopia 129 114 Sierra Leone 140 139 
Gambia n/a 52 Sudan 142 n/a 
Guinea 144 125 Tanzania n/a 75 
Haiti 139 143 Thailand 55 68 
Lao PDR 136 n/a Uganda 118 82 
Lesotho 131 138 Yemen, Rep. 127 144 
Liberia n/a 54 Zambia 125 61 
 
Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 and WEF, 2012 
Note: KAM rank out of 146 countries, GCR rank out of 144 countries, n/a denotes data not 
available 
 
Table 6.4 below shows how Thailand’s innovation rankings compare with those 
of the other countries in the region. Among the other eight Southeast Asian countries in 
                                                 
61
 The following LDCs do not appear in both KAM and GCR – Afghanistan, Bhutan, Central African Rep., 
Comoros, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Niger, Samoa, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Togo, Tuvalu,and Vanuatu. 
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the KAM, only Singapore’s (4
th
) and Malaysia’s (42
nd
) innovation rank is higher than 
Thailand’s (55
th









) and Cambodia’s 
(67
th
) innovation rank is higher than Thailand’s (68
th
). Table 6.4 below supports the 
notion that Singapore is Southeast Asia’s innovation leader. Using the KAM, Thailand 
fits into a second tier of innovation in the region with Malaysia as its peer. Using the 
GCR, Thailand is in a third tier of innovation with Brunei and Cambodia, behind 
Malaysia and Indonesia in the second tier. Overall, Thailand’s innovation is in the middle 
range for the region. It is not in the lead position but also not in a lagging position.  




Brunei n/a 59 
Cambodia 124 67 
Indonesia 103 39 
Laos 136 n/a 
Malaysia 42 25 
Myanmar 145 n/a 
Philippines 93 94 
Singapore 4 8 
Thailand 55 68 
Timor-Leste n/a 134 
Vietnam 113 81 
 
Source: Based on World Bank, 2012 and WEF, 2012  





  These international indicators can be useful for countries to identify strengths and 
weaknesses in their innovation systems. Policymakers can use these to benchmark their 
country’s NIS performance with other countries. Thailand has scored well on several 
internationally-accepted innovation indicators including availability of scientists and 
engineers, manufacturing trade, high-tech exports, imports and exports of capital goods, 
and royalty and license fees payments and receipts (WEF, 2012; World Bank, 2012). 
These represent Thailand’s strengths; areas in which Thailand has some comparative 
advantage. Relatively strong performance on these indicators could be expected for a 
newly-industrialized country with a favorable business climate that is a key base of 
production in global assembly and manufacturing chains. 
 Thailand has scored poorly on other innovation indicators, however, including 
government procurement of advanced technology, intellectual property protection, 
numbers of researchers in R&D, expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP, and co-
authored science and engineering publications (WEF, 2012; World Bank, 2012). These 
represent Thailand’s weaknesses; areas in which Thailand needs to improve so that it can 
continue to close innovation and development gaps. Weaker performance on these 
indicators could be expected for a developing country with a less-than-robust educational 
system that has relatively recently transitioned into an efficiency-driven stage of growth 
and is trying to catch up with innovation leaders. 
 While policymakers in Thailand will want to continue to play to the country’s 
innovation strengths, greater gains may be available by focusing on its innovation 
weakness. In terms of benchmarking, policymakers can take note of innovation-leading 
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countries’ performance in areas where Thailand is weak, for instance Finland, Korea, and 
Singapore. Thailand’s policymakers should ask: “What have innovation leaders done in 
the areas where we are weak?” With this knowledge in hand, Thailand can then attempt 
to emulate these “innovation best practices” with adjustments to its own policies. 
 Although these international indicators of innovation performance can be useful, 
they must be viewed appropriately and caution is advised. The KAM uses only secondary 
data that is self-reported by firms and national governments, which could introduce 
distortions. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report also uses self-
reported data, and its rankings can be confusing for innovation benchmarking. The report 
indicates that innovation is the most important of all factors for improving economic 
competitiveness (WEF, 2010, p. 8). However, countries’ performance on innovation 
indicators and their innovation ranking are not used to determine their stage of economic 
growth, either factor-driven, efficiency-driven, or innovation-driven (WEF, 2010, p. 10). 
Therefore a country can be in the “innovation-driven” stage of growth regardless of its 
“innovation” performance.  
Furthermore, some countries’ innovation rankings in the KAM and the GCR are 
very similar, for example Sierra Leone (140
th
 in the KAM and 139
th
 in the GCR) and 
Philippines (93
rd
 in the KAM and 94
th
 in the GCR). However, other countries have very 
different innovation rankings between the KAM and the GCR, for example Rwanda 
(134
th
 in the KAM and 51
st
 in the GCR) and Indonesia (103
rd
 in the KAM and 39
th
 in the 
GCR). These inconsistencies appear even though the KAM and the GCR have a similar 
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sample size and use much of the same data.
62
 The different indicators used to measure 
innovation appear to account for these inconsistencies. The KAM uses three innovation 
indicators: royalty payments, patents, and science and technology articles published. The 
GCR uses eight: Innovation capacity, quality of science/research institutes, company 
R&D spending, university-industry linkage, government procurement, availability of 
scientists and engineers, patents per million persons, and intellectual property protection. 
NIS policymakers should therefore be aware of the different methods and indicators used 
in international innovation measurement and their implications for NIS evaluation. 
Domestic Indicators 
The performance of Thailand’s NIS can also be evaluated with domestically-
produced indicators, including innovation goals recommended by STI, the output of R&D 
institutions including the higher education system, and the firm-level innovation survey 
conducted in Thailand in 2003.  
STI Goals 
The National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI) set three goals 
for improving Thailand’s science, technology, and innovation competitiveness, to be 
achieved by the year 2017. These are: (1) total expenditure for R&D as 1% of GDP, (2) a ratio 
of 50:50 private sector to government expenditure on R&D, and (3) 10 R&D personnel 
(FTE) for every 10,000 persons. Progress toward these goals is shown in Table 6.5 below.  
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Table 6.5 Improvement of Thailand’s  
Science, Technology, and Innovation Competitiveness 
Strategic Plan 
Performance Goals 
2005 2007 2010 2017 
Total expenditure on R&D as % of GDP 0.24 0.21 0.24 1 
Ratio of private sector to government R&D 
expenditure 
49:46 48:52 40:60 50:50 
R&D personnel (FTE) per 10,000 persons 3.29 6.76 9.01 10 
 
Source: Based on Durongkaveraj, 2010; NRCT, 2010; and Vanichseni & Suvalai, 2009 
With respect to the goal of total expenditure for R&D as 1% of GDP, STI notes 
improvements in government, private, and state enterprise R&D spending. Yet, as Table 
6.5 above shows, R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP have not grown in the five 
year period from 2005 through 2010 but have remained stable at around 0.25%. Private 
sector investment in R&D comes mainly from a relatively few large MNCs 
(Intarakumnerd, 2010). The numerous SMEs and microenterprises in Thailand likely 
have few resources to devote to R&D. Moreover, government tax incentives and 
subsidies for firms’ R&D investment are too narrowly defined and most firms do not take 
advantage of these incentives (Intarakumnerd, 2010). In terms of expenditures on R&D 
as a percentage of GDP, it is known that Thailand lags well behind the region’s leaders 
Singapore (2.61% in 2007) and Malaysia (0.64% in 2006) (Intarakumnerd, 2010). To 
meet the 1% R&D expenditure goal shown in the table above, STI recommends enhanced 
use of venture capital, FDI, and research centers (Durongkaveraj, 2010). However, these 
options may not be enough, given their current status as reviewed in this study. R&D 
expenditure is an area where government has the capacity to channel significant 
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resources. To meet the 1% of GDP target set for 2017, Thailand’s government should 
increase its financial commitment to the national R&D effort. 
The public and private shares of R&D expenditure are a related issue. Table 6.5 
above shows the strategic plan goal of a 50:50 contribution for R&D spending from the 
public and private sectors for 2017. The table also shows a decline in the share of private 
investment (from 49% to 40%) and an increase in the share of government investment 
(from 46% to 60%) in R&D between 2005 and 2010. Since we know that overall 
expenditures on R&D in Thailand lag behind neighboring countries, we cannot be certain 
that increased government expenditure accounts for the increase in the government’s 
share. A more likely explanation for the imbalance may be continued disinvestment in 
R&D on the part of the private sector. Some of that decline may be tied to the recent 
recession although, STI found a 9% decline in R&D expenditures in Thailand’s 
manufacturing and service sectors between 2006 and 2008 as the recession was just 
beginning to surface (STI, 2009). To balance public and private investments in R&D, STI 
notes the incentives offered for R&D investment, including BOI tax and non-tax 
incentives and projects undertaken by NSTDA and NIA, discussed earlier. The STI 
further recommends other alternatives, including personal income tax exemptions or 
reductions, enhanced venture capital, improved IP management, and enhancing the 
competitiveness of SMEs. Some of these recommendations have also been discussed 
above (Durongkaveraj, 2010). It should be noted that measures to encourage a greater 
share of private sector investment in R&D such as enhanced venture capital availability 
and SME competitiveness will likely require still many more years before taking effect. 
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Thailand’s government should be prepared to shoulder a greater share of R&D 
expenditure in the near term and perhaps reconsider its 2017 goal of a 50:50 public-
private ratio. 
Concerning the goal of R&D personnel, Table 6.5 above shows that R&D 
personnel have increased dramatically between 2005 and 2010 and has almost reached 
the target of 10 researchers per 10,000 persons set for 2017 by the Strategic Plan. STI 
finds that no policy measures exist for developing R&D human resources, so perhaps the 
increase in researchers is due to market forces alone. According to NRCT, between 2005 
and 2009, while the number of lead researchers on R&D projects remained stable, 
research assistants and technical support personnel grew (NRCT, 2010). Including 
support staff in official counts could also account for the growth experienced in R&D 
personnel. Thailand is within reach of its R&D personnel goal for 2017. To better ensure 
the realization of this goal, STI recommends improving university-industry linkages 
(UILs); science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education; labor 
mobility; and scholarships/outstanding student programs (Durongkaveraj, 2010). These 
suggestions should be followed, especially in the face of an increasingly competitive 
regional market for R&D and innovation talent (Intarakumnerd, 2010). 
The Strategic Plan developed by STI can be useful for evaluating R&D aspects of 
Thailand’s NIS. The plan identifies future benchmarks for R&D expenditures and human 
resources, including percent of GDP devoted to R&D, the ratio of private to government 
R&D expenditure, and numbers of R&D personnel per 10,000 persons. Between 2005 
and 2010, personnel numbers had improved, while the expenditure ratio became more 
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unbalanced and the percent of Thailand’s GDP on R&D had declined. It is important to 
note that NRCT is only now clarifying what activities can be formally classified as R&D 
in Thailand. Also, with relatively few Thai firms innovating, the ratio of public to private 
R&D expenditure must be viewed with caution. Most importantly, the combined level of 
R&D expenditures by both the public and private sectors is far behind leading Southeast 
Asian countries. Since innovation policy in Thailand has only been formalized for a few 
years (with the creation of STI in 2008), more time may be needed before clear trends in 
the Strategic Plan benchmarks and the effect of the STI can be seen. Still, the Strategic 
Plan’s 2017 goals can be helpful to evaluate Thailand’s innovation performance.  
R&D Output 
STI human resource development is another indicator for evaluating Thailand’s 
NIS. Thailand’s R&D output grew between 1998 and 2008. Specifically, scientific 
publications grew by over 300% and patents granted grew by 12% (Intarakumnerd, 
2010). Furthermore, Intarakumnerd (2010) reports that in the ten year period 2001-2010, 
approximately 56% published scientific articles were published with international co-
authorship, showing Thai researchers’ integration into global research networks. 
Performance on these R&D output indicators suggests that Thailand’s R&D institutions 
contributing toward the development of STI human resources.  
However, there is evidence that Thai universities have underperformed in 
developing STI capacity. Thailand’s universities have been described as relatively weak, 
with research that is less relevant to industry and publication that is less internationally 
recognized (Intarakumnerd et al., 2002; Krishna, n.d.; Sakunsriprasert, 2009; Schiller, 
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2006). Formal university-industry linkages are in the early stage of development, with 
few activities and less-developed institutional mechanisms (Krishna, n.d.). University-
industry linkages have been based on personal connections between researchers and 
companies, not long-term organizational commitments. These linkages primarily involve 
short-term training, consulting, or research activities in low levels of technology. There 
appears to be little incentive within the universities to encourage linkages with industry 
(Brimble & Doner, 2007; Sakunsriprasert, 2009).  
From the other side of the university-industry linkages, Thai firms appear to value 
innovation information gathered from parent or associate companies much more. Table 
6.6 below shows that, on a 100 point-scale, internal sources of information are more 
important for innovation activities in Thai firms than external ones.   
Table 6.6 Importance of Innovation Information Sources 
Source Result 
Internal Sources within the enterprise (unspecified) 82.0 
External Patent disclosures 32.0 
Exhibitions 53.1 
Internet 63.0 
Universities, educational institutions 35.8 
Research institutes 35.8 
Clients 77.4 
Competitors 42.1 
Parent/associate company 61.2 
Business service providers 33.1 
Technical service providers 40.2 
Specialist literature 56.6 
Professional conferences and meetings 55.2 
 
Source: Based on Intarakumnerd, 2007 
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This result could indicate: (1) a lack of absorptive capacity necessary to interact 
with and learn from universities and R&D institutes, (2) universities and public research 
institutes are of limited quality, and uninteresting to firms as an innovation information 
source, (3) a mismatch between what universities and public research institutes can 
provide and what firms want, or (4) communication between the two are underdeveloped 
(Intarakumnerd, 2007, p. 11-13). Overall, the evidence from both sides indicates 
university-industry linkages are weak. 
Firm-Level Innovation Surveys 
A firm-level Innovation Survey was conducted by NSTDA in 2003 to assess the 
innovation activities and capabilities of private firms in Thailand (Intarakumnerd, 2007). 
The survey serves as a useful NIS evaluation instrument. It adopted definitions and 
methods used by OECD in the Oslo and Frascati Manuals, as well as those used by other 
Asian countries, including Korea and Singapore. In the 2003 survey, 6,031 firms were 
surveyed, with a response rate of 42.8%. Of these firms, 6% reported that they performed 
R&D activities and 5.8% reported that they carried out innovation activities. These 
innovation activities included detailed design work and reengineering, which are catch-up 
actions (Intarakumnerd, 2007). Large companies are more likely to be innovative than 
SMEs. The chemicals, machinery, electronics, and food sectors appear to be more 
innovative than others, but still at small percentages. These results correspond to the 
R&D investments in these sectors, shown in Figure 5.2 above (see p. 94).  
Overall, the survey shows a relatively small percentage of firms in Thailand 
performing innovation activities. According to the firm-level innovation survey of 2002, 
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in Korea, 42% of firms were innovating (Intarakumnerd, 2007, p. 8). Table 6.7 below 
contains key results from the survey. 
Firm-level evaluations show Thai firms’ absorption and diffusion of technology, 
their output of innovative products and processes, and their awareness and utilization of 
innovation partnerships and resources. Comparative analysis indicates that Thai firms can 
improve their innovativeness. Although many firms in Thailand now work in high-tech 
manufacturing industries, surveys show that most firms are not involved in globally-
competitive innovation activities (Intarakumnerd, 2007). 
Table 6.7 Selected Results of Thailand’s Innovation Survey in 2003 
Firm Indicators Result 
No. of manufacturing and service firms 21,653 
Sample size 6,031 
Response rate 42.8% 
R&D performing firms 6.0% 
Innovating firms 5.8% 
Innovating firms, SME 7.3% 
Innovating firms, large company 14.4% 
Innovating firms, Thai-owned  10.2% 
Innovating firms, partial MNC-owned 12.2% 
     Share of innovating firms by sector  
Food, beverage, tobacco 18% 
Wood, wood products, furniture 10% 
Paper, paper products, printing/publishing 10% 
Chemicals, chemical products, coal, petroleum, rubber and plastic products 11% 
Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment 13% 
Jewelry, diamond, gem and ornament 10% 
 





Thailand NIS Government Official Interviews 
Finally, individuals with knowledge and experience in Thailand’s NIS were asked 
for their evaluations of the system. These government officials discussed implementation 
and measurement issues, coordination and linkages, and the role of the Creative Economy 
in Thailand’s NIS. Their comments are summarized below. The interview questions are 
presented in Appendix C.  
Dr. Yada Mukdapitak, Deputy Secretary General of STI 
Dr. Yada Mukdapitak is the Deputy Secretary General of National Science 
Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI). Dr. Mukdapitak notes that the NIS 
cannot be set out with a single rule or policy. Instead, NIS is a new paradigm for 
stimulating many policies related to STI development. Dr. Mudapitak says the term 
“NIS” may not be commonly known but it is embedded in all dimensions of STI policy in 
Thailand. It is known that an NIS for one country may be different from that of other 
countries. This implies that an NIS for one sector may be different from the others from 
the same country. This idea can be applied when implementing NIS and measuring its 
performance (personal communication, April 7, 2011).  
Dr. Mudapitak believes that implementing the NIS requires understanding the 
roles and characters of each system component. Implementation means unique and 
creative application of the NIS scheme to each system component and on a sector, 
subsector, or even product basis. Effective implementation means recognizing what is the 
most appropriate in the context of Thailand such as components, sectors, or products. In 
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Thailand, innovation can be something that already exists; the key issue is to use what 
you have. The usage may be from your own R&D or someone else’s which you extend.  
The mechanism in building innovation is the linkages among private business, 
educational institutions, financial institutions, and government. Implementing the NIS 
framework means identifying and matching key players, but when players are 
approached, they must become the most important, rather than the system itself (personal 
communication, April 7, 2011).  
In terms of NIS performance measurement, Dr. Mukdapitak states that the whole 
system cannot be measured effectively because of its scale and complexity. The more 
effective way in NIS performance measurement is focusing on each component, sector, 
or product, and building up its own indicators based on its roles and characters. The 
macro picture will be completed by integrating several pieces of micro ones. Dr. 
Mukdapitak uses the term “chain links” to describe the relationship among components in 
the system, meaning that missing one link will shorten the life of the whole system 
(personal communication, April 7, 2011).  
Prof. Dr. Soottiporn Chittmittrapap, Secretary General of NRCT 
Prof. Dr. Soottiporn Chittmittrapap, the Secretary General of National Research 
Council of Thailand (NRCT) states that the main reason for the use of the NIS strategy is 
to further the utilization of research results and innovation for commercialization. 
Increasing innovation activities can help Thailand leapfrog in terms of social and 
economic development, therefore the NIS is significant. However, the NIS has not been 
as successful as it could be due to the poor performance and lack of cooperation among 
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relevant organizations in the system. Adopting the innovation system strategy for 
promoting innovation in Thailand led to the formation of the NIA. To this point, 
however, NIA has had limited success in connecting industries and universities in 
innovating partnerships. Also public-private partnerships do not get support from the 
funding system, and producers of research results and innovation have weak IPRs. 
Cooperation is the main factor for successfully implementing the innovation system. In 
Thailand, coordination between innovation laws, public-private partnerships, and 
readiness can be improved (personal communication, September 22, 2011). 
An NIS consists of three things: (1) innovation creation or value creation, (2) 
innovation protection, and (3) innovation utilization. Currently in Thailand, relevant 
stakeholders are forming an NIS that fits the Thai context and puts organizations in 
charge of each of these three areas. In terms of innovation creation, NRCT motivates and 
promotes research and innovation. It has been studying international practices in 
innovation promotion; collecting inputs from relevant stakeholders, including research 
institutes, funding agencies, and research users; and promoting laws and regulations 
related to innovation activities. NRCT stimulates SMEs’ innovation activities by 
matching SMEs and research institutes; the result of these collaborations is intended to 
meet the needs of markets and end users. NRCT is addressing the issue of 
commercialization of research results and innovation, which is in need of reform. Based 
on past research projects that NRCT has overseen; it can serve as an innovation database 
or clearinghouse. It has a stock of knowledge that could be tapped into for innovation and 
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commercialization purposes (S. Chittmittrapap, personal communication, September 22, 
2011). 
In terms of the protection of innovative works, DIP acts as an IPR protector. 
Industry is reluctant to fully invest in R&D because the ownership of the research result 
would belong to the financial supporter, i.e. the government. There are risks in further 
investing in product lines derived from R&D so industry is unlikely to put money into 
R&D. Firms may be willing to invest more in R&D if ownership of the R&D results 
funded by the government belong to the firm. Creating this motivation comes through 
giving ownership of the innovation to the innovator. When firms receive benefits from 
R&D and innovation, the country gains too (S. Chittmittrapap, personal communication, 
September 22, 2011).  
The protection of IPRs and related issues for the benefit of innovators are being 
improved. However, DIP is more of an innovation regulator than an innovation supporter 
that makes linkages between innovation and utilization. This situation creates obstacles 
for researchers and innovators. It is up to DIP, in particular, to determine how to be more 
flexible in terms of IPR management. If government acts as a partner with firms instead 
of a regulator, for example, it can more easily monitor financial flows within those firms 
(S. Chittmittrapap, personal communication, September 22, 2011).  
Promoting the utilization of innovation can come from, for example, creating 
“pilot plants” for innovators by organizations like NSTDA, changing the mindset of 
researchers, and adjusting the promotional method for universities’ professors from 
producing papers for publication to creating innovations that can be commercialized. 
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NRCT also acts to help with innovation utilization, but there should be a separate 
organization acting as a linkage between the market and R&D performers to help proof of 
technology, technology licensing, and negotiating between researchers and innovators. 
Currently, universities have been creating their own technology licensing offices (TLOs). 
However, the volume of research in Thailand is relatively small and these offices create 
additional transaction costs, so it may not be worth the investment (S. Chittmittrapap, 
personal communication, September 22, 2011).  
To be successful with the NIS approach, integration and a comprehensive process 
are needed. The relevant organizations in Thailand need to adjust and adapt to serve the 
system. A change in understanding of the roles of actors in the system, including 
researchers, innovation producers, and funding agencies, is needed. All sectors and 
stakeholders involved with the NIS need to realize their role and make changes so that the 
system can perform better. Mindset is important. How to change the mindset of 
researchers to realize the importance of R&D for social and economic development as a 
whole, rather than focusing on their own benefits? How to make individuals realize that 
they are part of the system, not just an isolated mind? (S. Chittmittrapap, personal 
communication, September 22, 2011). 
Mr. Alongkorn Ponlaboot, Deputy Minister of Commerce 
Mr. Alongkorn Ponlaboot is Thailand’s Deputy Minister of Commerce. He notes 
that the only results that have come from the present innovation infrastructure are reports 
and books, nothing tangible. The same problems continue to occur. The Creative 
Economy is the new trend focused on ideas or innovations in the country. It goes back to 
139 
 
basics by asking “what is the research for?” The Creative Economy’s surrounding 
organizations and clusters constitute another mechanism to drive innovations to 
commercialization, in addition to the conventional R&D structure in Thailand. Patenting 
is low in Thailand, and the Creative Economy can help to improve this. (personal 
communication, April 27, 2011).  
In the Creative Economy, the focus is on applied research and commercializable 
research for value creation. In working with intellectual property, there are patent and 
prototype holders who cannot reach the market. Part of the reason for the Creative 
Economy is because some “local wisdom” innovations will not be funded by banks, so 
the Ministry of Commerce has grants and loans available. Investment is the most 
important aspect. The creative academy or institute will act like a funding agency, but 
also make recommendations to the Budget Bureau to allocate funds for “creative 
organizations.” Also a “creative bank” will be able to do memorandum of understandings 
(MOUs) with industry (A. Ponlaboot, personal communication, April 27, 2011).  
Deputy Minister Ponlaboot indicates that basic research is good but eventually 
you have to commercialize it, that’s the key issue. Research may conform to the Creative 
Economy by putting 50% to creative industries, 25% to basic research, and 25% to 
researchers’ preferences. The business man is the most important person that can tell you 
what research to do and what to innovate. If the private sector wants R&D, they need to 
cooperate with universities to meet their demands since they may not have their own 
facilities. Instead of doing research or innovating from your own idea you “place an 
order” and there is no worry that the innovation will be commercialized as the private 
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sector has already targeted the market. This is the bottom line of the Creative Economy 
strategy (personal communication, April 27, 2011).  
The strategy is somewhat like the triple helix model of the private sector, 
government, and universities. Fifteen creative industries have been identified and an 
organization has been created to assist them. Ten “creative academies” will also be 
developed from the existing universities to act as a coordinator and the core of a creative 
industry, like in a Center of Excellence model. Other universities will also be in the 
network. Government helps in this process as it can, for example, creative partnerships 
where investors and innovators are brought together in a virtual market (A. Ponlaboot, 
personal communication, April 27, 2011). 
 The Ministry is trying now to make links between trade associations, industrial 
clusters, and the Industrial Council and connect them with the Creative Economy 
infrastructure. Deputy Minister Ponlaboot says that Thailand does not lack resources, but 
needs to do a better job of coordinating them (personal communication, April 27, 2011).  
The opinion of government officials who actually work in Thailand’s NIS is 
useful for assessing NIS performance. In one view, a well-performing NIS is one which 
creates and commercializes tangible products. It uses basic and applied research from 
universities and R&D institutes to meet the innovation demands of the private sector. In 
this view, 50% of the research effort should be directed to “creative industries,” 25% to 
basic research, and 25% to the preference of the individual researcher (A. Ponlaboot, 
personal communication, April 27, 2011). In another view, NIS effectiveness requires 
linking business, educational institutions, financial institutions, and government. It also 
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requires recognizing the appropriate components, sectors, and products in the system. 
Therefore, individual performance measurement for system components, sectors, and 
products is advised (Y. Mukdapitak, personal communication, April 7, 2011). Another 
view sees that linkages and cooperation are the main factors for successfully 
implementing the innovation system. These linkages extend beyond partnerships of 
innovators to the wider environment including policy and laws. Technological readiness 
as well as the cooperation between innovators and organizations can be improved in 
Thailand. A successful NIS approach in Thailand requires integration and a 
comprehensive process (S. Chittmittrapap, personal communication, September 22, 
2011). 
Outcomes of Innovation 
The performance of Thailand’s NIS can also be evaluated in terms of the 
outcomes of innovation. Innovation outcomes are the longer-term, broader-scale effects 
of innovation on the economy. What is the system delivering in terms of socioeconomic 
results?  
 Indicators for assessing Thailand’s innovation outcomes are shown in Table 6.8 
below. Some of these indicators, such as those concerning new business creation and 
royalty and license payments, give us an idea of how innovation in Thailand is impacting 
business and industry. Other indicators, such as those concerning high-tech products 
exported to foreign markets and the competitiveness of the Thai economy on a global 
scale, give an idea of how Thailand’s innovation is impacting the larger economy. The 
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last indicator in Table 6.8, Thailand’s ranking on the Human Development Index, can 
give an idea of how innovation in its broadest sense affects social welfare.  
Some of these indicators have appeared earlier in this study and are presented 
again here because they are helpful measures of innovation outcomes. The indicators 
dealing with competitiveness from the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the 
International Institute for Management Development (IMD) have not appeared to this 
point. As the global competitiveness of an economy is an important outcome of 
innovation, these well-known indices were selected. The Human Development Index 
score also has not appeared to this point. Economic and technological innovation can 
effect improvements in the socioeconomic development of a country generally; therefore 
the widely-used United Nations Development Program (UNDP)’s Human Development 
Index was a logical choice to capture these trends in Thailand. 
 The table shows that during the period of available data, business creation was 
relatively flat while receipts for royalties and licenses rose considerably. High-tech 
exports as a percentage of all exports have declined slightly but their value in real US 
dollars has risen. The global competitiveness of Thailand’s economy has remained 
relatively stable. The World Economic Forum typically ranks Thailand’s competitiveness 
just within the upper third of all countries in the study while the International Institute for 
Management Development typically ranks it in the middle of its study group. Finally, 
Thailand’s Human Development Index score has remained stable since 2001, with a 
slight decline in 2010 and 2011. 
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Overall, indicators such as these can be used to represent prosperity and societal 
well-being in Thailand. Table 6.8 below shows that some positive outcomes have resulted 
from innovation efforts in Thailand. By continuing to improve the NIS, even greater 
positive outcomes can be achieved. Continuing to monitor the outcomes of innovation in 
Thailand using these and other indicators will be important to understand the full impact 
of the NIS and related public policies. 
Royalty and license fees and the value of high-tech exports have risen over the 
past decade. This is likely due to Thailand’s increasing participation in higher value 
added global supply chains, such as automobiles and electronics. However, other 
indicators of innovation outcomes are falling over the past decade. New businesses 
created and the percent of high-tech exports both have declined. This trend may reveal 
the barriers to business development and lack of technological learning and development 
in firms noted by Intarakumnerd (2010) and Arnold et al. (2000) (see p. 92). While 
Thailand’s World Competitiveness Yearbook ranking is stable, there has been a slight 
decline in its Global Competitiveness Index ranking in the last few years. Several new 
countries entered the Global Competitiveness Report study during this time including 
Angola, Belize, Cape Verde, Haiti, Iran, Lebanon, Rwanda, and Yemen. However, since 
this decline coincides with the formalization of innovation policy in Thailand and the 
creation of the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI), it may 
be of some concern. As noted in Chapter 1 above, the drive for a globally competitive 
economy is an important reason for innovation policy. Thailand’s ranking in the Human 
development Index had been relatively stable until 2009 when a noticeable decline 
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occurred. While recent political instability in Thailand may account for this, some losses 
in innovation and competitiveness may as well.  
The outcomes from economic and technological innovation take time before their 
impact can be known. The indicators presented in Table 6.8 should be revisited in five or 
ten years’ time to take note of changes to these trends. Overall, attention to innovation 
outcomes demonstrates that Thailand’s NIS needs to be proactive to promote 
development, enhance global competitiveness, and serve as a means to keep the country 
from falling behind in the evolving global economy.  
 
Table 6.8 Selected Indicators of Innovation Outcomes 
Indicators 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 




n/a 31,013 30,119 27,654 n/a n/a 
New business density (new 




n/a 0.70 0.67 0.60 n/a n/a 




n/a 14.3  46.4 100.8 153.1 n/a 
High-technology exports 









15.69 20.61 27.05 31. 30 34.16 n/a 
World ranking by the 




76/177 74/177 73/177 77/177 92/169 103/173 








31/80 34/104 35/117 34/134 38/139 39/142 








n/a 26/51 29/53 27/55 26/59 27/59 
 










Synthesis of Evidence from the Thailand NIS Case 
Table 6.9 below presents the assessment framework seen in Chapter 4, with 
evidence from the Thailand case now included. The table reveals some key information 
about Thailand’s NIS. NIS theory identifies private firms as the primary innovators in a 
national economy. The intent of the NIS is to facilitate firms’ innovative efforts. 
Currently in Thailand there appears to be relatively few private firms performing 
innovation activities. Technology absorption among firms is low (WEF, 2012). Among 
most large multinational corporations (MNCs), many large local firms, and most small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), research and technological development is infrequent 
(Arnold et al., 2000). In a survey of private manufacturing and service firms in Thailand, 
only 5.8% were determined to be “innovating” in contrast with 42% in Korea 
(Intarakumnerd, 2007). 
Several government agencies, research institutes, and the Thailand Science Park 
actively work to facilitate innovation in the private sector through linkages between firms 
and innovation resources. Industrial clusters are one form of innovation system linkage 
that is working well in Thailand. The booming electronics and automobile industries in 
Thailand have clearly benefitted from the cluster approach, and government agencies 
have played a key role in cluster development. 
The Thailand Science Park hosts technology-based firms and the nation’s four 
public research institutes, provides ready access to major universities, and helps to 
incubate start-up companies. The National Innovation Agency (NIA) has become a lead 
agency in working to connect firms in strategic sectors. It provides funding, shares 
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financial risks, and offers technical advice and other partnering services. It works to 
further develop partnerships between universities, R&D institutes, and firms in the 
targeted sectors. Some innovative products, discussed above, have resulted from NIA-
enabled linkages.  
Table 6.9 NIS Assessment Framework: Thailand Case 
Question Evidence from Thailand NIS Case 
What is NIS? Few private firms are innovating; some public 
research institutes are innovating; some links 
between firms, institutes, and universities, but 
typically weak; industry clusters provide some 
linkages in some sectors; public organizations 
work to promote innovation and are linked to each 
other and possibly overlap; institutional 
environment for innovation is improving; output 
of higher education and IPRs are concerns 
Why is NIS adopted? Regional economic crisis/Thailand’s financial 
crisis of 1997; desire to compete in global 
economy; concerted learning and research efforts 
focused on other NIS/innovative countries to find 
suitable policy alternative 
How is NIS implemented? The 2008 Innovation Law, the Strategic Plan, and 
the STI Policy create a framework of goals and 
allocation of resources; NIA and STI are leading 
policy implementation agencies; key capital 
investment and technology from foreign sources 
How can NIS performance be 
evaluated? 
Conventional quantitative indicators used by 
OECD, WEF, and World Bank; firm-level 
innovation surveys; measures of success offered 
in Strategic Plan; evaluation of key government 
officials; socioeconomic outcomes of the 
system 
 
Incompatibilities and past disappointments between industry and universities 
cause these linkages to remain weak. Despite some autonomy among universities and 
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growing research outputs, universities’ research does not appear to be significant for 
firms. Many firms do not have a strong demand for STI human resources. There are only 
two organizations in the private sector that can facilitate innovation in firms, which do 
not appear to be very active. Based on firm surveys, there is an interest in innovation 
linkages. But these firms are either unaware of existing linkage opportunities, or 
unwilling to participate. Thailand’s industrial clusters provide benefits for the firms 
involved. However, the advantages of Thailand’s industrial clusters are related to 
efficiency rather than innovation gains. These clusters do not appear to link firms 
together for enabling “knowledge spillovers,” as NIS theory predicts. Links between 
firms and domestic investors to allow financial resources for innovation to flow also 
appear to be weak or absent.  
Social institutions and infrastructure in Thailand create an environment that can be 
conducive for firms’ innovation. Physical infrastructure in Thailand, including ICT and 
industrial estates, and the investment regime for foreign capital, are viewed favorably. 
However, the regime governing intellectual property rights, the investment regime for 
domestic capital, and the provision of innovation-oriented human resources from higher 
education are lagging (WEF, 2010). Thailand’s recent innovation law and the 
corresponding innovation policies and plans help to guide private sector, public sector, 
and academic innovation activities. The law and supportive policies set goals and 
expectations for innovation outcomes, target strategically important industries and 
sectors, and channel resources to innovation actors.  
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Figure 6.1 below presents a conceptual model of the structure of Thailand’s 
current NIS. It shows relationships between innovators and supporting actors in the 
system including firms, universities, research institutes, and government agencies. Some 
of these relationships involve strong linkages between actors in the system portrayed with 
a bold connecting line. However, in other cases the linkages between actors in the system  
Figure 6.1 Conceptual Model of Thailand’s NIS 
 
 
Note:  = Strong Linkage;     =   Weak Linkage;  No Line   =   Absent Linkage 
are weak shown with a dashed connecting line. Some actors in the system may not be 
linked to the others at all; these isolated actors in the system are portrayed with no 
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connecting line. Surrounding these actors and linkages is Thailand’s innovation 
environment composed of the nation’s innovation laws, plans, and policies; rules 
governing investment and intellectual property; the higher education system; and the 
nation’s ICT infrastructure. This institutional environment guides and also constrains the 
interactions of the actors in Thailand’s innovation system. 
Barriers to Innovation in Thailand 
Synthesizing the details of the Thailand NIS case within the assessment 
framework is very useful because it helps to identify the major barriers to innovation in 
the country. With this knowledge, problem areas that Thailand’s NIS must address 
become clear. There are four critical barriers to innovation in Thailand related to the 
overall direction and rationale of the country’s innovation policy, and the organization 
and functioning of key system components and processes. More specifically, these 
barriers concern resource allocation, the nature of industry in Thailand, the integration of 
R&D into the innovation system, and the organization of the public sector component. 
Strategic Allocation of Resources 
Thailand’s current innovation policy creates obstacles instead of advantages in 
moving the country toward innovation-based growth and competitiveness. Currently, a 
two-track innovation policy is pursued. One track is focused on science and technology. 
It is outward looking and recognizing the importance of global trends and participation. It 
has been building for decades with many important successes along the way. This track 
takes a long-term view. The other track is the “Creative Economy” approach which is 
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focused partially on cultural arts and local cuisine rather than high technology, the more 
common focus in terms of innovation. Some elements of the Creative Economy agenda 
look inward to “local wisdom” and heritage and turn back from the global technology 
frontier mentioned in Chapter 2 towards a more factor-driven stage. Other elements of the 
Creative Economy however emphasize contemporary, cutting edge fields such as film, 
software design, and fashion. The problem with a two-track policy is that it can 
misallocate resources. For a country like Thailand, with relatively limited resources, it 
must be strategic in the way that it allocates resources for innovation. Pursuing both of 
these tracks simultaneously and independently means there are relatively fewer resources 
available to either.  
Firms’ Incentives for Innovation 
Chapter 5 showed that private industry in Thailand is not oriented toward R&D 
and technological learning, and therefore not conducive to innovation. This fact is 
demonstrated by Table 5.4 above which plainly shows that most Thai firms do not 
possess higher-order technical capacity. Most firms in Thailand are SMEs, and most of 
these SMEs are small. Furthermore, though the rise of industry brought significant 
economic benefits to Thailand, many successful industrial firms in the country are 
foreign-owned ones with large global operations. Thai affiliates in this arrangement are 
“branches” of larger MNCs.  
SMEs do not conduct R&D for innovation purposes because, very simply, they 
cannot afford it. SMEs often function to meet more immediate needs of larger firms in a 
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wider supply or value chain. They do not have the capital and resources to devote to 
higher-order, skill-intensive, technology-intensive activities like R&D.  
The branch plant organization of industry that exists in Thailand means that as 
“host” country for a parent MNC, relatively simpler technical work will be performed in 
Thailand. Simpler technology will be present in the local affiliate firms and relatively 
less-advanced skills will be required in the work force. At the headquarters of these 
MNCs, which reside in the “home” countries, higher-order work is conducted, including 
executive-level functions, marketing, design, engineering, and R&D. The branch plant 
arrangement means innovation occurs in MNCs’ R&D institutions in Japan, Europe, and 
America, not in Thailand. Little local learning occurs, little indigenous innovation 
emerges.  
Size and structure explain the lack of R&D orientation in Thai firms. They further 
explain why Thailand performs well on some internationally-accepted innovation 
indicators, such as foreign investment and technology transfer, imports of capital goods, 
value chain presence, manufacturing trade, high-tech exports, and royalty and license fees 
payments, but not others, such as higher education and training, firms’ technology 
absorption, venture capital access, intellectual property protection, numbers of 
researchers in R&D, expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP, science and 
engineering publications, and royalty and license fee receipts. Performing well on the 
former set of indicators makes perfect sense for a newly-industrialized country with a 
favorable business climate that is a key base of production in global assembly and 
manufacturing chains. Performing worse on the latter set of indicators makes perfect 
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sense for a developing country with a less-than-robust educational system that has 
relatively recently transitioned into an efficiency-driven stage of growth.  
Several steps can facilitate a move to the next stage of development for Thailand’s 
firms: allocating more capital to R&D and innovation activities from government; 
improving university-industry links; and overcoming disincentives for innovation in firms 
by broadly defining tax incentives and subsidies for R&D, strengthening intellectual 
property rights, reducing barriers to labor mobility and business development, and 
attracting a portion of MNCs’ R&D facilities to Thailand. However, this is not very likely 
except in subareas where there is a large concentration of activity. These are the types of 
measures taken by global and regional innovation leaders as their private sectors 
advanced to higher stages of development. 
Isolated University Research 
Industrially oriented applied research can be conducted in university R&D 
facilities in close collaboration with firms. Firms can identify their needs to university 
labs and contract with them to undertake the innovative activities. In this way, the 
demand from industry pulls innovation from R&D institutions into the market place. As 
Chapter 5 showed, industry in Thailand is not supportive of university research and this 
“innovation pull” does not occur. This is because industry does not need university R&D. 
As mentioned above, the branch plant structure means R&D activities occur in the home 
country not the host country, and with predominantly small supporting firms, the need 
and resources for innovation is absent.  
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This scenario becomes a self-reinforcing, vicious circle. Industry does not need 
university innovation, so universities are not incentivized to provide it; universities have 
no need to produce innovation, so there is none available to industry. Innovation-capable 
human resources are not demanded by industry, so universities supply fewer of them. If 
those that exist cannot find jobs, “brain drain” occurs as they relocate to other countries 
where their qualifications are in demand. 
Complicated Public Sector Component 
Thailand’s NIS has several policy statements, plans, objectives, initiatives, and 
agencies. There are several plans with a five-year time frame that require coordination 
within the government to follow the plan. However, the coordination issues were not 
considered a significant threat. With most agencies working on their own innovation 
efforts independently, this resulted in significant policy and program overlap across 
agencies as well as bureaucratic in-fighting against what they saw as interference from 
one another. 
Like Finland, Korea, and Singapore, Thailand also created a single agency, the 
NIA, to lead innovation efforts. NIA has shown itself to be a dynamic agency in 
implementing various project-based linkages between innovators and resources. In this 
manner, NIA plays a similar role as TEKES and ASTAR do in the Finnish and 
Singaporean NIS. However, NSTDA and STI are also key agencies in Thailand’s NIS. In 
Thailand’s NIS, an excessive amount of initiatives by different agencies can lead to 
overlap, unclear bureaucratic boundaries, and conflict in the public sector component of 
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the NIS, and too much “red tape” for the private sector. Potentially-innovative firms may 
become overwhelmed by a complicated system.  
The NIS evaluation in Finland showed the NIS was seen as too complicated by 
firms. The transaction costs with the system were too high and firms decided not to 
participate. Thailand’s NIS policymakers must make sure the system is coordinated so 
firms do not ignore innovation linkages and opportunities. It is important for clearly 
defined organizational responsibilities and boundaries to be imposed on the system. So-
called “lean government” principles can be used to reduce public sector waste by 
eliminating unneeded approval cycles, reporting, and other processes and simplifying and 
streamlining needed processes. Its aim should be increasing efficiency and effectiveness 
of the NIS.   
Policy Recommendations to Improve Thailand’s NIS 
Understanding the barriers to innovation that currently exist in Thailand enables 
making specific policy recommendations that should be considered to improve the NIS. 
In response to these impediments, conflicts in resource allocation must be minimized for 
more efficient use; incentives for domestic innovation must be created by attracting 
foreign-based R&D institutions to relocate and encouraging large domestic firms R&D 
that have the capital resources required for innovation; strengthening the linkages 
between university and industry should be done to affect university R&D; and trust and 
credibility within stakeholder partnerships must be created for these links to form. An 
effectively organized government sector can accomplish these through well-designed 
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policy. Thailand’s government should address these problems using the recommendations 
provided here. 
Reconcile the S&T Track and the Creative Economy Track  
To gain the most innovation benefits, the current Creative Economy innovation 
track should be reconciled with Thailand’s science and technology efforts and policies for 
pursuing innovation.  By reconciling these two tracks, resources dedicated to innovation 
in Thailand will not conflict or overlap. To do so requires developing links between 
innovation policy and programs and creative industries. Niche markets exist for Thailand 
in terms of fashion, food, and culture, especially in the context of the growing tourist 
industry. In areas where advanced technology can assist the development of these 
industries, innovation policy and the innovation system should be present to provide that 
boost. It goes without saying that in the high-tech fields associated with the Creative 
Economy such as media and software design; innovation policy should be supportive and 
allow needed resources to flow. Within Thailand’s NIS, these two innovation tracks 
should be complimentary and not competitive. By complimenting one another and 
efficiently allocating resources, larger benefits of innovation can be available. 
Stimulate Private Sector Innovation 
To overcome the innovation barriers posed by the branch plant structure and the 
predominant firm size in Thailand, the government must attract foreign-based MNCs’ 
R&D institutions to Thailand. It must also encourage R&D in its large domestic firms 
that have the capital and resources required for innovation. It must do both of these to the 
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extent possible. Additionally, a privately-managed fund for technological upgrading in 
firms should be created. These three steps together can encourage domestic innovation. 
How should foreign R&D institutions be attracted to Thailand? The BOI has a 
Regional Operating Headquarters (ROH) tax credit program, as discussed in Chapter 5 
above. It needs to complement this scheme with an additional Regional R&D 
Headquarters (“RRDH”) tax credit program. The RRHD would offer a further reduction 
in the corporate tax rate for companies that locate not only their Regional Operating 
Headquarters, but also their R&D facilities, to Thailand.  The ROH tax rate provided by 
the BOI currently stands at 10%, well below the standard 30% corporate tax rate. For 
those firms that locate their ROHs and their RRDHs to Thailand, perhaps the rate could 
be revised downward to 5%, for example.  
The Thai government should couple this approach with further investment in 
university and public sector R&D labs and facilities. Thailand should focus on niche 
areas – what it does well or where opportunities exist and promote innovation within 
target industries. A key lesson learned from the case studies of Finland, Korea, and 
Singapore was that major government-led investment in R&D is critical to successful 
NIS development. Thailand must continue with, and enhance, its plans to upgrade science 
parks and industrial estates. Centers of Excellence at universities need to be ready for 
action. These investments will go further in drawing foreign MNCs’ R&D institutions to 
Thailand by creating the innovation infrastructure these MNCs need. MNCs used to be 
drawn to Thailand by its low-cost opportunities alone. Now, Thailand needs to draw 
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MNCs by its low-cost opportunities along with its state-of-the-art facilities and industrial 
clusters to provide them the best return on their investment. 
How should domestic firms’ R&D be stimulated? It is important to remember that 
not all industries in Thailand are foreign owned. Though most firms in Thailand are 
relatively small in size there are some, significant, large domestic firms in the country. 
These are the other private sector organizations necessary for Thai innovation which must 





 Petroleum Authority of Thailand Plc. (PTT), and Siam Cement. 
Why are these large firms targeted for R&D and innovation support rather than directly 
supporting R&D in SMEs? Thailand’s SMEs are so numerous and, overall, so small that 
supporting their innovation through direct government subsidy would end up spreading 
resources out so much as to be ineffective. These SMEs would have to start up internal 
R&D efforts from scratch and would need years to attain only marginal innovation 
results. Thailand would realize better return on its investment by offering a measure of 
support to complement the ongoing activities of larger firms that are operating in strategic 
fields. 
These large domestic firms are now expanding their markets and operations in the 
Southeast Asian region and in wider Asia. Their competitive success will depend on their 
ability to innovate. These firms compose a select group in Thailand that are in a position 
to compete internationally and to innovate near the global technology frontier. Tax breaks 
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 Boonrawd Brewery is the first and largest Brewery of Thailand. Its products include beer, soda water, 
drinking water, and various energy drinks and beverage. The company serves customers throughout 
Thailand as well as in nearly 50 countries worldwide, including Europe and North America. 
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 Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) is a Thailand-based global conglomerate with operations and investments 
in agribusiness and food, retail and distribution, and telecommunications industries. 
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and supportive investments directed at these types of firms, in a similar fashion as those 
for foreign R&D institutions described above, provide the best return on public 
investment.  
Large domestic firms indicate areas in which Thailand holds some comparative 
advantages, such as agriculture, automobiles, electronics and ICT, energy, and food and 
beverages. As shown in Table 5.1-5.3 (see p. 80-81) and Figure 5.2 (see p. 91), these 
sectors are the top producers and exporters, with the most value added, and the most 
investment in R&D. Thailand’s innovation policy must identify and target areas where 
the country holds a comparative advantage. It cannot afford not to play to its strengths.  
Moreover, these advantages should be viewed in the context of how they can meet 
(1) the country’s future needs, and (2) regional and global opportunities that are available 
for exploitation. CP, one of the country’s largest food and agricultural firms, provides an 
excellent example as it diversifies into aquaculture operations in Thailand. Aquaculture 
can be seen as a prime area for R&D and innovation as concerns over local, regional, and 
global food supplies are rising and world fish stocks are falling. These types of innovative 
efforts in areas of critical need should be viewed by government as strategic opportunity 
and supported appropriately. Other areas exist in which firms have strengths and local, 
regional, or global needs are emerging, such as energy, next generation vehicles, 
sustainable tourism, and management of water supply and water quality. These areas 
require the kind of innovation that comes from science and technological advancement. 
Government can play a matchmaking role to help make and support strategic connections 
in fields of future critical need.  
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Encouraging R&D in firms as described above can encourage domestic 
innovation even further because of the external effects of innovation. As larger firms 
undertake a new strategic phase of R&D, it can spill over and pull the relatively few mid-
size SMEs in Thailand into their own phase of innovative activity in support of the larger 
firms. Indeed, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, the director-general of ASEAN, has recently 
recommended that Thailand actively facilitate large firm-to-small firm innovation 
spillovers by using state funds to establish mentoring relationships for Thailand’s 
SMEs.
65
 These two approaches complement one another in helping to maximize the 
external benefits of innovation for Thai firms. However, a question may arise here as to 
whether large firms would be willing to bear the burden of SME innovation mentoring. 
Making large firm R&D assistance conditional on SME mentoring may be met with 
resistance. In this situation, it may be best to let the market allocate the gains of 
innovation spillovers. SMEs can still benefit indirectly from large firms R&D because of 
the public goods aspects of innovation. 
Some innovation occurs in small start-ups as well. These start-ups are sometimes 
spun off from university research or other industrial concerns. To support relatively small 
innovation activities that often need small amounts of funding or resources, at least a few 
steps can be taken. Business incubators can be created in strategic locations such as 
within or nearby universities or other research institutes or labs. Similarly, entry into 
larger innovation hubs such as the Thailand Science Park can be facilitated for start-ups 
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 The Nation on Sunday. (2012, April 8). Small Thai firms should eye opportunities around the region, 
Surin says. The Nation. 
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by reducing their rent or other through concessions. Finally, small seed fund grants can, 
of course, be made available to start-ups with few or no strings attached. 
As mentioned above, there are only two organizations in Thailand’s private sector 
for encouraging innovation among firms, the Technology Promotion Agency (TPA) and 
the Kenan Institute Asia (KI Asia). These organizations play a relatively minor role in the 
system. NIS policymakers could enhance the role of these private sector organizations, or 
help to create a new private sector organization, by implementing a levy-grant program 
for firms’ technological development, similar to the ones in Korea and Singapore. The 
system requires qualified firms to contribute some percentage of their wage bills to a 
general fund. Firms can then apply to receive a grant from the fund to sponsor 
technological skill training and other innovation-related development activities for 
employees. In Thailand, NIS policymakers should serve as monitors and consultants to 
the program, but the private sector firms themselves should be in charge of managing the 
fund. TPA or KI Asia can serve as fund manager, or an entirely new organization created 
by private sector firms themselves could perform this role. This program enhances private 
innovators by providing incentives for innovation-related activities and also giving some 
ownership of innovation management to firms themselves. By managing the fund, the 
relationship between private firms and the larger NIS can be deepened. By serving as 
consultant, NIS policymakers can better understand the innovation needs of firms. A pilot 




Incentivize Universities’ Participation in the System 
The reward system for universities, their staffs, and their students in Thailand 
should be reconfigured to help this institution become better integrated into the NIS. 
Enabling better linkages between industry and universities helps to achieve this. When 
industry and universities have a collaborative relationship, students learn about real-world 
issues in business and industry. Students can also have hands-on learning by participating 
in joint projects between universities and industry. These experiences create higher 
quality STI workforces that are ready to be hired. Seagate has created these types of 
linkages with universities, as discussed in Chapter 5.   
Promoting private sector innovation by taking the steps described above creates 
the demand for STI human and knowledge resources. Thailand’s academic sector must be 
prepared when this innovation pull takes effect. Several approaches can be taken. 
Scholarships and other educational subsidies should be targeted at the country’s best and 
brightest science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) students. 
Commercializable outputs of R&D should be incorporated into university professors’ 
promotion schemes, as appropriate. Collaboration between private firms, R&D 
institutions, and universities for encouraging innovation should be facilitated by all 
means necessary.  
Sakunsriprasert (2009) showed that trust and commitment among innovation 
actors in Thailand is important for successful collaboration. The structure of innovation 
grants can incentivize repeated interaction between industry and university for innovation 
projects. This can help to create trust and credibility. Funding agencies including TRF 
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and the NIA can do this by increasing the amount of funding to a pair of industry-
university collaborators that remains stable over time. Table 6.10 below illustrates this 
approach. 
Table 6.10 Incentivizing Repeated Interaction 
Innovation Partners Time Period Payoff 
A and B t x 
A and B t+1 0.5x 
A and B t+2 1.5x 
A and B t+3 2.5x 
A and B t+n (n-0.5)x 
 
The table shows that in the first year of a collaborative innovation project, 
innovator A and innovator B receive the payoff/award x to assist their work, for example, 
an innovation grant worth US$100,000 (x = 100,000). The table shows that by year five 
the same partners receive US$450,000 [(5 – 0.5)100,000]. With this policy, innovator A 
and innovator B are incentivized to maintain their relationship instead of just a one-time 
collaboration. This creates the opportunity for trust and credibility to form and a stronger 
innovation linkage develops. This is one option but another form could work in reverse. 
Start-up funds can be supplied to kick-start the process with lower funds for maintenance 
provided over time. 
Industry-university linkages can also be enabled by reducing the risks of 
collaboration through risk management. Project partners can leave the partnership or the 
results of the project may not turn out as planned. Managing risks such as these help 
partners in an innovation project to commit to each other. Funding agencies can require 
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some amount of an innovation grant to be placed in an escrow fund. This policy provides 
insurance for innovation project risks. The fund can compensate the other partners in case 
one of them leaves the partnership. It can also compensate investors in case an innovation 
project does not produce the required results. With this policy, funds in escrow serve as a 
form of “innovation insurance.” To mitigate the moral hazard aspects of innovation 
insurance, however, funding agencies must have a rigorous ex-ante review and ongoing 
monitoring process to ensure the feasibility of the projected outcome. 
Rationalize the Public Sector 
Rationalizing the government bureaucracy components of the NIS can also help 
enable linkages and improve the functioning of the NIS. There are several agencies 
involved with innovation in Thailand. Overlapping and redundant activities in the various 
agencies need to be streamlined. Bureaucratic boundaries and responsibilities have to be 
better defined. Government initiatives and points of contact for the private sector must be 
clear and well-managed, otherwise private actors will be less encouraged to engage with 
the NIS, as occurred in the Finland case. 
The NRCT is well positioned to help rationalize the system and provide linkage 
by providing critical information. It performs this role to a great extent now, but can do 
still more. As mentioned by NRCT’s Secretary General above, the NRCT is a central 
repository of R&D activities which received government funding since 1950. In this way, 
NRCT serves as a rich “database” or “clearinghouse” of research results which can be 
drawn upon for innovation and commercialization purposes. NRCT has formulated the 
2008-2012 Master Plan to support the development, management and public access to the 
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National Research Database System (NRDB). The NRDB aims to create a national pool 
of innovation knowledge by linking, exchanging, and sharing research data with other 
institutes and agencies, including the National Science and Technology Development 
Agency (NSTDA), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Ministry of Labour 
(MOL), Ministry of Social and Human Security Development (MSO), Kasetsart 
University (KU), and Chulalongkorn University (CU). NRCT is also involved in 
implementing internationally-accepted standards for R&D and other critical innovation 
activities and benchmarks. 
Most importantly, an independent agency with an independent budget and a long 
term view to direct resources to the national innovation effort is needed. This should not 
be a newly created agency however, as there are already a number of agencies involved 
in Thailand’s NIS.  Instead, the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy 
Office (STI) should be reconfigured with independent budget control so that it can make 





SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 From linear innovation processes to innovation systems, the National Innovation 
System (NIS) approach is a recent paradigm for organizing innovation in national 
economies. This systems approach represents a more holistic view of innovation 
processes and has the potential to improve innovation outputs and outcomes for firms, 
industrial sectors, and nations.  
 This study developed a framework for assessing the status and performance of a 
country’s NIS by investigating the theoretical concept of the National Innovation System 
(NIS) and the experience with NIS in innovation-leading countries including adoption, 
implementation, and evaluation. Together this approach provides an understanding of the 
fundamental components of the NIS, the relationship among them, and the system as a 
whole. These components were used to develop a framework for assessing the status and 
performance of the NIS in a given country. 
 The framework calls for an understanding of, first, what the NIS is, i.e. its 
theoretical conceptualization and its basic system components; second, why the NIS 
approach is adopted, i.e. the rationale for incorporating the approach in encouraging 
innovation; third, its implementation in terms of the organizational structures and 
functions in place; and fourth, potential methods by which the performance of the NIS 
can be evaluated. Understanding the questions, the theories behind them, and real-world 
experiences provides guidance for policymakers in acquiring relevant data to create their 
own indicators for NIS assessment.  
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 The NIS assessment framework was applied to a case study of a developing 
country, Thailand. Background information on Thailand’s economic and science and 
technology policy development was presented, and the details of Thailand’s NIS were 
then described. Examining the evidence from the Thailand case using the assessment 
framework identified aspects of the system where things have gone “right” and also areas 
of on-going challenges. Moreover, it provides a better understanding of both the 
functioning of the NIS and the barriers to innovation in the country. These barriers 
concern resource allocation, the nature of industry in Thailand, the integration of R&D 
into the innovation system, and the organization of the public sector component. 
 It is important that the barriers to innovation in Thailand be removed. Policy 
recommendations to improve the functioning of the NIS and overcome barriers include: 
(1) minimizing the conflicts in resource allocation for more efficient use; (2) creating 
incentives for domestic innovation by attracting foreign-based R&D institutions to 
relocate, encouraging large domestic firms R&D that have the capital resources required 
for innovation, and building internal capacity to encourage domestic firms to develop 
R&D components to allow them to compete more favorably in evolving global economy; 
(3) strengthening the linkages between university and industry affect university R&D; 
and (4) creating trust and credibility within stakeholder partnerships for these links to 
form. An effectively organized government sector can accomplish these objectives 
through well-designed policy. 
 Most importantly, a new strategic direction for innovation policy and a truly 
“country-specific” framework for assessing Thailand’s NIS in the future can be 
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developed. This framework allows Thai NIS policymakers to determine their own 
indicators that are “made to measure” their specific system. Besides assessing the 
components that make up the NIS by focusing on the questions mentioned above, the 
country-specific assessment framework emphasizes: (1) the rationale and goals for NIS, 
(2) the necessary instruments for NIS, (3) the functioning of NIS components, and (4) 
measures of NIS success. This country-specific assessment framework is presented in 
Table 7.1 below. This, in turn, allows policymakers to better identify opportunities and 
target available resources to areas with the greatest potential return.  
  The policy recommendations just mentioned become the assessment framework 
for the future. The emphasis should now be on assessing whether the recommended steps 
are being taken, and evaluating their effects on achieving global competitiveness and 
economic growth and development. This assessment is done by asking, first, whether the 
rationale for the policy is logical and its objectives are clear, second, whether the 
necessary instruments for innovation are contained in the NIS, third, whether the 
components are functioning properly, and fourth, whether indicators of success are 
suitable. 
 Each question itself suggests appropriate measures for judging success, however 
the needs for policy and the actions government should take regarding NIS will change 
over time. Therefore we need to have a way to monitor and evaluate NIS status and 
performance and make necessary adjustments as needed. This country-specific 
assessment framework serves this role, as a feedback mechanism for Thailand’s 
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innovation system. The four questions within it are the key questions to continue to ask 
and answer into the future.  
Table 7.1 Country-Specific Assessment Framework for Thailand’s NIS 
Question Criteria  
Is the rationale for Thailand’s 
NIS policy logical and are its 
objectives clear? 
Continuing to build S&T capacity and infrastructure; 
increasing and enhancing R&D and innovation in 
Thailand; combining STI with strategic comparative 
advantages to facilitate global competitiveness and 
sustainable growth. 
Are the necessary instruments 
to make innovation happen 
contained in Thailand’s NIS? 
Incentives and support to attract foreign R&D; 
incentives and support to stimulate domestic firm R&D 
and technological upgrading; reconfigured university 
reward system to facilitate R&D collaboration with 
industry; clearly defined public sector roles, 
responsibilities, and initiatives; independent budget 
control and long-term outlook for STI as lead NIS 
agency. 




Firms: Conducting R&D and innovation; universities: 
increasing R&D and innovation and providing STI HRs; 
firms and universities: collaborating for mutually 
beneficial R&D; government: facilitating to other NIS 
actors, providing strategic, long-term STI direction. 
Are suitable indicators used to 
measure the success of 
Thailand’s NIS? 
Public and private R&D expenditure; quantity and 
quality of STI HRs (including relocated foreign MNCs’ 
R&D personnel); quantity and quality of (joint industry-
university) patents; quantity and quality of (joint 
industry-university, joint international partner) STE 
publications and citations; opinion of domestic NIS 
experts; development of “Thai brand”; creation of new 
businesses; enhancement of global competitiveness; 
enhancement of human development. 
  
The NIS is a fundamental component of the nation’s overall economic 
development strategy. In the case of Thailand, innovation will affect the country’s 
competitive position both globally and regionally. Referring back to the flying geese 
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analogy, Thailand’s economic development depends on keeping up with innovation 
leaders in the region, like Singapore and Korea, who are flying ahead at a fast pace. 
Falling behind these leaders means Thailand’s economic development will suffer. By 
closing the gap with the leading geese, however, Thailand stands to move to higher tiers 
of industrial and technological capability and more sophisticated stages of economic 
growth. At this point in time, focusing on regional innovation leaders in an increasingly 
competitive Southeast Asia makes sense for Thailand. 
From this big-picture view, the NIS becomes an important means to an important 
end. This is the reason that outcomes of innovation, such as the creation of new 
businesses, the competitiveness of the economy in an international context, and the social 
development of the nation must also be measured when assessing NIS status. Enhancing 
these outcomes moves Thailand forward through subsequent stages of economic 
development. Enhancing these outcomes is the goal of the NIS and justifies its inclusion 
within a broader economic development strategy.  
 Thailand’s economy can become more innovative by incorporating this study’s 
policy recommendations for the NIS, keeping innovation outcomes and regional 
innovation leaders in sight, and addressing the questions of the country-specific 
framework above. Innovation is the key. As Thailand’s economy becomes more 
innovative it will also become more competitive in the evolving global economy. In this 
process, further development of the economy will naturally occur. This is the reason for 
developing the NIS in the first place and the nation’s global competitiveness and 
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development performance are the most important benchmarks against which it should be 
assessed. 
 Developing country policymakers can look to the experiences of innovation-
leading countries including innovation systems adopted, how they were implemented, 
and how they are evaluated. This approach provides a framework for developing a 
comprehensive NIS. Ultimately however, they must determine a way forward for NIS 
development that is most appropriate for the unique context in their own country’s 
economy. While “best practices” implemented elsewhere can offer useful guidance, “one 
size fits all” solutions are unlikely. Likewise, measures for evaluating NIS performance 
from international analyses can provide helpful insights, but the most applicable 
standards for evaluating a country’s NIS, whether quantitative or qualitative, will most 
likely be domestically determined based upon concurrent conditions, resource availability 
and competitive advantage. A failure to develop a well-formulated and comprehensive 
innovation strategy will make it increasingly difficult for developing countries to compete 
in a rapidly changing global economy. 
 

































Annual GDP growth (%), 2005-2009 3.40 
GDP per capita (in/nal current $ PPP), 2009 4.47 
GDP (current US$ bill), 2009 7.78 
Human development index, 2010 7.29 
Multidimensional poverty index, 2008 8.49 
Gender inequality index, 2008 4.63 
Seats in parliament held by women (as % of total), 2009 3.38 
Composite risk rating, 07/2010-06/2011 4.84 
Economic Regime 
 
Gr. capital formation as % of GDP, 2005-2009 7.54 
Trade as % of GDP, 2009 8.44 
Tariff & nontariff barriers, 2011 3.99 
Soundness of banks (1-7), 2010 7.94 
Exports of goods and services as % of GDP, 2009 8.87 
Interest rate spread, 2009 7.29 
Intensity of local competition (1-7), 2010 7.33 
Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP, 2009 8.38 
Cost to register a business as % of GNI per capita, 2011 5.89 
Days to start a business, 2011 3.05 
Cost to enforce a contract (% of debt), 2011 9.57 
Governance 
 
Regulatory quality, 2009 5.96 
Rule of law, 2009 5.41 
Government effectiveness, 2009 5.75 
Voice and accountability, 2009 3.70 
Political stability, 2009 1.58 
Control of corruption, 2009 5.00 
Press freedom (1-100), 2010 3.68 
Innovation System 
 
FDI outflows as % of GDP, 2004-2008 4.92 
FDI inflows as % of GDP, 2004-0208 5.14 
Royalty and license fees payments (US$ mil.), 2009 8.80 




Royalty and license fees receipts (US$ mil.), 2009 7.38 
Royalty and license fees receipts (US$/pop.), 2009 5.95 
Royalty payments and receipts(US$ mil.), 2009 8.48 
Royalty payments and receipts(US$/pop.) 2009 6.80 
Science and engineering enrollment ratio (%), 2009 n/a 
Science enrollment ratio (%), 2009 n/a 
Researchers in R&D, 2009 6.30 
Researchers in R&D/mil. People, 2009 3.42 
Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP, 2008 2.38 
Manuf. trade as % of GDP, 2009 9.28 
University-company research collaboration (1-7), 2010 7.10 
S&E journal articles, 2007 7.24 
S&E journal articles/mil. people, 2007 5.17 
Availability of venture capital (1-7), 2010 7.02 
Patents granted by USPTO, avg. 2005-2009 7.53 
Patents granted by USPTO/mil. people, avg. 2005-2009 5.89 
High-tech exports as % of manuf. exports, 2009 8.93 
Private sector spending on R&D (1-7), 2010 6.56 
Firm-level technology absorption (1-7), 2010 5.50 
Value chain presence (1-7), 2010 7.48 
Capital goods gross imports(% of GDP), avg. 2005-2009 9.48 
Capital goods gross exports (% of GDP), 2005-2009 9.48 
S&E articles with foreign coauthorship (%), 2008 3.68 
Avg. number of citations per S&E article, 2008 7.29 
Intellectual property protection (1-7), 2010 4.05 
Education 
 
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above), 2007 5.00 
Average years of schooling, 2010 3.15 
Average years of schooling, female, 2010 2.99 
Gross secondary enrollment rate, 2009 3.45 
Gross tertiary enrollment rate, 2009 6.10 
Life expectancy at birth, 2009 3.52 
Internet access in schools (1-7), 2010 6.95 
Public spending on education as % of GDP, 2009 4.59 
4th grade achievement in math (TIMSS), 2007 n/a 
4th grade achievement in science (TIMSS), 2007 n/a 
8th grade achievement in math (TIMSS), 2007 4.13 




Quality of science and math education (1-7), 2010 5.95 
Quality of management schools (1-7), 2010 6.11 
15-year-olds’ math literacy (PISA), 2009 2.46 
15-year-olds’ science literacy (PISA), 2009 2.62 
School enrollment, secondary, female (% gross), 2009 3.31 
School enrollment, tertiary, female (% gross), 2009 5.70 
No schooling, total, 2010 3.15 
No schooling, female, 2010 3.70 
Secondary school completion ,total (% of pop. 15+), 2010 2.36 
Secondary school completion ,female (% of pop. 15+), 2010 2.28 
Tertiary school completion ,total (% of pop. 15+), 2010 7.72 
Tertiary school completion ,female (% of pop. 15+), 2010 7.72 
Labor 
 
Unemployment rate, total (% of labor force), 2005-2009 9.91 
Unemployment rate, male (% of male labor force), 2005-2009 9.82 
Unemployment rate, female (% of female labor force), 2005-2009 10.00 
Employment in industry (%), 2008 3.37 
Employment in services (%), 2008 0.71 
Prof. and Tech. workers as % of labor force, 2008 n/a 
Extent of staff training (1-7), 2010 5.88 
Brain drain (1-7), 2010 7.18 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations (1-7), 2010 7.94 
Flexibility of wage determination (1-7), 2010 3.89 
Pay and productivity (1-7), 2010 8.32 
Reliance on professional management (1-7), 2010 5.95 
Local availability of specialized research and training services (1-7), 2010 5.27 
Difficulty of hiring index, 2010 5.39 
Rigidity of hours index, 2010 10.00 
Difficulty of redundancy index, 2010 10.00 
Redundancy costs (weeks of wages), 2010 3.81 
Labor tax and contributions (%), 2011 8.58 
Employment to population ratio, total, 15+ (%), 2005-2009 8.94 
Employment to population ratio, male, 15+ (%), 2005-2009 8.52 
Employment to population ratio, female, 15+ (%), 2005-2009 8.73 
Employment to population ratio, total, ages 15-24 (%), 2005-2009 7.25 
Employment to population ratio, male, ages 15-24 (%), 2005-2009 6.97 
Employment to population ratio, female, ages 15-24 (%), 2005-2009 6.69 




Employment to population ratio, male, 25+ (%), 2005-2009 7.68 
Employment to population ratio, female, 25+ (%), 2005-2009 8.87 
Share of unemployment with tertiary education , 2007 10.00 
Share of unemployment with secondary education, 2007 4.22 
Labor force participation rate, total, 15+, 2005-2009 8.45 
Labor force participation rate, male, 15+, 2005-2009 7.54 
Labor force participation rate, female, 15+, 2005-2009 8.38 
Labor force participation rate, total, 15-24, 2005-2009 5.49 
Labor force participation rate, male, 15-24, 2005-2009 5.14 
Labor force participation rate, female, 15-24, 2005-2009 5.42 
Labor force participation rate, total, 15-64, 2005-2009 8.24 
Labor force participation rate, male, 15-64, 2005-2009 8.03 
Labor force participation rate, female, 15-64, 2005-2009 7.96 
Labor force participation rate, total, 65+, 2005-2009 6.48 
Labor force participation rate, male, 65+, 2005-2009 5.77 
Labor force participation rate, female, 65+, 2005-2009 7.25 
Youth unemployment rate, total, 2005-2009 9.70 
Youth unemployment rate, male, 2005-2009 9.69 
Youth unemployment rate, female, 2005-2009 9.79 
Adult unemployment rate, total, 2005-2009 9.90 
Adult unemployment rate, male, 2005-2009 9.90 
Adult unemployment rate, female, 2005-2009 10.00 
Share of youth unemployment in total unemployment, total, 2005-2009 1.01 
Share of youth unemployment in total unemployment, male, 2005-2009 1.34 
Share of youth unemployment in total unemployment, female, 2005-2009 0.82 
Long-term unemployment, total, 25+, 2005-2009 n/a 
Long-term unemployment, male, 25+, 2005-2009 n/a 
Long-term unemployment, female, 25+, 2005-2009 n/a 
Labor force with tertiary education (% of total), 2007 n/a 
Labor force with secondary education (% of total), 2007 n/a 
Firms offering formal training (% of firms), 2009 n/a 
Females in Labor Force (% of total labor force), 2009 7.11 
ICT 
 
Total telephones per 1000 people, 2009 6.14 
Main telephone lines per 1000 people, 2009 3.70 
Mobile phones per 1000 people, 2009 8.00 
Computers per 1000 people, 2008 6.23 




Daily newspapers per 1,000 people, 2004 n/a 
International internet bandwidth (bits per person), 2009 4.79 
Internet users per 1000 people, 2009 4.28 
Fixed broadband internet access tariff (US$ per month), 2009 7.71 
Availability of e-government services (1-7), 2008 7.36 
Government online service index (1-7), 2010 4.96 
ICT expenditure as % of GDP, 2008 7.61 
 













Thailand NIS Government Officials Interviews: Questions and Schedule 
Interview Questions 
Since National Science, Technology and Innovation Act (2008), Thailand has 
engaged in a formal strategy to enhance the nation’s competitiveness by encouraging 
economic innovation in firms. The strategy takes a systemic, coordinated approach by 
creating and connecting both public and private institutions to promote innovation. 
Specific measures include creating dedicated government agencies, upgrading the legal 
and regulatory landscape (FDI rules, IPR regime), making grants and loans, and 
encouraging industrial clusters, R&D parks, and similar collaborative ventures.   
1. In your view, is the NIS approach being implemented effectively?  
2. How can NIS be improved?  
3. What is your agency’s role in this system?  
4. How would you evaluate the status and the overall performance of NIS? 
Thailand NIS Government Official Interviewees 
1. Mr. Alongkorn Ponlaboot    
Deputy Minister 
Ministry of Commerce (MOC)  
Interview date: April 27, 2011 
2. Prof. Dr. Soottiporn Chittmittrapap  
Secretary General 
National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT) 
Interview date: September 22, 2011 
3. Dr. Yada Mukdapitak 
Deputy Secretary General 
National Science Technology and Innovation Policy Office (STI) 




Abernathy, W., & Utterback, J. (1978). Patterns of industrial innovation. Technology 
Review, 80(7), 40-47. 
 
Akamatsu, K. (1961). A theory of unbalanced growth in the world economy. 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Review of World Economics, 86, 3-25. 
 
Akamatsu, K. (1962). A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries. 
Journal of Developing Economies, 1(1), 3-25. 
 
Andrews, T. G., Chompusri, N., & Baldwin, B. J. (2003). The changing face of 
multinationals in Southeast Asia. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Arnold, E., Bell, M., Bessant, J., & Brimble, P. (2000). Enhancing policy and 
institutional support for industrial technology development in Thailand: The 







Aronson, D. (1997). Applying the power of systems thinking to innovation. R&D 
Innovator, 6(2). Retrieved from 
http://www.winstonbrill.com/bril001/html/article_index/articles251_300.html 
 
Arrow, K. J. (1962). Economics of welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. 
In R. R. Nelson (Ed.), The rate and direction of inventive activity (pp. 609-626). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2010). Key indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2000: 
Thailand. Retrieved from 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2010/pdf/THA.pdf 
 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2012). Statistical database system (SDBS). Retrieved 
from https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp 
 
Atkinson, R. D. (1993). The next wave in economic development. Economic 





Aubert, J-E. (2004). Promoting innovation in developing countries: A conceptual 




Baker, C., & Phongpaichit, P. (2005). A history of Thailand. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Bartzokas, A. (2007). Country review: Korea. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/invest-
in-research/pdf/download_en/korea.pdf 
 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. 
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Berry, F. S. (2008, June). Expanding our models of innovation and diffusion for multi-
level governance research. Paper presented at the 4TAD (Transatlantic Dialogue) 
Conference on the Status of Inter-Governmental Relations and Multi-Level 
Governance in Europe and the US, Milan, Italy. Retrieved from 
http://www.4tad.org/ws/paper_wks1_Berry.pdf 
 
Berry, F. S., & Berry, W. D. (1990). State lottery adoptions as policy innovations: An 
event history analysis. The American Political Science Review, 84(2), 395-415. 
 
Bosworth, B. (2005) Economic growth in Thailand: The macroeconomic context. 
Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/bosworth/20060615.pdf 
 
Brimble, P. (2003). Foreign direct investment, technology and competitiveness in 
Thailand. In S. Lall & S. Urata (Eds.), Competitiveness, FDI and technological 
activity in East Asia (pp. 334-374). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Brimble, P., & Doner, R. F. (2007). University-industry linkages and economic 
development: The case of Thailand. World Development, 35(6), 1021-1036. 
 
Brimble, P., & Urata, S. (2006, June). Behavior of Japanese, Western, and Asian MNCs 
in Thailand: Lessons for Japanese MNCs. Paper presented at the Conference, 
Japan Center for Economic Research, Tokyo, Japan. Retrieved from 
http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/pdf/discussion105.pdf 
 
Burgelman. R. A., Christensen, C. M., & Wheelwright, S. C. (Eds.) (2004). Strategic 
management of technology and innovation (4
th









Chairatana, P. (2006). Conceptualizing innovation systems: Can developing countries 
learn from the developed world? (Doctoral dissertation). Aalborg University, 
Denmark. Retrieved from http://www.business.aau.dk/ike/upcoming/Pun-
arj/PAC_PhD_Content.pdf 
 
Chen, D. H. C., & Dahlman, C. J. (2005). The knowledge economy: The KAM 
methodology and World Bank operations. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=841625 
 
Christensen, C. M., & Bower, J. L. (2004). Customer power, strategic investment, and the 
failure of leading firms. In R. A. Burgelman, C. M. Christensen & S. C. 
Wheelwright (Eds.), Strategic management of technology and innovation (4
th
 ed.) 
(pp. 245-264). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Chung, S-Y. (2003, November). A Korean approach to S&T policy. Paper presented at 
the International Workshop on R&D Policy & Management, Korea International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA) & Korea Industrial Technology Association 
(KOITA), Seoul, Korea.  
 
Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A garbage can model of organizational 
choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), 1-25. 
 
Department of Intellectual Property (DIP). (2009). Thailand’s implementation on 




Dobbin, F., Simmons, B., & Garrett, G. (2007). The global diffusion of public policies: 
Social construction, coercion, competition, or learning? Annual Review of 
Sociology, 33, 449-472. 
 
Doner, R. F. (2009). The politics of uneven development: Thailand’s economic growth in 
comparative perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R. R., Silverberg, G., & Soete, L. (Eds.). (1988). 





Durongkaveroj, P. (2010). Science technology and innovation: Policy and management 
[PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from 
http://www.picmet.org/new/Conferences/2010/pichet.pdf 
 
Edquist, C. (1997). Systems of innovation approaches: Their emergence and 
characteristics. In C. Edquist (Ed.), Systems of innovation: Technologies, 
institutions and organizations (pp. 1-35). Washington, DC: Pinter. 
 
Edquist, C. (2001). Innovation policy: A systemic approach. In D. Archibugi & B-Å. 
Lundvall (Eds.), The globalizing learning economy: Major socio-economic trends 
and European innovation policy (pp. 219-238). New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Eisinger, P. K. (1988). The rise of the entrepreneurial state: State and local economic 
development policy in the United States. Madison, WI: The University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
 
European Union (EU). (1995). Green paper on innovation. Retrieved from 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com95_688_en.pdf 
 
Feinson, S. (2003). National innovation systems: Overview and country cases. Retrieved 
from http://www.cspo.org/products/rocky/Rock-Vol1-1.PDF 
 
Finegold, D., Wong, P-K., & Cheah, T. C. (2004). Adapting a foreign direct investment 
strategy to the knowledge economy: The case of Singapore’s emerging 
biotechnology cluster. European Planning Studies, 12(7), 921-941. 
 
Freeman, C. (1982). The economics of industrial innovation. London, United Kingdom: 
Pinter Publishers Ltd.  
 
Freeman, C. (1987). Technology policy and economic performance. London, United 
Kingdom: Pinter Publishers Ltd. 
 
Freeman, C. (2004). Technological infrastructure and international competitiveness. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(3), 541-569. 
 
Friedman, T. L. (1999). Understanding globalization: The Lexus and the olive tree. New 
York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 






Georghiou, L., Smith, K., Toivannen, O., & Ylä-Anttila, P. (2003). Evaluation of the 




Girling, J. L. S. (1981). The bureaucratic polity in modernizing societies. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Government Public Relations Department (PRD). (2011). The creative economy: A new 
model for Thailand. Retrieved from 
http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_news.php?id=5591&a=2 
 
Grinstein-Weiss, M., Edwards, K., Charles, P., & Wagner, K. (2009). Adoption of a 
policy innovation: The case of individual development accounts (IDAs). Journal 
of Policy Practice, 8(1), 34-53. 
 
Hoang, P. T. (2008). SMEs in Thailand and Indonesia: Development, policies, and 
experiences [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from 
http://www.vdf.org.vn/Doc/2008/87WSPTHoang21May08Slides.pdf 
 
International Business Machines (IBM). (2004). Measuring innovation for national 
prosperity: Innovation framework report. Retrieved from 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/governmentalprograms/innovframe2.pdf 
 
Institute for Systems and Innovation (ISI), German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
(GIGA), Georgia Tech, Program in Science, Technology and Innovation Policy 
(STIP). (2008). New challenges for Germany in the innovation competition: Final 
report. Retrieved from http://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/isi-
en/p/projekte/archiv/rf_tlf_asien.php 
 
Intarakumnerd, P. (2007). Measuring innovation in catching up economies: A Thai 
experience. Retrieved from 
http://www.cas.uio.no/research/0708innovation/CASworkshop_Patarapong.pdf 
 
Intarakumnerd, P. (2010). Country profile of Thailand for OECD review of innovation in 
South-East Asia. Bangkok, Thailand: Thammasat University, Thailand. 
 
Intarakumnerd, P., & Brimble, P. (2007). Thailand at the crossroads: The dynamics of 
Thailand’s national innovation system. In T. Turpin & V. V. Krishna (Eds.), 
Science, technology policy and the diffusion of knowledge: Understanding the 
dynamics of innovation systems in the Asia Pacific (pp. 234-273). Northampton, 




Intarakumnerd, P., Chairatana, P., & Tangchitpiboon, T. (2002). National innovation 
system in less successful developing countries: The case of Thailand. Research 
Policy, 31(8), 1445-1457. 
 
International Institute for Management Development (IMD). (2012). World 
competitiveness scoreboard. Retrieved from http://imd.org 
 
Juma, C., Fang, K., Honca, D., Huete-Perez, J., Konde, V., & Lee, S. (2001). Global 
governance of technology: Meeting the needs of developing countries. 
International Journal of Technology Management, 22(7/8), 629-655. 
 
Kasahara, S. (2004). The flying geese paradigm: A critical study of its application to East 
Asian regional development. Retrieved from 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20043_en.pdf 
 
Kayal, A. A. (2008). National innovation systems: A proposed framework for developing 
countries. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Management, 8(1), 74-86. 
 








Kim, L. (1993). National system of industrial innovation: Dynamics of capability 
building in Korea. In R. R. Nelson (Ed.), National innovation systems: A 
comparative analysis (pp. 357-383). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kingdon, J. W. (1995). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies (2
nd
 ed.). New York, 
NY: Harper Collins College Publishers. 
 
Koanantakool, T. (2006). ICT development in Thailand: Infrastructure, research and 
industry [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from 
http://www.eusea2006.org/Website/programme/fi le. 2006–07-14.9623885989 
 






Koh, W. T. H. (2006). Singapore’s transition to innovation-based economic growth: 
Infrastructure, institutions, and government’s role. R&D Management, 36(2), 143-
160. 
 
Koh, W. T. H., & Wong, P-K. (2005). Competing at the frontier: The changing role of 
technology policy in Singapore’s economic strategy. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 72(3), 255-285. 
 
Kojima, K. (1978). Giant multinational corporations: Merits and defects. Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Economics, 18(2), 1-17. 
 
Kojima, K. (2000). The flying geese model of Asian economic development: Origin, 
theoretical extensions, and regional policy implication. Journal of Asian 
Economics, 11(4), 375-401. 
 





Kuhlman, S., & Arnold, E. (2001). RCN in the Norwegian research and innovation 
system. Retrieved from http://isi.fraunhofer.de/isi/publ/download/isi01b52/rcn-
norway.pdf?pathAlias=/publ/downloads/isi01b52/rcn-norway.pdf 
 
Kwan, C. H. (1996). A new wave of foreign direct investment in Asia. In D. K. Das 
(Ed.), Emerging growth pole: The Asia-Pacific economy (pp. 157-179). New 
York, NY: Prentice Hall. 
 
Lee, K-R. (2003, November). Understanding the national innovation system of Korea. 
Paper presented at the International Workshop on R&D Policy & Management, 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) & Korea Industrial 
Technology Association (KOITA), Seoul, Korea.  
 
Library of Congress. (1987). Country studies: Thailand. Retrieved from 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+th0009) 
 
Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The science of muddling through. Public Administration Review, 
19(2), 79-88. 
 
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public 





Lorlowhakarn, S., & Ellis, W. (2005). Thailand’s National Innovation Agency. CACCI 




Lugar, M. I. (1987). The states and industrial development: Program mix and policy 
effectiveness. In J. M. Quigley (Ed.), Perspectives on local public finance and 
public policy (pp. 29-64). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
 
Lundvall, B-Å. (1988). Innovation as an interactive process: From user-producer 
interaction to the national system of innovation. In G. Dosi, C. Freeman & R. R. 
Nelson (Eds.), Technical change and economic theory (pp. 349-369). London, 
United Kingdom: Pinter Publishers Inc. 
 
Lundvall, B-Å. (Ed.). (1992). National systems of innovation: Towards a theory of 
innovation and interactive learning. London, United Kingdom: Pinter Publishers 
Inc. 
 
Ministry of Commerce (MOC). (2012). Summary of export, import, and trade balance. 
Retrieved from http://www2.ops3.moc.go.th/ 
 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEE). (2009). Evaluation of the Finnish 
national innovation system: Policy report. Retrieved from 
http://www.tem.fi/files/24928/InnoEvalFi_POLICY_Report_28_Oct_2009.pdf 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). (2010). Thailand’s economic fact sheet. Retrieved 
from http://www.mfa.go.th/internet/BDU/100922094236_1Sep.pdf 
 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT). (2009). The second 
Thailand information and communication technology (ICT): Master plan (2009-
2013). Retrieved from http://www.mict.go.th/download/Master_Plan.pdf 
 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). (2006). Sustaining innovation-driven growth: 




Mohr, L. B. (1969). Determinants of innovation in organizations. The American Political 
Science Review, 63(1), 111-126. 
 






Montreevat, S. (2006). Strengthen rules on foreign investment. Retrieved from 
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/sm21feb06.pdf 
 
National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC). (2003). Information 
technology policy framework 2001-2010: Thailand vision towards a knowledge-
based economy. Retrieved from 
http://www.nectec.or.th/pld/documents_pris/IT2010eng.pdf 
 
National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT). (2009). Annual report 2009. Bangkok, 
Thailand: The Office of National Research Council of Thailand. 
 
National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT). (2010). 2010 national survey on R&D 
expenditure and personnel of Thailand. Bangkok, Thailand: The Office of 
National Research Council of Thailand. 
 
National Statistics Office (NSO). (2007). Data summary report of the 2007 industrial 
census: Whole kingdom. Retrieved from 
http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/stat/indus/data/ds_indus07_whole.pdf 
 
National Statistics Office (NSO). (2012). Statistical data: Economics. Retrieved from 
http://service.nso.go.th/nso/nsopublish/themes/economic.html 
 
Nelson, R. R. (1987). Understanding technical change as an evolutionary process. 
Amsterdam, Netherland: Elsevier Science Pubic Company. 
 
Nelson, R. R. (Ed.). (1993). National innovation systems: A comparative analysis. 
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. 
 
Niosi, J. E. (2002). National systems of innovations are “X-efficient” (and X-effective): 
Why some are slow learners. Research Policy, 31(1), 291-302. 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (1997a). National 
innovation systems. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/56/2101733.pdf 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (1997b). The 
measurement of scientific and technological activities, proposed guidelines for 
collecting and interpreting technological innovation data: Oslo manual (2
nd
 ed.). 
Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/61/2367580.pdf 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (1999). Managing 





Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2002). Frascati 
manual: Proposed standard practice for surveys on research and experimental 
development. Retrieved from 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/OECDFrascatiManual02_en.pdf 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2005). Guidelines 
for collecting and interpreting innovation data: Oslo manual (3
rd
 ed). Retrieved 
from http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/free/9205111e.pdf 
 
Patton, M. Q. (1997). Utilization-focused on evaluation: The new century text (3
rd
 ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publication, Inc. 
 
Porter, M. E. (2003). Thailand’s competitiveness: Creating the foundations for higher 




Porter, M. E., Sachs. J. D., & MacArthur, J. W. (2001). Executive summary: 
Competitiveness and stages of economic development. In Global competitiveness 




Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. (1973). Implementation: How great expectations in 
Washington and dashed in Oakland (2
nd
 ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
 
Rochananonda, C. (2006, February). Tax incentives and FDI in Thailand. Paper 
presented at the International Symposium on FDI and Corporate Taxation: 
Experience of Asian Countries and Issues in the Global Economy, Tokyo, Japan. 
Retrieved from http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~ap3/apppfdi6/paper/THAILAND.pdf 
 
Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of innovations (4
th
 ed.). New York, NY: The Free Press. 
 
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 
98(5), 71-102.  
 
Roos, G., Fernstrom, L., & Gupta, O. (2005). National innovation systems: Finland, 








Roth, G., & Wittich, C. (Eds.). (1978). Max Weber: Economy and society. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
 
Sakunsriprasert, A. (2009). University-industry interaction and project’s performance on 
innovation: Perspective of university’s researcher. (Doctoral dissertation). 
National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), Thailand. Retrieved 
from http://libdcms.nida.ac.th/thesis6/2009/b164203.pdf 
 
Schiller, D. (2006). The potential to upgrade the Thai innovation system by university-
industry linkages. Asian Journal of Technology Innovation, 14(2), 67-91. 
 
Schiller, D., & Leifner, I. (2007). Higher education funding reform and university-
industry links in developing countries: The case of Thailand. Higher Education, 
54(4), 543-556. 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, 
capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1939). Business cycles: A theoretical, historical and statistical 
analysis of the capitalist process. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Shadish, W. R., Cook ,T. D., & Leviton, L. C. (1991). Foundations of program 
evaluation. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publication, Inc. 
 
Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2008). The mechanisms of policy diffusion. American 
Journal of Political Science, 52(4), 840-857. 
 
Shulin, G. (1999). Implications of national innovation systems for developing countries: 
Managing change and complexity of economic development. Retrieved from 
http://www.intech.unu.edu/publications/discussion-papers/9903.pdf 
 
Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behaviour (4
th
 ed.). New York, NY: The Free Press. 
 
Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65-94. 
 
Smith, K. (1997). Economic infrastructures and innovation systems. In C. Edquist (Ed.), 
Systems of innovation: Technologies, institutions, and organizations (pp. 86-106). 
London, United Kingdom: Pinter Publishers Inc. 
 
Smith-Doerr, L., Manev, I. M., & Rizova, P. (2004). The meaning of success: Network 
position and the social construction of project outcomes in an R&D lab. Journal 
of Engineering and Technology Management, 21(2), 51-81.  
191 
 
Speirs, J., Pearson, P., & Foxon, T. (2007). Adapting innovation systems indicators to 
assess eco-innovation. Retrieved from http://www.dime-
eu.org/files/active/0/Foxon_Speirs_Pearson_final.pdf 
 
Stahl-Rolf, S., & Hamann, O. (n.d.). International experiences with ex-ante and ex-post 
evaluations of innovation networks. Retrieved from http://www.competence-
research-centres.eu/uploads/media/Evaluation_international.doc 
 
Stufflebeam, D. L. (1971). Educational evaluation and decision making. Bloomington, 
IN: Peacook Publishers, Inc. 
 
Suh, J. (2000). Korea’s innovation system: Challenges and new policy agenda. Retrieved 
from http://www.intech.unu.edu/publications/discussion-papers/2000-4.pdf 
 




Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). (1992). The development of 
Thailand’s technology capability in industry. TDRI Quarterly Review, 7(4), 36-39. 
 
Thomas, P. G. (2006). Performance measurement, reporting, obstacles and 
accountability: Recent trends and future directions. Retrieved from 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/performance/pdf/prelims.pdf 
 
Tidd, J., Bessant, J., & Pavit, K. (2002). Managing innovation, integrating technological, 
market and organizational change (2
nd
 ed.). New York, NY: Wiley. 
 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2012). Human development report: 
Global report. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011 
 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). 
(2009). Measuring ICT for development and building of the information society in 




United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (2011). Thailand country 
profile. Retrieved from http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts/country-
profiles/thailand 
 





Vanichseni, S., & Suvalai, P. (2009). The profile of Thailand research performance: 
Final report. Bangkok, Thailand: The Office of National Research Council of 
Thailand.  
 
Verspagen, B. (1991). A new empirical approach to catching up or falling behind. 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2(2), 359-379. 
 
Vuegelers, R., Aiginger, K., Breznitz, D., Edquist, C., Murray, G., Ottaviano, G., . . .Ylä-
Anttila, P. (Eds.). (2009). Evaluation of the Finnish national innovation system: 
Full report. Retrieved from 
http://www.tem.fi/files/24929/InnoEvalFi_FULL_Report_28_Oct_2009.pdf 
 
Walker, J. L. (1969). The diffusion of innovations among the American states. American 
Political Science Review, 63(3), 880-899. 
 
Wejnert, B. (2002). Integrating models of diffusion of innovations: A conceptual 
framework. Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 297-326. 
 
Wholey, J. S. (1979). Evaluation: Promise and performance. Washington, DC: Urban 
Institute. 
 
Wholey, J. S., Scanlon, J. W., Duffy, H. G., Fukumoto, J. S., & Vogt, L. M. (1970). 
Federal evaluation policy: Analyzing the effects of public programs. Washington, 
DC: Urban Institute. 
 
Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. 
New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc. 
 
Wolf, M. (2004). Globalisation and interdependence. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/esa/documents/un.oct.2004.globalisation.and.interdepence.pdf 
 
Wolf, M. (2005). Will globalization survive? Retrieved from 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/wolf0405.pdf 
 
Wong, P-K. (1999, June). National innovation systems for rapid technological catch-up: 
An analytical framework and a comparative analysis of Korea, Taiwan, and 
Singapore. Paper presented at the DRUID’s Summer Conference on National 
Innovation Systems, Industrial Dynamics and Innovation Policy, Rebild, 







Wong, P-K. (2003). From using to creating technology: The evolution of Singapore’s 
national innovation system and the changing role of public policy. In S. Lall & S. 
Urata (Eds.), Competitiveness, FDI, and technological activity in East Asia 
(pp.191-238). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Wong, P-K., & Singh, A. (2005). From technology adopter to innovator: The dynamic’s 





Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W. (1994). Bureaucratic dynamics: The role of 
bureaucracy in a democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
World Bank. (2000). Republic of Korea transition to a knowledge-based economy 
(Report No. 20346-KO). Retrieved from 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/137743/KoreaKE.pdf  
 
World Bank. (2007). International program for development evaluation training 
(IPDET). Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/ipdet/modules.html 
 
World Bank. (2009). World development indicators (WDI) 2009. Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
 




















Yim, D. S. (n.d.). Korea’s national innovation system and the science and technology 
policy. Retrieved from http://www.kiep.go.kr/include/filedown.jsp?fname=%C7ѱ
%B9%B9%DFǥ%C0ڷ%E13.pdf&fpath=news06&NO=118175&FNO=178 
 
Yeung, H. W-C. (2006). Innovating for global competition: Singapore’s pathway to high-
tech development. In B-Å. Lundvall, P. Intarakumnerd & J. Vang (Eds.), Asia’s 
innovation systems in transition (pp. 257-292). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
 
Yeung, H. W-C. (2008). Industrial clusters and production networks in Southeast Asia: A 




Yuh, H. (2006). Korea’s national innovation system. Retrieved from 
http://crds.jst.go.jp/GIES/archive/GIES2006/paper/pdf/41_hee-yol-yu.pdf 
